Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 3

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind presents cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind, combining invited articles and articles selected from submissions. Each volume will highlight two themes to bring focus to debates. The series will reflect the diversity of methods adopted in contemporary philosophy of mind and provide a venue for rigorous and innovative work by both established and up-and-coming voices in the field.

The themes covered in the third volume are mind and science, sensory experience, and the philosophy of mind of Margaret Cavendish and C.A. Strong. It also contains a book symposium on David Papineau's The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience.

Uriah Kriegel, Rice University

Uriah Kriegel is Professor of Philosophy at Rice University. He is the author of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory (OUP, 2009), The Sources of Intentionality (OUP, 2011), The Varieties of Consciousness (OUP, 2015), and Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value (OUP, 2018).

I. Mind and Science
1. The Parts of an Imperfect Agent, Sara Aronowitz
2. The Average isn't Normal, Henry Cowles and Joshua Knobe
3. Correspondence and Construction: The Representational Theory of Mind and Internally-Driven Classificatory Schemes, Gabriel Dupre
4. Bias and the Domain of Consciousness, Gabbrielle Johnson
5. Aphantasia and Conscious Thought, Preston Lennon
6. The Introspective Method, Maja Spener
II. Sensory Experience: Perception, Imagination, Pleasure
7. Right Here, Right Now: On the Eudaimonic Value of Perceptual Awareness, Dorothea Debus
8. Imagination, Fiction, and Perspectival Displacement, Justin D’Amrbosio and Daniel Stoljar
9. The Dilemma for Attitude Theories of Pleasure, Daniel Pallies and Alexander Dietz
10. Seeing through Transparency, Davide Bordini
III. Book Symposium on David Papineau s The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
11. Précis of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, David Papineau
12. Papineau on Sensory Experience, Alex Byrne
13. Truth and Content in Sensory Experience, Angela Mendelovici
14. An Argument Against Papineau s Qualitative View of Sensory Experience, Adam Pautz
15. Responses to Mendelovici, Pautz and Byrne, David Papineau
IV. History of Philosophy of Mind: Cavendish and Strong
16. Cavendish and Strawson on Emergence, Mind, and Self, David Cunning
17. 'Actions of a Body Sentient': Cavendish on the Mind (and against Panpsychism), Alison Peterman
18. C. A. Strong: Real Materialism, Evolutionary Naturalism, Panpsychism, Galen Strawson