The Problem of Political Authority An Examination of the Right to Coerce and the Duty to Obey

Modern states commonly deploy coercion in a wide array of circumstances in which the resort to force would clearly be wrong for any private agent. What entitles the state to behave in this manner? And why should citizens obey its commands? This book examines theories of political authority, from the social contract theory, to theories of democratic authorization, to fairness- and consequence-based theories. Ultimately, no theory of authority succeeds, and thus no government has the kind of authority often ascribed to governments. The author goes on to discuss how voluntary and competitive institutions could provide the central goods for the sake of which the state is often deemed necessary, including law, protection from private criminals, and national security. An orderly and livable society thus does not require acquiescence in the illusion of political authority.

MICHAEL HUEMER is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, USA. He is author of Ethical Intuitionism (Palgrave, 2005). 

Analytical Contents
Preface
PART I:THE ILLUSION OF AUTHORITY
The Problem of Political Authority
The Traditional Social Contract Theory
The Hypothetical Social Contract Theory
The Authority of Democracy
Consequentialism and Fairness
The Psychology of Authority
What If There Is No Authority?
PART II: SOCIETY WITHOUT AUTHORITY
Evaluating Social Theories
The Logic of Predation
Individual Security in a Stateless Society
Criminal Justice and Dispute Resolution
War and Societal Defense
From Democracy to Anarchy
References
Index