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XIII | (2) |
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XV | (1) |
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XVI | |
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1 | (4) |
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2 CHAPTER 2: A THEORETICAL APPROACH |
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5 | (67) |
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5 | (5) |
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2.2 The Mundell-Fleming Model |
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10 | (16) |
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2.2.1 Flexible Exchange Rate |
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12 | (1) |
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12 | (1) |
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12 | (1) |
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13 | (1) |
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Interest Parity Condition |
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14 | (1) |
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14 | (1) |
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15 | (1) |
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16 | (1) |
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2.2.2 Fixed Exchange Rate |
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17 | (1) |
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17 | (1) |
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17 | (2) |
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19 | (1) |
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20 | (1) |
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Distribution of Money Supply Across Countries |
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20 | (1) |
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Effect of the Monetary Policy on Output and Interest Rates |
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21 | (1) |
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22 | (4) |
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2.3 Dynamic Effects: The Dombusch Model |
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26 | (20) |
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2.3.1 Flexible Exchange Rates |
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26 | (1) |
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26 | (1) |
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26 | (2) |
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28 | (1) |
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Uncovered Interest Parity Condition |
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29 | (1) |
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Monetary and Fiscal Shocks |
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29 | (1) |
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The Long Run Comparative Statics |
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29 | (1) |
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30 | (1) |
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31 | (1) |
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31 | (1) |
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32 | (1) |
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32 | (1) |
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2.3.2 Fixed Exchange Rates |
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33 | (1) |
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33 | (1) |
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33 | (1) |
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33 | (2) |
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35 | (1) |
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Uncovered Interest Parity |
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35 | (1) |
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36 | (1) |
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36 | (1) |
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36 | (1) |
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36 | (1) |
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Distribution of Money Supply across the Countries |
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37 | (1) |
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38 | (1) |
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39 | (1) |
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39 | (1) |
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40 | (6) |
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2.4 The N-1 Problem in a Fixed Exchange Rate System |
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46 | (6) |
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2.4.1 The asymmetric or Hegemonic Solution |
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47 | (1) |
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2.4.2 Symmetric or Cooperative Solution |
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48 | (1) |
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48 | (1) |
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49 | (3) |
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2.5 Time Inconsistency and Credibility Problem |
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52 | (15) |
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52 | (1) |
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2.5.2 Social Losses under Discretionary Policy as Commitment |
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53 | (1) |
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54 | (5) |
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2.5.4 Rules versus Discretion and the Presence of Stochastic Shocks |
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59 | (3) |
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2.5.5 Multiple Period Horizon |
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62 | (1) |
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2.5.6 Dealing with the Time Inconsistency Problem |
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63 | (2) |
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65 | (2) |
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2.6 Summary and Conclusions |
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67 | (3) |
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70 | (2) |
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3. CHAPTER 3: LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE: THE EMS AS AN INSTRUMENT TO ACHIEVE PRICE AND EXCHANGE RATE STABILITY |
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72 | (68) |
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72 | (1) |
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3.2 Review of the European Exchange Rate Agreements |
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73 | (14) |
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73 | (3) |
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The EMS: the Quest for Stability |
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76 | (1) |
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The Institutional Arrangements |
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77 | (2) |
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The Turbulent EMS: 1979-1987 |
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79 | (1) |
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The EMS without Realignments 1987-1992 |
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80 | (4) |
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84 | (1) |
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Some Explanations of the Crisis of 1992 |
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85 | (2) |
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3.3 Effect of the EMS on Price Stability |
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87 | (15) |
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Credibility and Inertia Inflation |
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87 | (1) |
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Review of the Empirical Literature |
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87 | (2) |
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89 | (7) |
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The Unemployment-Inflation Trade--Off |
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96 | (6) |
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3.4 The Effect of the EMS on the Dynamic Exchange Rate |
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102 | (36) |
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Responses to Nominal and Real Shocks: An Econometric Analysis |
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102 | (1) |
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103 | (1) |
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Variability of Nominal and Real Exchange Rates |
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104 | (4) |
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3.4.1 Model Specification Analysis |
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108 | (1) |
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Univariate and Bivariate Analysis |
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108 | (1) |
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108 | (2) |
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110 | (1) |
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111 | (1) |
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112 | (1) |
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112 | (3) |
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115 | (1) |
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Impulse Response Analysis |
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115 | (2) |
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117 | (1) |
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117 | (1) |
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EMS Wide Bands 1993.07-1994.04 |
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118 | (1) |
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Forecast Error Variance Decomposition |
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118 | (1) |
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119 | (1) |
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120 | (18) |
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138 | (1) |
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139 | (1) |
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4. CHAPTER 4: THE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE |
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140 | (58) |
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140 | (2) |
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4.2 Review of Economic integration in Latin America from the Import-Substitution to the Washington Consensus |
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142 | (19) |
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4.2.1 Regional Integration within a Protectionist Framework |
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142 | (1) |
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142 | (3) |
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New attempt of integration: LAIA |
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145 | (2) |
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Other Free Trade Agreements among Latin American Countries |
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147 | (1) |
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147 | (2) |
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Economic Integration in Central America |
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149 | (1) |
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4.2.2 The New Integration Approach |
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150 | (2) |
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The Integration between Argentina and Brazil |
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152 | (3) |
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The Enlargement of the Agreement to Paraguay and Uruguay |
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155 | (1) |
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MERCOSUR: The Asuncion Treaty |
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155 | (2) |
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Institutional Aspects of MERCOSUR |
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157 | (1) |
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158 | (3) |
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4.3 Macroeconomic Profile of MERCOSUR |
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161 | (14) |
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161 | (1) |
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Structure and Evolution of Regional GDP |
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161 | (7) |
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168 | (1) |
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168 | (1) |
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Exchange Rates and Capital Inflows |
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169 | (2) |
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171 | (4) |
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4.4. Recent MERCOSUR Relevant Experiences with Fixed Exchange Rates |
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175 | (14) |
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Stabilization Plans Anchored on Fixed Exchange Rates |
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175 | (6) |
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4.4.1 The Argentinian Currency Board System |
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181 | (2) |
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The Effect of the Currency Board on the Argentinian |
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183 | (2) |
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183 | (2) |
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Recent Developments and Evaluation |
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185 | (1) |
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4.4.2 The Brazilian Real Plan |
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186 | (2) |
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188 | (1) |
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4.5 Summary and Conclusions |
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189 | (7) |
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196 | (2) |
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5. CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND ECONOMIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS |
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198 | (5) |
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203 | |
