Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants

The subject of intelligence accountability is of great importance for those who believe that a democratic nation's secret agencies ought to be subject to safeguards designed to prevent their abuse of power...Born and Caparini have brought together a number of studies about the state of intelligence accountability in nations as varied as Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Norway, and the United States...'Loch K. Johnson, University of Georgia, USA This comprehensive volume discusses the various challenges of establishing and maintaining accountable and democratically controlled intelligence services, drawing both from states with well-established democratic systems and those emerging from authoritarian systems and in transition towards democracy.The events of September 11, 2001 sharply revived governmental and societal anxieties in many democratic countries concerning the threats posed by terrorism, organized crime, the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, and other complex security threats. In many countries, public discourse of subjects traditionally considered part of social policy, such as immigration and asylum, have been securitized, while intelligence services have been granted greater resources and expanded powers.This comprehensive volume discusses the various challenges of establishing and maintaining accountable and democratically controlled intelligence services, drawing both from states with well-established democratic systems and those emerging from authoritarian systems and in transition towards democracy. It adopts a multidisciplinary and comparative approach, identifying good practices to make security services accountable to society and its democratic representatives. The volume will engage both academics and practitioners in the discussion of how to anchor these vital yet inherently difficult to control institutions within a firmly democratic framework. As such, it has clear relevance for these concerned with the control and oversight of intelligence and security issues in many countries.Contents: Preface, Amb. Dr. Theodor Winkler; Part I Introduction: Controlling and overseeing intelligence services in liberal democratic states, Marina Caparini; The need for efficient and legitimate intelligence, Fred Schreier. Part II Reforms in eastern Europe: Control and oversight of security intelligence in Romania, Larry L. Watts; Transformation of the Polish secret services: from authoritarian to informal power networks, Andrzej Zybertowicz; Reforming the intelligence services in Bulgaria: the experience of 19892005, Nikolai Bozhilov; The aftermath of 1989 and the reform of intelligence: the Czechoslovakian case, Oldrich Cern?. Part III Reforms in the West: The United States Department of Defense intelligence oversight programme: balancing national security and constitutional rights, George B. Lotz II; Checks and imbalances? Intelligence governance in contemporary France, Hans Born and Thorsten Wetzling; Parliamentary oversight of the Norwegian secret and intelligence services, Leif Mevik and Hakon Huus-Hansen. Part IV Parliamentarians: Parliamentary and external oversight of intelligence services, Hans Born; The UK's intelligence and security committee, Ian Leigh; Democratic and Parliamentary accountability of intelligence services after 11 September, Peter Gill. Part V Data Protection: Public oversight and national security: comparative approaches to freedom of information, David Banisar; Reconciliation and developing public trust in Hungary: opening state security files, Laacute;szloacute; Majteacute;nyi; Part VI Conclusion: Secret and intelligence services: strengthening democratic accountability, Hans Born and Fairlie Jensen; Bibliography; Index.About the Author: Hans Born is Coordinator of the Working Group on Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces(PCAF), at DCAF, Switzerland. Marina Caparini is Coordinator of the Working Group on Internal Security and Civil Society at DCAF, Swi