Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to

When, if ever, is one justified in accepting the premises of an argument? What is the proper criterion of premise acceptability? Providing a comprehensive theory of premise acceptability, this book answers these questions from an epistemological approach that the author calls "common sense foundationalism". His work will be of interest to specialists in informal logic, critical thinking and argumentation theory as well as to a broader range of philosophers and those teaching rhetoric.

Preface

ix

Acknowledgments

xiii

PART 1. ACCEPTABILITY: DIALECTICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL COSIDERATIONS

Why Do We Need a Theory of Acceptability?

3

(18)

Acceptance -- A Basic Definition

3

(1)

Acceptability, Certainty, and Epistemic Duty

4

(6)

``Popular'' Criteria for Acceptability

10

(9)

Conditions for Acceptability

19

(2)

Acceptability and Presumption

21

(17)

Uses of ``Presumption''

21

(6)

Presumption and Dialectics

27

(3)

Challenger Presumption and Acceptability

30

(3)

Comparison with Other Views

33

(5)

Factors Determining Presumption: Basic Considerations

38

(35)

Principles of Presumption -- A Basic Survey

40

(1)

Presumption and Belief-Generating Mechanisms

41

(1)

Belief-Generating Mechanisms and Warrant

42

(2)

Warrant and the Factors Determining Presumption

44

(23)

Warrant, Presumption of Warrant, and Presumption

67

(6)

Epistemological Considerations: Acceptability, Deontology, Internalism, Justification

73

(20)

Classical Foundationalist Accounts of Epistemic Obligation

74

(2)

BonJour's Defense of the Meta-Awareness Requirement

76

(3)

Nondeontological Conceptions of Epistemic Justification

79

(1)

Alston's Account of Epistemic Justification

80

(5)

Epistemic Justification and Acceptance

85

(8)

PART 2. STATEMENTS, BELIEF-GENERATING MECHANISMS, AND PRESUMPTIVE RELIABILITY

What Types of Statements Are There?

93

(21)

Rhetorical Systems of Statement Classification

95

(2)

A Fourfold Typology of Statements

97

(12)

Basic Beliefs, Inferred Beliefs, Received Beliefs

109

(1)

Basic Belief-Generating Mechanisms: A Heuristic Suggestion

110

(4)

Necessary Statements and A Priori Intuition

114

(10)

What Types of Necessary Statements Are There?

114

(5)

Necessarily True Statements and Reason

119

(2)

Is There a Presumption of Reliability for A Priori Intuition?

121

(3)

Descriptions and Their Belief-Generating Mechanisms

124

(19)

What Types of Descriptions Are There?

124

(3)

Perception and Its Presumption

127

(11)

The Presumptive Reliability of Introspection

138

(2)

Memory and Its Presumption

140

(3)

Interpretations and Their Modes of Intuition

143

(75)

Three Types of Explanations

143

(3)

Explanations and Subjunctives

146

(4)

An Analysis of the Subjunctive Conditional

150

(4)

What Types of Interpretations Are There?

154

(17)

Types of Subjunctives, Types of Explanations, and Intuition

171

(3)

Physical Subjunctives and Physical Intuition

174

(13)

Personal Subjunctives and Personal Intuition

187

(6)

Institutional Subjunctives and Institutional Intuition

193

(6)

Interpretations in General and Intuition

199

(7)

Objections and Replies

206

(12)

Evaluations and the Moral Faculties

218

(63)

The Standard Account of Types of Evaluations

218

(2)

Supervenience, Moral Intuition, and Moral Sense

220

(6)

Judgments of Intrinsic Value

226

(16)

Judgments of Deontic Value

242

(9)

Judgments of Aretaic Value

251

(20)

Objections and Replies

271

(10)

Taking One's Word: The Interpersonal Belief-Generating Mechanism

281

(38)

Importance of Taking One's Word

281

(3)

Testimony Defined

284

(7)

Presumption for Relying on Testimony: Preliminary Considerations

291

(5)

Sources of Testimony

296

(1)

Personal Testimony and Its Presumption

297

(2)

When Is There a Presumption for Testimony Received Through a Chain?

299

(4)

Expert Testimony and Its Presumption

303

(6)

The Issue of Common Knowledge

309

(3)

Presumption for the Word of the News Media?

312

(1)

Presumption for Institutional Testimony

313

(6)

PART 3. PRACTICE AND PERSPECTIVE

An Outline of the Practice of Epistemic Casuistry

319

(48)

When Is There a Presumption for a Basic Premise Which Is Logically Determinate?

323

(2)

Under What Conditions Is There a Presumption for a Basic Premise Which Is a Description?

325

(22)

Under What Conditions Is There a Presumption for a Basic Premise Which Is an Interpretation?

347

(10)

Where Is There a Presumption for a Basic Premise Which Is an Evaluation?

357

(10)

Theoretical Considerations: A Commonsense Foundationalism

367

(12)

Why Foundationalism?

367

(2)

Why Common Sense?

369

(3)

Objections and Replies

372

(3)

Prospects

375

(4)

Notes

379

(10)

References

389

(6)

Index

395

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Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem

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