Principles of International Politics: People's Power, Preferences, and Perceptions

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ISBN: 9781568024233 | 1568024231
Cover: Paperback
Copyright: 11/1/1999

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In contrast to most current approaches to international politics, this work views domestic politics and international relations as inseparable and the role of individual political leaders as key. A core assumption is that political leaders and foreign policy decision makers are motivated to keep their jobs and that they select policies and allocate scarce resources so as to help them fulfill their personal political objectives.

Tables, Figures, and Maps	p. ix
Preface	p. xii
Foundations of International Politics	p. 1
Governing Principles	p. 2
Organizational Features of This Book	p. 6
The Core Concerns of International Relations	p. 8
The Link Between Domestic Politics and International Politics	p. 8
Is the State the Central Actor?	p. 11
Solving International Relations Puzzles	p. 12
Power, Preferences, and Perceptions: The Three Pillars of International Relations	p. 14
Self-Interest: The Decisive Motivation for Action	p. 16
Summary	p. 20
Christopher Columbus and International Relations	p. 22
Columbus's Proposal, or Ferdinand and Isabella's Ambition	p. 23
Factors That Shape Foreign Policy Choices	p. 24
Probability of Success or Failure	p. 24
Policy Costs and Political Costs	p. 25
Expected Utility of a Policy Compared to Alternative Policies	p. 26
Discovering America: An Evaluation of Political Economy and National Security	p. 27
The Offer to Portugal	p. 28
The Offers to England and France	p. 30
The Offer to Spain	p. 30
Lessons Suggested by Columbus's Experience	p. 33
The Right Policy for One Leader May Be Wrong for Another	p. 34
The Importance of Context	p. 35
Tools and Solutions: An Illustration of the Use of Decision Theory in the Study of International Relations	p. 38
Spain's Expected Utility	p. 39
Portugal's Expected Utility	p. 44
Game Theory, or Why People Sometimes Choose What They Do Not Like Best	p. 46
Summary	p. 54
International Politics from a Structural Perspective	p. 56
Evaluating Alternative Principles	p. 56
Defining the Puzzles of Cooperation and Conflict	p. 58
Examples of International Cooperation	p. 58
Examples of Conflict and Competition	p. 61
Structural Perspectives	p. 63
Neorealism	p. 64
Some Limitations of Neorealism	p. 70
Liberal Theories	p. 73
Liberal Theories and the Promotion of Cooperation	p. 79
Marxism	p. 90
Summary	p. 92
International Politics from Group and Decision-Making Perspectives	p. 95
The Bureaucratic, or Interest Group, Perspective	p. 95
Organizational Roles in Foreign Policy	p. 97
Principal-Agent Problems	p. 100
Standard Operating Procedures	p. 107
Strategic Perspective	p. 110
Comparing the Core Perspectives	p. 113
Hierarchy Versus Anarchy	p. 115
Core Assumptions About Policy and Security Risks	p. 117
The Three Perspectives Illustratively Applied to Columbus	p. 127
The Columbian Voyages of Discovery: A Neorealist Explanation	p. 127
The Columbian Voyages of Discovery: An Interest Group Explanation	p. 128
The Columbian Voyages of Discovery: A Strategic Explanation	p. 129
Summary	p. 131
Evaluating Arguments About International Politics	p. 133
Theories As Simplifications of Reality	p. 135
What Is a Theory?	p. 136
Constructing Theories	p. 138
Judging Theories	p. 140
The Importance of Logical Consistency	p. 140
Truth and Falsity in Assumptions	p. 143
The First Principle of Wing-Walking	p. 146
The Case Study Method and Testing Theories	p. 152
A Standard for Comparing Theories	p. 156
Why Do We Need Theories?	p. 157
Guidelines for Evaluating Arguments and Evidence: The Scientific Method	p. 161
When a Theory Is Wrong	p. 163
Scientific Theories Must Be Falsifiable	p. 165
Summary	p. 166
What Is Power?	p. 167
Defining Power	p. 168
Methods of Exercising Power	p. 170
Persuasion	p. 171
Rewards	p. 173
Punishments	p. 176
Force	p. 181
Measuring Power	p. 183
The Fungibility of Power	p. 188
Projecting Power over Large Distances	p. 193
Summary	p. 195
Limits to Power	p. 196
Power and Military Victory	p. 197
Power Can Be Cyclical	p. 199
Coordination and Power	p. 202
Distribution Problems, Coordination Problems, and Power	p. 204
Pure Strategy Equilibria	p. 206
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium	p. 208
International Organizations: An Alternative to or Reflection of Power?	p. 211
Power and Motivation	p. 217
Asymmetric Motivation and Costs	p. 225
The Exercise of Power	p. 230
Summary	p. 234
Preferences in International Politics	p. 236
Preferred Values and American Foreign Policy: An Illustration	p. 237
What Are Preferences?	p. 241
Rationality and Preferences	p. 242
Preferences and Constrained Choices	p. 243
Vending Machines, Preferences, and Decisions	p. 246
Ordering Preferences	p. 246
Vending Machines and Information Constraints	p. 247
Buying Soda As an Expected Utility Problem	p. 248
Constrained Choice in International Relations: Some Examples	p. 249
Cold War Perceptions As Constraints	p. 251
Preferences at Marathon: An Ancient Greek Example	p. 253
Social Choice Problems: Is There a National Interest?	p. 257
Social Choice and the Cuban Missile Crisis	p. 257
Preference Cycles and Structural Realism	p. 263
Interest Groups and the Social Choice Problem	p. 264
Summary	p. 265
Preferences and the Cold War's End	p. 267
Social Choice and Spatial Views of Policy	p. 268
Predicting Policy Choices: The Median Voter Theorem	p. 271
Multidimensional Issues	p. 274
Preferences and the End of the Cold War: Win Sets As a Tool for Understanding Policy	p. 276
Domestic Soviet Preferences and the End of the Cold War	p. 278
Winning Preferences Inside the Soviet Union	p. 278
External Pressures to the End of the Cold War	p. 285
Summary	p. 289
Perceptions in International Affairs	p. 290
Perceptions and Reality	p. 291
People Form Perceptions All the Time	p. 295
What Are Beliefs or Perceptions?	p. 296
Perceptions and Information	p. 298
Perceptions and Trade Sanctions: An Illustration	p. 299
The Trade Sanctioning Game	p. 301
The Sanctioning Game and Domestic Politics	p. 310
Perception, Repetition, and Reputation	p. 315
Summary	p. 317
Perceptions, Deterrence, and Terrorism	p. 320
Perceptions and Deterrence	p. 321
General Deterrence	p. 322
Extended Deterrence and Extended Immediate Deterrence	p. 326
North Korea's Artful Use of Misconduct	p. 330
Perceptions and Deterrence: The Gulf War	p. 333
Beliefs About Terrorism	p. 339
Summary	p. 345
Domestic Politics and International Interactions: The Central Units of Analysis	p. 346
The Origins of the State	p. 347
International Relations Without the State	p. 353
Domestic Politics As an Alternative to the State	p. 354
Can Domestic Politics Affect the Definition of the National Interest?	p. 357
The 1992 Presidential Election	p. 358
Policy Objectives in the 1992 Presidential Election	p. 360
Voter Preferences, Voting Blocs, and Electoral Rule	p. 363
Alternative Interpretations of the Domestic Politics Example	p. 369
Summary	p. 370
Domestic Institutions and National Performance	p. 372
Universal Political Institutions	p. 374
Tools to Remain in Power	p. 377
Allocation of Resources and Political Institutions	p. 378
Leadership Incentives and Political Institutions	p. 382
Winning Coalition Size and Trade Policy	p. 384
The Neorealist, Alternative View of Trade Policy	p. 387
The Interest Group View of Trade Policy	p. 390
Evidence: Winning Coalition Size and Economic Performance	p. 391
Winning Coalition Size and National Survival	p. 393
Summary	p. 399
Alliances	p. 401
What Is a Military Alliance?	p. 402
The Purpose of Alliances	p. 404
When Are Alliances Reliable?	p. 408
Predicting the Reliability of Alliances	p. 413
Measuring Shared Interests	p. 414
Testing the Predictive Model	p. 418
Alliances, Coordination, and Competition	p. 420
Conflict Among Allies	p. 426
Summary	p. 432
The Causes of War: Structural Accounts	p. 434
Realist Theories of War	p. 435
How Well Does Neorealism Do in Explaining War and Instability?	p. 437
Bipolarity and Stability	p. 437
Bipolarity and Stability: A Second Look	p. 445
History and Neorealist Empirical Claims	p. 448
Other Neorealist Hypotheses and the Historical Record	p. 452
The Survival of Essential and Inessential States	p. 452
Uncertainty and War	p. 453
Acquiescence and Neorealism	p. 455
Balance of Power and Neorealism	p. 456
The Power Transition: A Structural Alternative to neorealism	p. 458
Examples of International Rules and Norms	p. 460
Dissatisfaction, the Status Quo, and War	p. 462
Summary	p. 468
Strategic Theories of War	p. 469
The International Interaction Game and War	p. 470
War and Uncertainty: The IIG and Structural Theories	p. 476
Weakness and War: Resurrection and Pacific Doves	p. 478
Violent Pacific Doves: A Case History	p. 483
Arms Races, Deterrence, and War	p. 488
Other Hypotheses About War	p. 495
The Scapegoat Hypothesis	p. 495
Status Inconsistency	p. 497
War in Cycles	p. 499
Summary	p. 500
A Predictive Model of International Affairs	p. 501
Logical Foundation of the Model	p. 503
Perceptual Analysis	p. 507
Estimating the Model	p. 512
Why Does This Model Help?	p. 515
Intuition Behind the Model's Dynamics	p. 516
Developing the Data	p. 518
Model Output	p. 522
Prediction and International Relations	p. 529
Using the Model	p. 534
Glossary of Key Terms	p. 536
Bibliography	p. 548
Subject Index	p. 573
Citations of Authors	p. 585
Table of Contents provided by Syndetics. All Rights Reserved.

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Principles of International Politics: People's Power, Preferences, and Perceptions

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