The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 1974-79

Historians have hitherto cast British policy as one of consistent, weak appeasement prior to the Falklands War, encouraging Argentine leaders to stake everything on an invasion. Drawing on recently declassified government files, private papers and interviews, Aaron Donaghy argues against this popular notion. He shows that through a combination of preventative diplomacy and robust defence planning, the Labour government of 1974-79 succeeded in maintaining peace, avoiding the fate of its Tory successors.

The mid to late 1970s marked the most dangerous period prior to the war. The Argentine occupation of Southern Thule, withdrawal of ambassadors, attacks on ships and secret deployments tell only part of the story. Uncovering remarkable evidence, Donaghy explains how misconceptions about Britain's naval deployment in the South Atlantic in 1977 would have fatal consequences for policymaking in March 1982. This study of how the British government confronted Argentina will provide a new understanding of the immediate origins of the Falklands War.

Aaron Donaghy is an Irish Research Council Government of Ireland Postdoctoral Fellow at University College Dublin, Ireland. His research interests include twentieth century British history and the history of international relations, particularly Anglo-American relations.

Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Maps
Introduction
1. 'Leave This Poisoned Chalice Alone'
2. The Lowest Common Multiple
3. A Sensational Hostage
4. Islands Surrounded by Advice
5. The Mixed Approach
6. Absentee Landlords
7. Defence of the Realm
8. 'No Talks, Just Football'
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index