Foundations of Moral Philosophy Readings in Metaethics

Foundations of Moral Philosophy: Readings in Metaethics is a comprehensive collection of fifty-six contemporary readings and historical sources on major issues in metaethics. It focuses on the meaning of moral terms, the nature of moral psychology, whether we can know moral truths (if there are any), and the role of moral reasons. The book features unparalleled representation of women philosophers, with one-third of the contemporary articles authored or coauthored by women. Wherever appropriate, the articles have been carefully edited to ensure that they will be exceptionally clear and understandable to undergraduate students. The volume is enhanced by a general introduction, introductions and study questions for each selection, and a detailed glossary.

Steven M. Cahn is Professor of Philosophy at The City University of New York Graduate Center. He is the author or editor of more than fifty books. Most recently, he coauthored Happiness and Goodness (2015). Dr. Cahn is the editor of Exploring Ethics, Fourth Edition (OUP, 2016), The World of Philosophy (OUP, 2015), and Exploring Philosophy, Fifth Edition (OUP, 2014), and coeditor of Principles of Moral Philosophy (OUP, 2016) and Ethics, Sixth Edition (OUP, 2015).

Andrew T. Forcehimes is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. He has published articles in Ethics, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Utilitas, and Res Publica. He is the coeditor, with Steven M. Cahn, of Principles of Moral Philosophy (OUP, 2016).

PART I. INTRODUCTION
Andrew T. Forcehimes, The Driving Forces of Metaethics
PART II. HISTORICAL SOURCES
Plato, The Republic
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism
Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil
PART III. REALISM
G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica
Peter Railton, Naturalism and Prescriptivity
Derek Parfit, Against Non-Analytic Naturalism
Michael Smith, Realism
Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit, Moral Functionalism
Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay, Does Analytical Moral Naturalism Rest on a Mistake?
PART IV. NON-COGNITIVISM
A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic
C. M. Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
R. M. Hare, Language of Morals
Simon Blackburn, Antirealist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism
Mark Schroeder, What is the Frege-Geach Problem?
Allen Gibbard, Reasons for a Living Being
Michael Ridge, Ecumenical Expressivism
Paul Edwards, The Logic of Moral Discourse
PART V. ERROR THEORY
J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Ronald Dworkin, Against External Skepticism
Jonas Olson, In Defense of Moral Error Theory
Richard Joyce, Moral Fictionalism
PART VI. RELATIVISM
Mary Midgely, Moral Isolationism
Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism Defended
Stephen Darwall, Harman and Moral Relativism
PART VII. RESPONSE DEPENDENCE
David Lewis, Dispositional Theories of Value
David Enoch, Why Idealize?
PART VIII. CONSTRUCTIVISM
John Rawls, Themes from Kant's Moral Philosophy
Christine M. Korsgaard, Self-Constitution
Sharon Street, Coming to Terms with Contingency
T. M. Scanlon, Metaphysics and Morals
PART IX. THEISTIC VOLUNTARISM
Steven M. Cahn, The Question: Plato's Euthyphro ?
Robert M. Adams, A Modified Divine Command Theory
Michael Huemer, A Reply to Adams
PART X. EPISTEMOLOGY
H. A. Prichard, Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
P. F. Strawson, Ethical Intuitionism
Alison Hill, Moral Epistemology
Sarah McGrath, Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise
Sharon Street, A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value
Katia Vavova, Debunking Evolutionary Debunking
PART XI. MORAL EXPLANATIONS
Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality
Nicholas L. Sturgeon, Moral Explanations
PART XII. REASONS & MOTIVES
Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism
Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Moral Cognitivism and Motivation
Philippa Foot, Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperative
Bernard Williams, Internal Reasons and External Reasons, with Postscript
Julia Markovits, Internal Reasons and the Motivating Intuition
Mark Schroeder, The Humean Theory of Reasons
Derek Parfit, Against Subjective Theories of Reasons
Ruth Chang, Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid
Glossary
Index