Negotiation Games

Steven J. Brams is one of the leading game theorists of his generation. This new edition includes brand new material on topics such as fallback bargaining and principles of rational negotiation.

Steven J. Brams is Professor of Politics at New York University, USA

List of Figures

ix

List of Tables

xi

Preface to the second Edition

xiii

Preface

xxi

Modeling Negotiations

xxi

Overview and Level

xxiii

Acknowledgments

xxvi

l. Negotiations in the Bible

1

(28)

1.1. Introduction

1

(2)

1.2. Cain and Abel: Bargaining with God

3

(6)

1.3. Rahab and the Spies: Making a Just Agreement

9

(8)

1.4. Solomon’s Arbitration: Discovering the Truth

17

(8)

1.5. Conclusions

25

(1)

Notes

26

(3)

2. Bargaining Procedures and the Problem of Honesty

29

(35)

2.1. Introduction

29

(5)

2.2. The Honesty Problem

34

(5)

2.3. The Bonus Procedure

39

(6)

2.4. The Bonus Appraisal Procedure

45

(3)

2.5. The Penalty Procedure

48

(3)

2.6. The Penalty Appraisal Procedure

51

(2)

2.7. The Expansive Appraisal Procedure

53

(4)

2.8. Camp David: The Logic of the Procedures Applied

57

(3)

2.9. Conclusions

60

(2)

Notes

62

(2)

3. Arbitration Procedures and the Problem of Convergence

64

(37)

3.1. Introduction

64

(2)

3.2. Different Arbitration Procedures

66

(2)

3.3. Trade-Offs and Implicit Arbitration

68

(3)

3.4. Final-Offer Arbitration (FOA)

71

(4)

3.5. FOA in Practice: The Importance of Winning

75

(4)

3.6. Bonus FOA

79

(2)

3.7. Combined Arbitration

81

(5)

3.8. Two-Stage and Multistage FOA

86

(5)

3.9. Is Convergence in Stages Desirable?

91

(2)

3.10. Kissinger's Shuttle Diplomacy: A Case of Multistage Negotiations

93

(3)

3.11. Conclusions

96

(3)

Notes

99

(2)

4. Superpower Crisis Bargaining and the Theory of Moves

101

(37)

4.1. Introduction

101

(1)

4.2. Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken

102

(2)

4.3. The Cuban Missile Crisis as a Game of Chicken

104

(6)

4.4. Deception and Power in the Cuban Missile Crisis

110

(3)

4.5. A Sequential View of the Cuban Missile Crisis

113

(3)

4.6. The 1973 Alert Decision

116

(4)

4.7. Nonmyopic Equilibria and the Theory of Moves: A Digression

120

(7)

4.8. Stability in the Cease-Fire Game

127

(3)

4.9. Was There an Alternative to the Alert?

130

(2)

4.10. The Possible Effects of Power in the Cease-Fire Game

132

(2)

4.11. Conclusions

134

(2)

Notes

136

(2)

5. Threats and Reputation in Bargaining

138

(30)

5.1. Introduction

138

(3)

5.2. Repeated Play of a Sequential Game

141

(7)

5.3. Threat Outcomes in Repeated Play of a Game

148

(6)

5.4. The Sequential-Primary Game

154

(9)

5.5. Conclusions

163

(2)

Notes

165

(3)

6. Threats in Two Domestic Crises

168

(21)

6.1. Introduction

168

(1)

6.2. The Use of Threat Power in Poland, 1980-81

169

(6)

6.3. The White House Tapes Case: The Players and Their Preferences

175

(6)

6.4. The White House Tapes Case: The Trap

181

(5)

6.5. Conclusions

186

(1)

Notes

187

(2)

7. Bargaining in Legislatures

189

(38)

7.1. Introduction

189

(2)

7.2. Judgments about Vote Trading

191

(1)

7.3. Definitions and Assumptions about Vote Trading

192

(3)

7.4. Sincere and Insincere Voting

195

(4)

7.5. Initial Trades and the Paradox of Vote Trading

199

(3)

7.6. Subsequent Trades and the Instability of Vote Trading

202

(2)

7.7. The Consequences of Refusing to Trade

204

(2)

7.8. The Consequences of Forming Coalitions

206

(3)

7.9. Empirical Examples of the Paradox of Vote Trading

209

(2)

7.10. Choosing a Governing Coalition in a Multiparty System: Coalition Voting

211

(4)

7.11. Majority, Minimal Majority, and Governing Coalitions

215

(2)

7.12. Measuring Bargaining strength under Coalition Voting

217

(4)

7.13. Possible Uses of Coalition Voting

221

(2)

7.14. Conclusions

223

(2)

Notes

225

(2)

8. Bargaining Power

227

(36)

8.1. Introduction

227

(1)

8.2. Power in the U.S. Federal system

228

(3)

8.3. What Should a Power Index Measure?

231

(5)

8.4. The Power of Approval and Disapproval

236

(6)

8.5. Empirical Evidence of Presidential Power

242

(2)

8.6. The Paradox of the Chair's Position

244

(5)

8.7. The Chair's Counterstrategy of Deception

249

(3)

8.8. The Geneva Conference Game

252

(6)

8.9. Conclusions

258

(3)

Notes

261

(2)

9. Epilogue

263

(3)

Glossary

266

(7)

Bibliography

273

(14)

Index

287

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Summary

Author Biography

Table of Contents

Supplemental Materials