Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in problems related to human agency and responsibility by philosophers and researchers in cognate disciplines. The present volume brings together original contributions by leading specialists working in this vital field of philosophical inquiry. The contents represent the state of the art of philosophical research on intentional agency, free will, and moral responsibility. The volume begins with chapters on the metaphysics of agency and moves to chapters examining various problems of luck. The final two sections have a normative focus, with the first of the two containing chapters examining issues related to responsible agency and blame and the chapters in the final section examine responsibility and relationships. This book will be of interest to researchers and students interested in both metaphysical and normative issues related to human agency.

Andrei A. Buckareff is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Marist College, US. His work has appeared in various journals. He is the co-editor of Alternative Concepts of God with Yujin Nagasawa and Causing Human Actions with Jesús Aguilar.

Carlos J. Moya is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Valencia, Spain. He has published The Philosophy of Action and Moral Responsibility: the ways of skepticism , as well as a number of papers in several philosophical journals and contributions to edited volumes.

Sergi Rosell is a postdoctoral researcher associated to the University of Valencia (Phrónesis Group), and has been postdoctoral research fellow at the universities of Sheffield and Oxford. His work has appeared in various journals.

Introduction
PART I: METAPHYSICS OF AGENCY
1. The Argument from Slips; Santiago Amaya,
2. A Gradualist Metaphysics of Agency; Andrei A. Buckareff and Jesús H. Aguilar
3. Crossing a Mesh Theory with a Reasons-Responsive Theory: Unholy Spawn of an Impending Apocalypse or Love-Child of a New Dawn?; Michael McKenna and Chad Van Schoelandt
4. Classical Compatibilism and Temporal Ontology; Pablo Rychter
PART II: RESPONSIBILITY AND LUCK
5. Reasons and Freedom; Carlos Moya
6. On the Luck Objection to Libertarianism; David Widerker and Ira Schnall
7. Moral Luck and True Desert; Sergi Rosell
8. A New Form of Moral Luck?; Carolina Sartorio
PART III: RESPONSIBILITY AND BLAME
9. Helping It; Helen Steward
10. Ought without Ability; Carlos Patarroyo
11. Failures of Vigilance and Forward-Looking Responsibility for Omissions; Derk Pereboom
12. Moral Responsibility Skepticism: Meeting McKenna's Challenge; Neil Levy
13. In Defense of a Challenge to Moral Responsibility Skepticism: A Reply to Levy; Michael McKenna
PART IV: RESPONSIBILITY AND RELATIONSHIPS
14. Motivated by the Gods: Compartmentalized Agency and Responsibility; Constantine Sandis
15. Friendship, Freedom, and Special Obligations; Dana Nelkin
16. Skepticism About Autonomy and Responsibility as Educational Aims – What Next?; Stefaan Cuypers and Ish Haji