Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

, by Heidegger, Martin; Emad, Parvis; Maly, Kenneth

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ISBN: 9780253332585 | 0253332583
Cover: Hardcover
Copyright: 10/1/1997

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The text of Martin Heidegger's 1927--28 university lecture course on Emmanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason presents a close interpretive reading of the first two parts of this masterpiece of modern philosophy. Heidegger develops his reading of Kant against the neo-Kantianism of his day, demonstrating that objectification of beings as beings is inseparable from knowledge a priori, the central problem of Kant's Critique.

Translators' Foreword

Preliminary Consideration Introduction The Critique of Pure Reason as Laying the Foundation for Metaphysics as Science

(48)

1. The Traditional Concept of Metaphysics

(5)

2. General Meaning of Laying the Foundation of a Science

(14)

a) Phenomenological Interpretation of Science's Way of Being

(10)

XXX) The Existential Concept of Science. Knowledge as a Revealing Comportment to Beings, the Primary Revealing in the Practical-Technical Realm, and the Prescientific Understanding of the Being of Beings

(5)

XXX) Conversion of the Prescientific Comportment to the Scientific Comportment by the Basic Act of Objectification. Objectification as the Explicit Accomplishment of Understanding of Being

(3)

XXX) The Process of Objectification in the Genesis of the Modern Mathematical Sciences of Nature

(2)

b) The Relation between the Founding of Science and Philosophy

(4)

XXX) The Limit of Science's Self-Founding

(1)

XXX) Founding of Science as Regional Ontology. Founding of Ontological Inquiry in Philosophy as Fundamental Ontology

(3)

3. Laying the Foundation of Metaphysics as Science as the Critique of Pure Reason

(20)

a) Kant's Interpretation of Ontological Knowledge

(12)

XXX) Knowledge a priori

(2)

XXX) The Condition for the Possibility of a Science of Beings in General

(4)

XXX) Analytic and Synthetic Judgments

(2)

XXX) The Problem of the Possibility of Synthetic Judgments a priori or the Problem of an Ontological Understanding of Being

(4)

b) The Difference between Transcendental Philosophy or Metaphysics and Laying the Foundation of Metaphysics as the Critique of Pure Reason

(8)

XXX) Ontology as System. The Critique as Laying the Foundation of the System of Transcendental Philosophy

(1)

XXX) Laying the Foundation for Metaphysics as Critique of Pure Reason; Its Place in the Whole of Metaphysics

(7)

4. The Horizon of Inquiry, the Field of Investigation, and the Structural Plan of the Critique of Pure Reason

(9)

First Part The Transcendental Aesthetic

(57)

Chapter One The Function of Intuition in Synthetic Knowledge

(22)

5. Intuition as the Primary and Essential Character of Knowledge in General

(10)

a) The Intuitive Character of Knowledge in General

(2)

b) The Significance of Intuition. Infinite and Finite Intuition. Finite Intuition and Sensibility, Affection, and Receptivity

(4)

c) Sensibility and Understanding as the Two Roots of Human Knowledge; the Common Origins of Both Roots

(3)

d) Synthetic Knowledge a priori and the Necessity of Pure a priori Intuition

(1)

6. Demonstration of Pure Intuition a priori

(12)

a) Empirical Intuition and Empirical Sensation

(1)

b) Appearance as Object of Empirical Intuition Distinguished from the Thing Itself

(3)

c) The Togetherness of Sense-Data and Space-Time Relations in Empirical Intuition

(4)

d) Space and Time as Pure Forms of Intuition and the Manner of Their Investigation in the Transcendental Aesthetic

(4)

Chapter Two Phenomenological Interpretation of the Transcendental Aesthetic

(35)

7. Discussion of the Metaphysical Exposition of Space and Time

(6)

8. Phenomenological Analysis of Space and Time as Pure Forms of Intuition

(7)

9. The Difference between "Form of Intuition" and "Formal Intuition"

(5)

10. Transcendental Exposition of Space and Time

(4)

a) Space and Time as Conditions for the Possibility of Synthetic Knowledge a priori

(1)

b) The Phenomena of Motion and Change

(3)

11. The Priority of Time over Space as Form of Intuition

100

(5)

a) Time as Universal Form of Appearances

100

(3)

b) The Original Subjectivity of Time in Its Expression as Self-Affection

103

(2)

12. Summary Characterization of Space and Time, Their "Empirical Reality" and "Transcendental Ideality"

105

(8)

Second Part The Analytic of Concepts in the Transcendental Logic

113

(181)

First Division Exposition of the Idea of a Transcendental Logic and Analytic

113

(62)

Chapter One The Significance of Transcendental Logic

113

(23)

13. The Analysis of Thinking as Element of Knowledge and the Unity of Thinking and Intuition as the Two Themes of Transcendental Logic

113

(2)

14. Kant's Determination of Thinking

115

(5)

15. Determination of General and Transcendental Logic

120

(9)

a) Determination of General and Pure Logic as Distinguished from Applied Logic

120

(4)

b) Determination of Transcendental Logic as Object-Related

124

(5)

16. Division of General and Transcendental Logic into the Analytic and the Dialectic

129

(7)

a) Formal Corrections and Factual Truth of Knowledge

129

(1)

b) General Logic as Analytic and Dialectic

130

(1)

c) Ontological Truth; Transcendental Logic as Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic

131

(5)

Chapter Two The Significance of the Transcendental Analytic

136

(39)

17. Methodic and Critical Preparation for Interpreting the Transcendental Analytic

136

(12)

a) Transcendental Philosophy as Ontology of the Extant in General

136

(4)

XXX) Determination of General and Transcendental Logic as Science of Thinking with Respect to Objects in General

136

(3)

XXX) The Concept of Object in General; Foundation of Formal Logic in Formal Ontology

139

(1)

b) The Systematic Unity of the Ontological Determinations of the Extant in General and the Completeness of the Table of Categories

140

(2)

c) Division of the Transcendental Analytic

142

(6)

XXX) What Is Incorrect in the Division of Transcendental Analytic into an Analytic of Concepts and an Analytic of Principles

142

(2)

XXX) Preparatory Demonstration of the Problematic of the Metaphysical and the Transcendental Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding

144

(4)

18. Exposition of the Essence of the Transcendental Analytic of Concepts

148

(16)

a) The Meaning of "Analytic" and of "Transcendental Analytic"

148

(1)

b) Analysis of the Essence of the Concept

149

(15)

XXX) General Pure Logic as the Basis for Exposition of the Concept; Presentation of Directives for the Investigation

149

(4)

XXX) Concept as General Representation

153

(2)

XXX) The Concept as Reflective Representing; the Essence of Reflection and the Acts Belonging to It

155

(6)

XXX) Reflective Representation as Reprasentatio Discursiva

161

(1)

XXX) Foundation of the Concept in the Function of Unity, in Reflection

162

(2)

19. The Task and Way of Proceeding in the Transcendental Analytic of Concepts

164

(11)

a) The Direction of the Inquiry in the Transcendental Analytic of Concepts

164

(3)

b) The a priori Object-Related Thinking as Possible Place of Origin for the Categories

167

(1)

c) Categories as Concepts of Reflection; the Connection between Forms of Judgment as Modes of Unification and Categories as Modes of Unity

168

(3)

d) The Necessary Relatedness of Categories to Time

171

(4)

Second Division Phenomenological Interpretation of the Transcendental Analytic of Concepts

175

(119)

Chapter One The Place of Origin of Categories and Their Connection with Judgments as Functions of Unification

175

(32)

20. The Kantian Table of the Forms of Judgment

175

(4)

21. The Synthesis Underlying the Categories

179

(19)

a) "Synthesis" as Designation for Three Forms of Unification

179

(2)

b) The Connection of Pure Thinking in General, of Pure Object-Related Thinking, and of Pure Intuition; Synthesis as a Pre-Conceptual Gathering of the Manifold

181

(3)

c) Distinguishing Synthesis as Gathering [of a Manifold] from the Unifying Function of Understanding

184

(4)

d) The Power of Imagination as the Source of the Comprehensive Synthesis

188

(3)

e) The Pure, Imaginative, Time-Related Synthesis as Source of Pure Concepts of Understanding

191

(3)

f) Ontic and Ontological Concept-Formation; the Three Elements of Ontological Knowledge

194

(1)

g) The Unity of Imaginative Synthesis and the Unity of the Logical Function of Judgment

195

(3)

22. The Twofold Character of Categories as Basic Determinations of Being and of Judgment and the Impossibility of a Real Definition of Categories as Pure Concepts of Understanding

198

(9)

Chapter Two Disclosure of the Origin of Categories as Demonstration of Their Ontological Character

207

(87)

23. The Problem Posed by the Transcendental Deduction of Categories

207

(14)

a) Justification of Kant's View of the Transcendental Deduction as a Response to the Quaestio Juris

207

(7)

XXX) The Knowledge-Claim of Dogmatic Metaphysics as Motive for the Quaestio Juris

208

(2)

XXX) The Problem of Legitimacy of the Ob-jective Reality of Pure Concepts of Understanding

210

(3)

XXX) The Subjective Character of the a priori as Condition for the Quaestion Juris; the Transcendence-Structure of Dasein

213

(1)

b) Transcendental Deduction in Connection with the Problem of Transcendence

214

(7)

XXX) The Justification for Kant's Misconstruing Transcendence

215

(1)

XXX) Transcendence as a priori Constitution of Objectness

216

(4)

XXX) Characterization of Object-Related Concepts in the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment

220

(1)

24. Elucidation of the Structure of Object-Relatedness on the Basis of Temporality as the Constitution of the Subject -- "The a priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience"

221

(41)

a) Clarification of the Task and Orientation of This Inquiry

221

(10)

XXX) The Meaning of the Expressions "Experience" and "Possibility of Experience"

221

(2)

XXX) The Inquiry into the a priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience as Inquiry into the Transcendental Constitution of the Subject

223

(4)

XXX) The Crucial Function of the Synthesis of the Power of Imagination in the Enabling of Experience

227

(2)

XXX) Synthesis of Apprehension, Reproduction, and Recognition as Models of the Pure Synthesis of the Power of Imagination. Preliminary Characterization of the Idea of "Object in General"

229

(2)

b) Enabling of the Intuition of a Manifold through Time-Related Synthesis of the Power of Imagination in the Mode of Apprehension

231

(5)

c) Enabling the Grasping of a Region of Objects through Time-Related Synthesis of the Power of Imagination in the Mode of Reproduction

236

(4)

d) Enabling the Grasping of the Unity of a Region of Objects through the Time-Related Synthesis of the Power of Imagination in the Mode of Recognition

240

(9)

XXX) The Problem of the Interrelationship of the Three Syntheses of Apprehension, Reproduction, and Recognition

241

(2)

XXX) Interpretation of the Synthesis of Recognition as Synthesis of Pre-cognition

243

(6)

e) Objectness in General as the Subject's Free Self-Binding to a priori Rules of Knowledge

249

(3)

f) Presentation of the Possibility of Object-Relatedness as Explication of Subjectivity; Transcendental Appreception and Understanding as the Faculty of Rules

252

(8)

g) Summary of the Interpretation of the Section "The a priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience"

260

(2)

25. General Character of Transcendental Subjectivity as the Original Dimension of Synthetic a priori Knowledge

262

(11)

a) The Three Modes of the Transcendental Synthesis and Their Interconnection

263

(1)

b) The Unity of the Transcendental Synthesis and the Transcendental Apperception as the Ground of Their Unity

263

(1)

c) The Relationship of the Three Syntheses to Time and Their Connection to the Self on the Basis of the Relation to Time

264

(2)

d) Transcendental Apperception and Its Relationship to Time

266

(1)

e) Time as Self-Affection, Transcendental Apperception as Self-Standing, and the Unity of Subjectivity

267

(3)

f) Transcendental Subjectivity and the Ontological Essence of Categories

270

(3)

26. Presentation of the Possibility of Ontological Knowledge

273

(21)

a) Kant's Systematic Presentation of the Transcendental Deduction of Categories -- "The Relation of the Understanding to Objects in General and the Possibility of Knowing Them a priori"

273

(15)

XXX) Kant's Point of Departure from Separate Faculties of Knowledge as Condition of His Manner of Presentation of the Transcendental Deduction and the Necessity for the Mediating Function of the Power of Imagination

273

(3)

XXX) The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception in Relation to the Productive Synthesis of the Power of Imagination

276

(4)

XXX) Characterization of the Productive Synthesis of the Power of Imagination as Related to Time, as Unity of Receptivity and Spontaneity, and as the Basic Constitution of the Subject as Ecstatic

280

(4)

XXX) Demonstration of the a priori Interconnection between Transcendental Apperception and Pure Intuition as Presentation of the Ob-jective Reality and Ontological Essence of Categories

284

(4)

b) The Possibility of Synthetic Judgments a priori and the Possibility of Ontological Knowledge

288

(3)

c) The Significance of Kant's Doctrine of Schematism

291

(3)

Editor's Epilogue

294

(3)

Glossary of German Terms

297

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Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

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