Born of Fire and Ash Australian operations in response to the East Timor crisis 1999-2000

Australia’s involvement in East Timor from 1999–2000 was this nation’s largest mission conducted under United Nations auspices, the single largest deployment of ADF personnel since the Second World War, and an instrumental part of Timor-Leste gaining its independence. Critically, it was also one not nestled within a larger or lead nation’s logistics and administrative support, and also the first time Australia had led such a large multi-national force. In short, International Force East Timor was the most complex politico-strategic challenge Australia had faced, at least since the 1940s. Written from classified government sources and buttressed by hundreds of interviews with veterans and stakeholders, this first volume in the landmark Official History of Australian Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and East Timor—Born of Fire and Ash—is an honest, challenging, and compelling account of the 1999–2000 East Timor crisis and Australia’s response to it. It tackles the good alongside the bad, successes and failures, to chart a complex ‘truth’ unknown to most Australians, then and now.

Professor Craig Stockings is the Official Historian of Australian Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and East Timor. Craig is a graduate of both the Australian Defence Force Academy, and the Royal Military College, Duntroon. As an infantry officer he served in a range of regimental appointments within the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, and deployed with INTERFET to East Timor in 1999–2000. Craig holds a First Class Honours Degree in History, Masters qualifications in International Relations and Education, and a PhD in History.

Maps Figures Photographs Preface Chronology Abbreviations Volume preface PART ONE STRATEGIC AND POLICY CONTEXT Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION The volume The 27th province The East Timorese Cultural and political context A fateful choice The INTERFET narrative Chapter 2 ‘ NO PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE’ : THE QUESTION OF PORTUGUESE TIMOR, 1942– 75 From the Pacific War to the Carnation Revolution Attitudes to an Indonesian takeover The solidarity movement Flawed assumptions Diplomatic assistance at the United Nations Confidential briefings Balibó and the Australian official reaction The Indonesian invasion Conclusion Chapter 3 ‘ BUSINESS AS USUAL’ : AUSTRALIA, INDONESIA AND CHALLENGE OF EAST TIMOR, 1976– 96 Responses and reactions at the United Nations Public impact in Australia Dealing with the famine Recognition of Indonesian sovereignty Santa Cruz and beyond Domestic pressure Conclusion Chapter 4 ‘ PEBBLE FROM THE SHOE’ : THE HOWARD GOVERNMENT AND A CONSISTENCY OF POLICY, 1996– 99 The primacy of established patterns The end of the New Order A new president and new challenges Tripartite talks Australian policy in the Habibie era The Howard letter A surprising Indonesian response Aftershocks in Canberra Conclusion Chapter 5 ‘ WE MIGHT NOT HAVE AN OPTION’ : THE VIEW FROM CANBERRA, JANUARY– JUNE 1999 Adapting to a new reality Militia violence Tripartite developments A forum in Bali The 5 May Agreements What Australia knew Defence planning context Conclusion PART TWO BALLOT AND AFTERMATH Chapter 6 ‘ AN INTERESTING WAY TO RUN THE ORGANISATION’ : AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE PLANNING, EARLY TO MID-1999 ADF planning up to February 1999 A ‘ Warning Order’ from the CDF Increased readiness Continuing planning and ‘ leaks’ The 5 May Agreements and their implications UNAMET and ADF planning More detailed ADF planning, July 1999 Beyond Spitfire Conclusion Chapter 7 ‘ AN INCREDIBLE CULMINATING MOMENT’ : OPERATION FABER AND THE BALLOT, JUNE– AUGUST 1999 Establishment of UNAMET Military liaison officers Deployment of UNAMET The levers of violence Working with the TNI, POLRI and the militia Delays in the vote Some positive signals The conduct of voter registration UNAMET and the Australians as agents provocateur The campaign period Ballot day: a collective sigh of relief Conclusion Chapter 8 ‘ CARRYING THE FIRE OF DEATH’ : THE RUINATION OF THE 27TH PROVINCE, 1– 20 SEPTEMBER 1999 Post-ballot violence The East Timorese have their say An eruption of terror Removing UNAMET’ s ‘ eyes and ears’ Displacement and deportation A Security Council mission Martial law Violence 8– 12 September: under martial law Decision to evacuate Post evacuations: 12 September onwards The orchestration of the post-ballot violence Conclusion Chapter 9 ‘ BOOTS ON THE GROUND’ : OPERATION SPITFIRE, 6– 14 SEPTEMBER 1999 Joint Task Force 645 Joint Task Force 504 High-level planning through the referendum period Final planning in Townsville Preparations at RAAF Base Tindal Implicit risk The SASR and air evacuations from Dili An incident at Baucau Continuing ferry-runs Difficulties of compartmentalisation and secrecy Logistics fault lines Looking forward PART THREE THE PLANNING CAULDRON Chapter 10 ‘ A BIT OF DOING IT ON THE RUN’ : SERIOUS PLANNING BEGINS, 5– 14 SEPTEMBER 1999 Towards an intervention Real operational planning begins High-level ADF considerations The APEC meeting in Auckland Domestic considerations Indonesian agreement Tactical ADF planning, 10– 14 September A hiccup in the DJFHQ theatrette Logistics planning to mid-September Developing naval and air force considerations Conclusion Chapter 11 ‘ EVERYONE WAS INCREDIBLY TENSE’ : THE SPRINT TO DILI, 15– 20 SEPTEMBER 1999 UN Security Council Resolution 1264 Australian political position, 15– 20 September The plan from DJFHQ In extremis arrangement