Inferentialism Why Rules Matter

The term 'inferentialism', coined by Robert Brandom, has become a trademark of a certain position in the philosophy of language which claims that meanings identify with inferential roles – a radical departure from more traditional semantic approaches. Independently of this, the term is now cropping up in logic, in connection with positions prioritizing proof-theory over model theory and approaching meaning in logical, especially proof-theoretical, terms. The book brings these two strands together: it reviews and critically assesses the foundations of Brandomian inferentialism; it proposes upgrades; and it clarifies its relationship to inferentialism in logic. Emphasis is laid on clearly articulating the general assumptions on which inferentialism rests, thus elucidating its foundations, followed by discussing the consequences of this standpoint, and then dealing with the most intensive objections raised against the standpoint.

Jaroslav Peregrin is Head of the Department of Logic of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic and a professor at the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy of the University of Hradec Králové. His research is located at the intersection of logic, analytic philosophy, and semantics; he is the author of Doing Worlds with Words (1995) and Meaning and Structure (2001).

Acknowledgements
1. Inferentialism: State of Play
PART I: LANGUAGE, MEANING AND NORMS
2. Words as Governed by Rules
3. Meanings as Inferential Roles
4. The Rules of Language
5. Our Language Games
6. Rules and Evolution
PART II: LOGIC, INFERENCE AND REASONING
7. Inference in Logic
8. Logical Constants
9. Logic as Making Inference Explicit
10. Rules of Logic
11. Logic and Reasoning
Postscript: Inferentialism on the Go
Appendix: Proofs of Theorems
Notes
References
Index