Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 3

Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a series of volumes presenting outstanding new work on a set of connected themes, investigating such questions as:
DT What does it mean to be an agent?
DT What is the nature of moral responsibility? Of criminal responsibility? What is the relation between moral and criminal responsibility (if any)?
DT What is the relation between responsibility and the metaphysical issues of determinism and free will?
DT What do various psychological disorders tell us about agency and responsibility?
DT How do moral agents develop? How does this developmental story bear on questions about the nature of moral judgment and responsibility?
DT What do the results from neuroscience imply (if anything) for our questions about agency and responsibility?
OSAR thus straddles the areas of moral philosophy and philosophy of action, but also draws from a diverse range of cross-disciplinary sources, including moral psychology, psychology proper (including experimental and developmental), philosophy of psychology, philosophy of law, legal theory, metaphysics, neuroscience, neuroethics, political philosophy, and more. It is unified by its focus on who we are as deliberators and (inter)actors, embodied practical agents negotiating (sometimes unsuccessfully) a world of moral and legal norms.

David Shoemaker, Tulane University, New Orleans

David Shoemaker is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Murphy Institute at Tulane University. He is the author or co-author of two books and thirty-five articles, many of them having to do with the issues of agency, responsibility, and personal identity.

Introduction, David Shoemaker
1. Free Will and Agential Powers, Randolph Clarke and Thomas Reed
2. Injecting the Phenomenology of Agency Into the Free Will Debate, Terry Horgan
3. Coherence of Attitudes, Integration of the Self, and Personal Integrity, Sigrun Svavarsdottir
4. Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder and Moral Agency, Timothy Schroeder
5. Sensitivity to Reasons and Actual Sequences, Carolina Sartorio
6. Responsibility and the Actual Sequence, John Martin Fischer
7. Moral Luck Reexamined, Michael Zimmerman
8. The Hard Problem of Responsibility, Victoria McGeer and Philip Pettit
9. Rationality, Authority, and Bindingness: An Account of Communal Norms, Bennett Helm
10. A Difference-Making Framework for Intuitive Judgments of Responsibility, David Lagnado and Tobias Gerstenberg
11. Moral Responsibility, Reasons, and the Self, Chandra Sripada
Index