Representation through Taxation: Revenue,

Social scientists teach that politicians favor groups that are organized over those that are not. Yet even organized groups may be unable to credibly promise that their members will take certain actions in return for favorable policy treatment. In such environments, politicians have an incentive to favor those groups - organized or not - whose members find it advantageous to take these actions in any event. Gehlbach develops this argument in the context of the postcommunist experience, focusing on the incentive of politicians to promote sectors that are naturally more tax compliant, regardless of their organization. In the former Soviet Union, tax systems were structured around familiar revenue sources, magnifying this incentive and helping to prejudice public policy against new private enterprise. In Eastern Europe, in contrast, tax systems were created to cast the revenue net more widely, encouraging politicians to provide the collective goods necessary for new firms to flourish.

List of Tables	p. xi
List of Figures	p. xii
Acknowledgments	p. xv
Note on Transliteration	p. xix
Taxes, Representation, And Economic Development In The Russian Heartland	p. 1
Structuring Tax Systems - and the Tax Base	p. 4
The Nature of Representation	p. 9
Revenue Dependence and Economic Development	p. 13
Looking Ahead	p. 16
The Creation Of Tax Systems	p. 20
Taxation under Communism	p. 21
Taxation after Communism	p. 22
Initial Conditions and Postcommunist Tax Structure	p. 28
Tax Revenue and Tax Compliance	p. 38
Summary	p. 50
Appendix: Supplementary Tables and Figures	p. 52
The Logic Of Representation Through Taxation	p. 60
Theoretical Framework	p. 64
Empirical Predictions	p. 68
Summary	p. 74
Appendix: The Formal Logic of Representation through Taxation	p. 75
Model	p. 76
Equilibrium	p. 78
Comparative Statics	p. 80
Extensions	p. 83
Patterns Of Collective-Goods Provision	p. 86
Data	p. 89
Representation through Collective Action versus Representation through Taxation	p. 94
Divergent Patterns of Collective-Goods Provision	p. 101
Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations	p. 113
Summary	p. 118
Appendix: Supplementary Tables	p. 120
Revenue Traps	p. 127
Revenue Dependence and Factor Mobility	p. 131
The Political Economy of Privatization in Postsocialist States	p. 133
"Old" and "New" Equilibria	p. 142
Summary	p. 146
Appendix A: The Formal Logic of Revenue Traps	p. 147
Environment and Equilibrium	p. 147
Resistance to Shocks	p. 150
Welfare	p. 151
Necessity of Government Support	p. 152
Appendix B: Progress in Privatization during First Postcommunist Decade	p. 153
Conclusions	p. 155
The Institutional Nature of State Capacity	p. 157
The Political Consequences of Exit	p. 160
A Post-Olsonian Political Economy	p. 162
Bibliography	p. 165
Author Index	p. 181
Subject Index	p. 186
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

What is included with this book?

The New copy of this book will include any supplemental materials advertised. Please check the title of the book to determine if it should include any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.

The Used, Rental and eBook copies of this book are not guaranteed to include any supplemental materials. Typically, only the book itself is included. This is true even if the title states it includes any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.

FREE SHIPPING

Amazon no longer offers textbook rentals. We do!

Representation through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States

Summary

Table of Contents

Supplemental Materials