Logical Investigations Volume 2

Note: Supplemental materials are not guaranteed with Rental or Used book purchases.

ISBN: 9780415241908 | 0415241901
Cover: Nonspecific Binding
Copyright: 8/24/2001

Buy New

Print on Demand: 2-4 Weeks. This item cannot be cancelled or returned.

$44.28
eBook

Available Instantly

Online: 180 Days

Downloadable: 180 Days

$32.18

Edmund Husserl is the founder of phenomenology. TheLogical Investigationsis Edmund Husserl's most famous work and has had a decisive impact on the direction of twentieth century philosophy. This is the first time both volumes of this classic work, translated by J.N. Findlay, have been available in paperback. They include a new introduction by Dermot Moran, placing theLogical Investigationsin historical context and bringing out its importance for contemporary philosophy.

INVESTIGATION III ON THE THEORY OF WHOLES AND PARTS

(46)

Introduction

(1)

The difference between independent and non-independent objects

(21)

Complex and simple, articulated and unarticulated objects

(1)

Introduction of the distinction between independent and non-independent objects (contents)

(1)

The inseparability of non-independent contents

(1)

Analyses of examples following Stumpf

(2)

The objective determination of the concept of inseparability

(1)

Continuation. Tie-up with a criticism of a much-favoured notional determination

(1)

Further pointing up of our notional determination by introducing the concepts of pure law and pure genus

(2)

Independent and non-independent Ideas

(1)

Demarcation of the distinction of independent and non-independent contents and the distinction between intuitively emphatic and intuitively blended contents

(2)

Continuation. Reference to the wider sphere of the phenomena of fusion

(2)

The multiplicity of laws governing the various sorts of non-independent contents

(2)

The difference between these `material' laws and `formal' or `analytic' laws

(1)

Basic determinations in regard to analytic and synthetic propositions

(2)

Relative independence and non-independence

(3)

Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts

(22)

The concept of foundation and some relevant theorems

(2)

Transition to the treatment of the more important part-relations

(1)

Reciprocal and one-sided, mediate and immediate foundation

(1)

Exact determination of the concepts of piece (portion), moment, physical part, abstractum, concretum

(2)

The difference between the mediate and immediate parts of a whole

(1)

A novel sense of this distinction: nearer and more remote parts of the whole

(2)

Nearer and remoter parts relatively to one another

(2)

Exact pinning down of the pregnant notions of whole and part, and of their essential species, by means of the notion of foundation

(1)

Forms of sensuous unity and wholes

(3)

Forms of categorial unity and wholes

(1)

The pure formal types of wholes and parts. The postulate of an a priori theory

(2)

Additions regarding the `piecing' (fragmentation) of wholes through the `piecing' of their `moments'

(6)

INVESTIGATION IV THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT AND NON-INDEPENDENT MEANINGS AND THE IDEA OF PURE GRAMMAR

(30)

Introduction

(1)

Simple and complex meanings

(1)

Whether complexity of meanings merely reflects complexity of objects

(1)

Complexity of meanings and complexity of the concrete act of meaning. Implied meanings

(2)

The question of the meaningfulness of `syncategorematic' components of complex expressions

(2)

Independent and non-independent meanings. The non-independence of the sensory and expressive parts of words

(1)

Other opposed distinctions. Unclosed, abnormally abbreviated and defective expressions

(2)

The conception of non-independent meanings as founded contents

(1)

Difficulties of this conception. (a) Whether the non-independence of the meaning does not really only lie in the non-independence of the object meant

(1)

(b) The understanding of isolated syncategorematica

(1)

A priori laws governing combinations of meanings

(3)

Objections. Modifications of meaning which are rooted in the essence of expressions or meanings

(3)

Nonsense and absurdity

(1)

The laws of the compounding of meanings and the pure logico-grammatical theory of forms

(3)

Laws which discourage nonsense and laws which discourage absurdity. The Idea of a purely logical grammar

(6)

Notes

(2)

INVESTIGATION V ON INTENTIONAL EXPERIENCES AND THEIR `CONTENTS'

(100)

Introduction

(2)

Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego and consciousness as inner perception

(13)

Varied ambiguity of the term `consciousness'

(1)

First sense: Consciousness as the real phenomenological unity of the ego's experiences. The concept of an experience

(2)

The phenomenological and the popular concept of experience

(1)

The relation between experiencing consciousness and experienced content is no phenomenologically peculiar type of relation

(1)

Second sense. `Inner' consciousness as inner perception

(1)

Origin of the first concept of consciousness out of the second

(2)

Reciprocal demarcation of psychology and natural science (First edition)

(2)

The pure ego and awareness (`Bewusstheit')

(3)

Additional Note to the Second Edition

(1)

Consciousness as intentional experience

(34)

The meaning of Brentano's demarcation of `psychic phenomena'

(1)

Descriptive characterization of acts as `intentional' experiences

(2)

Avoidance of verbally tempting misunderstandings

The `mental' or `immanent' object

(3)

The act and the relation of consciousness or the ego to the object

100

(1)

The fixing of our terminology

101

(1)

Difficulties which surround the assumption of acts as a descriptively founded class of experiences

102

(4)

Whether experiences of one and the same phenomenological kind (of the genus feeling in particular) can consist partly of acts and partly of non-acts

106

(6)

Are there any intentional feelings?

107

(2)

Are there non-intentional feelings? Distinction between feeling-sensations and feeling-acts

109

(3)

Distinction between descriptive and intentional content

112

(1)

The intentional content in the sense of the intentional object

113

(2)

Simple and complex, founding and founded acts

115

(1)

The function of attention in complex acts. Instance of the phenomenological relation of verbal sound to sense

116

(3)

The difference between the quality and the matter of an act

119

(3)

The intentional and the semantic essence

122

(6)

Appendix to §11 and §20. Critique of the `image-theory' and of the doctrine of the `immanent' objects of acts

125

(3)

The matter of the act and its underlying presentation

128

(18)

The question of the relation between the matter and quality of an act

128

(1)

The view of `matter' as a founding act of `mere presentation'

129

(2)

Difficulties. The problem of the differentiation of qualitative kinds

131

(1)

Closer analysis of our two possible solutions

132

(2)

Consideration and rejection of the proposed conception

134

(1)

The testimony of direct intuition. Perceptual presentation and perception

135

(4)

Special investigation of the matter in the case of judgement

139

(1)

Continuation: `acceptance' or `assent' given to the mere presentation of the state of affairs

140

(3)

Additional note

143

(1)

The conception of the identical understanding of a word or a sentence as a case of `mere presentation'

143

(1)

A last objection to our view. Mere presentations and isolated `matters'

144

(2)

Study of founding presentations with special regard to the theory of judgement

146

(12)

An ambiguity in the word `presentation', and the supposed self-evidence of the principle that every act is founded on an act of presentation

146

(1)

Re-establishment of our proposition by means of a new notion of presentation. Naming and asserting

147

(2)

Difficulties. The concept of the name. Positing and non-positing names

149

(3)

Nominal positing and judgement. Where judgements as such can be parts of nominal acts

152

(3)

Continuation. Whether assertions can function as complete names

155

(3)

Further contributions to the theory of judgement. `Presentation' as a qualitatively unitary genus of nominal and propositional acts

158

(13)

The aim of the following investigation. The concept of an objectifying act

158

(1)

Qualitative and material differentiation of objectifying acts

159

(3)

Presentation in the sense of an objectifying act, and its qualitative modification

162

(3)

Continuation. Qualitative and imaginative modification

165

(2)

New interpretation of the principle that makes presentations the basis of all acts. The objectifying act as the primary bearer of `matter'

167

(1)

Further developments. Basic principles of complex acts

168

(1)

Backward glance to our previous interpretation of the principle under discussion

169

(2)

Summing-up of the most important ambiguities in the terms `presentation' and `content'

171

(6)

`Presentation'

171

(4)

The `presentational content'

175

(2)

Note

175

(2)

VOLUME II, PART 2 OF THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION

177

(4)

Foreword to the second edition

177

(4)

INVESTIGATION VI ELEMENTS OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ELUCIDATION OF KNOWLEDGE

181

(8)

Introduction

183

(6)

First section Objectifying intentions and their fulfilments: knowledge as a synthesis of fulfilment and its gradations

189

(80)

Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment

191

(25)

Whether every type of mental act, or only certain types, can function as carriers of meaning

191

(1)

That all acts may be expressed does not decide the issue. There are two senses to talk about expressing an act

192

(1)

A third sense of talk about the `expression' of acts. Formulation of our theme

193

(2)

The expression of a percept (`judgement of perception'). Its meaning cannot lie in perception, but must lie in peculiar expressive acts

195

(1)

Continuation. Perception as an act which determines meaning, without embodying it

196

(5)

Addendum

199

(2)

The static unity of expressive thought and expressed intuition. Recognition (das Erkennen)

201

(1)

Recognition as a character of acts, and the `generality of words'

202

(4)

The dynamic unity of expression and expressed intuition. The consciousness of fulfilment and that of identity

206

(3)

Addendum

208

(1)

The differing character of an intention inside and outside the unity of fulfilment

209

(1)

The wider class of experiences of fulfilment. Intuitions as intentions which require fulfilment

210

(1)

Frustration and conflict. The synthesis of distinction

211

(2)

Total and partial identification and distinction as the common phenomenological foundations of predicative and determining forms of expression

213

(3)

Indirect characterization of objectifying intentions and their essential varieties through differences in the syntheses of fulfilment

216

(10)

The synthesis of knowing (recognition) as the characteristic form of fulfilment for objectifying acts. Subsumption of acts of meaning under the class of objectifying acts

216

(2)

Phenomenological characterization of the distinction between signitive and intuitive intentions through peculiarities of fulfilment. (a) Sign, image and self-presentation

218

(4)

The perceptual and imaginative `adumbration' of the object

220

(2)

Signitive intentions beyond the limits of the meaning-function

222

(4)

The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge

226

(24)

Simple identification and fulfilment

226

(2)

The question of the relation between fulfilment and intuitive illustration

228

(1)

The gradations of mediate fulfilments. Mediate presentations

229

(1)

Distinction between mediate presentations and presentations of presentations

230

(1)

Genuine intuitive illustration in every fulfilment. Authentic and inauthentic intuitive illustration

231

(2)

The `fulness' of a presentation

233

(1)

Fulness and `intuitive substance' (Gehalt)

234

(1)

Relations of weight between the intuitive and signitive `substance' (Gehalt) of one and the same act. Pure intuition and pure signification. Perceptual and imaginal content, pure perception and pure imagination. Gradations of fulness

235

(3)

Graded series of fulfilments

238

(2)

Fulness and intentional matter

240

(2)

Continuation. Representation or interpretation (Auffassung). Matter as the interpretative sense, the interpretative form and the interpreted content. Differentiating characterization of intuitive and signitive interpretation

242

(2)

Representations as the necessary bases of presentation in all acts. Final clarification of talk about the different modes of the relation of consciousness to its object

244

(1)

Intentional essence and fulfilling sense. Epistemic essence. Intuitions in specie

245

(1)

Complete and defective intuitions. Adequate and objectively complete intuitive illustrations. Essentia (Essenz)

246

(4)

Consistency and inconsistency

250

(9)

The ideal distinction of meanings into the possible or real (reale) and the impossible or imaginary

250

(2)

Compatibility or consistency as an ideal relationship in the widest sphere of contents in general. Compatibility of `concepts' as meanings

252

(1)

Incompatibility (conflict) of contents in general

253

(1)

How conflict can also be a foundation for unity. Relativity of the talk of compatibility and conflict

254

(2)

Some axioms

256

(1)

Incompatibility of concepts as meanings

257

(2)

The ideal of adequation. Self-evidence and truth

259

(10)

Introduction

259

(1)

The fulfilling function of perception. The ideal of ultimate fulfilment

259

(3)

Positing acts in the function of fulfilment. Self-evidence in the loose and strict sense

262

(1)

Self-evidence and truth

263

(6)

Second section Sense and understanding

269

(52)

Sensuous and categorial intuitions

271

(24)

The problem of the fulfilment of categorial meaning-forms, with a thought leading towards its solution

271

(3)

Continuation. Extension of our sphere of examples

274

(1)

The distinction between sensuous stuff and categorial form throughout the whole realm of objectifying acts

275

(2)

The objective correlates of categorial forms are not `real' (realen) moments

277

(1)

The origin of the concept of Being and of the remaining categories does not lie in the realm of inner-perception

278

(2)

Widening of the concept of intuition, and in particular of the concepts perception and imagination. Sensible and categorial intuition

280

(1)

Phenomenological analysis of the distinction between sensuous and categorial perception

281

(2)

Continuation. Characterization of sense-perception as `straightforward' perception

283

(3)

Characterization of categorial acts as founded acts

286

(3)

Added note on nominal formations

289

(1)

Sensuous forms categorially grasped but not functioning nominally

290

(1)

Collectiva and disjunctiva

291

(1)

Universal objects constituting themselves in universal intuitions

292

(3)

A study in categorial representation

295

(10)

Backward reference to the researches of our first section

295

(1)

The question of the representing contents of categorial forms

296

(2)

Arguments for the assumption of peculiar categorial representing contents

298

(1)

Continuation. The mental linkage of combined acts and the categorial unity of corresponding objects

299

(1)

The representing contents of the founding intuitions are not immediately connected by the representing content of the synthetic form

300

(2)

The relation of our two distinctions: outer and inner sense, also sense for categories

302

(3)

The a priori laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking

305

(16)

The complication into ever new forms. The pure theory of the forms of possible intuitions

305

(1)

The relative or functional difference between matter and form. Pure acts of understanding and those mixed with sense. Sensuous concepts and categories

306

(1)

Categorial forming involves no real reshaping of the object

307

(1)

Our freedom in the categorial forming of given material and its limits. Purely categorial laws (laws of `authentic' thinking)

308

(3)

The new laws of the validity of signitive and admixedly signitive acts (laws of inauthentic thinking)

311

(3)

The pure logico-grammatical laws are laws for any understanding whatever, and not merely for any human understanding. Their psychological meaning and normative function in relation to inadequate thought

314

(2)

The senseless problem of the real meaning of the logical

316

(1)

Distinction between the most important differences mixed up in the current opposition of `intuiting' and `thinking'

317

(4)

Additional note to the second edition

319

(2)

Third section Clarification of our introductory problem

321

(14)

Non-objectifying acts as apparent fulfilments of meaning

323

(12)

That not every act of meaning includes an act of knowing

323

(2)

The controversy regarding the interpretation of the peculiar grammatical forms which express non-objectifying acts

325

(2)

Arguments for and against the Aristotelian conception

327

(5)

Decision

332

(3)

APPENDIX External and internal perception: physical and psychical phenomena

335

(14)

1 The popular and the traditional philosophical concepts of external and internal perception

335

(1)

2 and 3 Epistemological and psychological motives for deepening the traditional division: Brentano's conception

336

(4)

4 Criticism. External and internal perception are, on a normal interpretation of the concepts, of the same epistemological character: Perception and apperception

340

(1)

5 The equivocations of the term `appearance'

341

(3)

5a Excised passage from the First Edition

344

(1)

6 There is for this reason confusion between the epistemologically meaningless opposition of inner and outer perception, and the epistemologically fundamental opposition of adequate and inadequate perception

344

(2)

7 That the dispute is not verbal

346

(1)

8 Confusion of two fundamentally different divisions of `phenomena'. That `physical' contents do not exist `in merely phenomenal fashion', but exist `actually'

347

(2)

Notes

349

(10)

Index

359

Please wait while the item is added to your bag...

FREE SHIPPING

Amazon no longer offers textbook rentals. We do!

Logical Investigations Volume 2

Summary

Author Biography

Table of Contents

Supplemental Materials