Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy

In this refreshingly original and accessible investigation into the nature of metaphysics, Heather Dyke argues that for too long philosophy has suffered from a language-fixation. Where this language-fixation leads philosophers to reason badly she calls it the 'representational fallacy'. She illustrates the various ways it can lead philosophers astray, and argues that metaphysics can be better done without it. She discusses the philosophy of time as an illustration of how a metaphysical debate about the nature of time was needlessly transformed into a sterile debate about language, and of how, once the focus on language is dropped, a new metaphysical strategy emerges. Dyke shows how the same applies to other debates in metaphysics, and how this promises fruitful new research programmes, where the focus is on ontology rather than on language. The clear and accessible way in which current practice in metaphysics is brought under the spotlight will challenge philosophers to examine their ownmethodology.