The Shorter Logical Investigations

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ISBN: 9780415241922 | 0415241928
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Copyright: 10/12/2001

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This paperback abridged edition of J.N. Findlay's translation makes the key sections of this classic work available in one volume for the first time. It has been specially edited and includes a new introduction by Dermot Moran and a new preface by Sir Michael Dummett. It places theLogical Investigationsin historical context and brings out its importance for contemporary philosophy.

Preface

xxi

Michael Dummett

Introduction

xxv

Dermot Moran

Select bibliography

lxxix

Translator's Introduction (Abridged)

lxxxiii

Foreword to First German Edition, Volume I (1900)

(2)

Foreword to Second German Edition, Volume I (1913)

(6)

PROLEGOMENA TO PURE LOGIC Volume I of the German Editions

(76)

Introduction

(1)

The controversy regarding the definition of logic and the essential content of its doctrines

(1)

Necessity of a renewed discussion of questions of principle

(1)

Disputed questions. The path to be entered

(2)

Logic as a normative and, in particular, as a practical discipline

(8)

The theoretical incompleteness of the separate sciences

(1)

The theoretical completion of the separate sciences by metaphysics and theory of science

(1)

The possibility and justification of logic as theory of science

(3)

The ideas of theory and science as problems of the theory of science

(1)

Logic or theory of science as normative discipline and as technology

(1)

Relevant definitions of logic

(2)

Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines

(7)

The concept of a normative science. The basic standard or principle that gives it unity

(4)

Normative disciplines and technologies

(1)

Theoretical disciplines as the foundation of normative disciplines

(3)

Psychologism, its arguments and its attitude to the usual counter-arguments

(6)

The disputed question as to whether the essential theoretical foundations of normative logic lie in psychology

(1)

The line of proof of the psychologistic thinkers

(1)

The usual arguments of the opposition and the psychologistic rejoinder

(3)

A gap in the psychologistic line of proof

(2)

Empiricistic consequences of psychologism

(8)

The laws of thought as supposed laws of nature which operate in isolation as causes of rational thought

(2)

A third consequence of psychologism, and its refutation

(3)

Continuation

(3)

Psychologism as a sceptical relativism

(9)

The ideal conditions for the possibility of a theory as such. The strict concept of scepticism

(1)

Scepticism in the metaphysical sense

(1)

The concept of relativism and its specific forms

(1)

Critique of individual relativism

(1)

Critique of specific relativism and, in particular, of anthropologism

(4)

General observation. The concept of relativism in an extended sense

(1)

Psychologism in all its forms is a relativism

(2)

The psychologistic prejudices

(14)

First prejudice

(2)

Second prejudice

(1)

Refutation. Pure mathematics would likewise be made a branch of psychology

(1)

The research domain of pure logic is, like that of mathematics, an ideal domain

(2)

Third prejudice. Logic as the theory of evidence

(1)

Transformation of logical propositions into equivalent propositions about the ideal conditions for evidence of judgement. The resultant propositions are not psychological

(3)

The decisive points in this dispute

(4)

End of our critical treatments

(4)

Need for special investigations to provide an epistemological justification and partial realization of the Idea of pure logic

(4)

Appendix: References to F. A. Lange and B. Bolzano

(3)

The idea of pure logic

(14)

The unity of science. The interconnection of things and the interconnection of truths

(2)

Continuation. The unity of theory

(1)

The question as to the ideal conditions of the possibility of science or of theory in general. A. The question as it relates to actual knowledge

(2)

B. The question as it relates to the content of knowledge

(2)

The tasks of pure logic. First: the fixing of the pure categories of meaning, the pure categories of objects and their law-governed combinations

(1)

Secondly: the laws and theories which have their grounds in these categories

(1)

Thirdly: the theory of the possible forms of theories or the pure theory of manifolds

(5)

INVESTIGATIONS INTO PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE Volume II, Part I of the German Editions

(16)

Introduction

(1)

The necessity of phenomenological investigations as a preliminary to the epistemological criticism and clarification of pure logic

(1)

Elucidation of the aims of such investigations

(4)

The difficulties of pure phenomenological analysis

(2)

It is essential to keep in mind the grammatical side of our logical experiences

(1)

Statement of the main aims of the following analytical investigations

(1)

Additional Notes

(3)

`Freedom from presuppositions' as a principle in epistemological investigations

(4)

INVESTIGATION I EXPRESSION AND MEANING

101

(30)

Essential distinctions

103

(18)

An ambiguity in the term `sign'

103

(1)

The essence of indication

103

(1)

Expressions as meaningful signs. Setting aside of a sense of `expression' not relevant for our purpose

104

(1)

Questions as to the phenomenological and intentional distinctions which pertain to expressions as such

105

(1)

Expressions as they function in communication

106

(1)

Expressions in solitary life

107

(1)

Phenomenological distinctions between the physical appearance of the expression, and the sense-giving and sense-fulfilling act

108

(2)

The phenomenological unity of these acts

110

(2)

The ideal distinctions: firstly, between expression and meaning as ideal entities

112

(2)

Continuation: the expressed objectivity

114

(1)

Connection between meaning and objective reference

115

(1)

Content as object, content as fulfilling sense and content as sense or meaning simpliciter

116

(1)

The equivocations in talk of meaning and meaninglessness connected with these distinctions

117

(4)

Fluctuation in meaning and the ideality of unities of meaning

121

(10)

Introduction

121

(1)

Relations of coincidence among the contents of intimation and naming

121

(1)

Essentially occasional and objective expressions

122

(4)

Pure logic and ideal meanings

126

(5)

INVESTIGATION II THE IDEAL UNITY OF THE SPECIES AND MODERN THEORIES OF ABSTRACTION

131

(30)

Introduction

133

(2)

Universal objects and the consciousness of universality

135

(7)

We are conscious of universal objects in acts which differ essentially from those in which we are conscious of individual objects

135

(1)

The indispensability of talk about universal objects

136

(1)

Must the unity of the Species be regarded as a spurious unity? Identity and exact likeness

137

(1)

Objections to the reduction of ideal unity to dispersed multiplicity

138

(2)

Transition to the following chapters

140

(2)

The psychological hypostatization of the universal

142

(3)

The metaphysical and psychological hypostatization of the universal. Nominalism

142

(1)

A deceptive line of thought

143

(2)

Abstraction and attention

145

(13)

Objections to any and every form of nominalism

The lack of a descriptive fixation of aims

145

(2)

The origin of modern nominalism as an exaggerated reaction to Locke's doctrine of general ideas. The essential character of this nominalism, and of the theory of abstraction in terms of attention

147

(2)

Generality of psychological function and generality as a meaning-form. Different senses of the relation of a universal to an extension

149

(2)

Application to the critique of nominalism

151

(1)

The difference between attending to a non-independent moment of an intuited object and attending to the corresponding attribute in specie

151

(2)

Fundamental deficiencies in the phenomenological analysis of attention

153

(2)

Significant talk of attention embraces the whole sphere of thinking and not merely the sphere of intuition

155

(3)

Abstraction and representation

158

(3)

The general idea as a device for economizing thought

158

(3)

INVESTIGATION III ON THE THEORY OF WHOLES AND PARTS

161

(20)

Introduction

163

(1)

The difference between independent and non-independent objects

164

(10)

Complex and simple, articulated and unarticulated objects

164

(1)

Introduction of the distinction between independent and non-independent objects (contents)

165

(1)

The inseparability of non-independent contents

166

(1)

Analyses of examples following Stumpf

167

(2)

The multiplicity of laws governing the various sorts of non-independent contents

169

(1)

The difference between these `material' laws and `formal' or `analytic' laws

170

(2)

Basic determinations in regard to analytic and synthetic propositions

172

(2)

Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts

174

(7)

The concept of Foundation and some relevant theorems

174

(2)

Exact pinning down of the pregnant notions of Whole and Part, and of their essential Species, by means of the notion of Foundation

176

(1)

Forms of categorial unity and wholes

177

(1)

The pure formal types of wholes and parts. The postulate of an a priori theory

178

(3)

INVESTIGATION IV THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT AND NON-INDEPENDENT MEANINGS AND THE IDEA OF PURE GRAMMAR

181

(16)

Introduction

183

(1)

Simple and complex meanings

184

(1)

The question of the meaningfulness of `syncategorematic' components of complex expressions

184

(2)

Independent and non-independent meanings. The non-independence of the sensory and expressive parts of words

186

(1)

The conception of non-independent meanings as founded contents

187

(2)

Difficulties of this conception. (a) Whether the non-independence of the meaning does not really only lie in the non-independence of the object meant

189

(1)

A priori laws governing combinations of meanings

189

(3)

Nonsense and absurdity

192

(1)

The laws of the compounding of meanings and the pure logico-grammatical theory of forms

193

(4)

INVESTIGATION V ON INTENTIONAL EXPERIENCES AND THEIR `CONTENTS'

197

(70)

Introduction

199

(2)

Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego and consciousness as inner perception

201

(10)

Varied ambiguity of the term `consciousness'

201

(1)

First sense: Consciousness as the real phenomenological unity of the ego's experiences. The concept of an experience

202

(2)

The relation between experiencing consciousness and experienced content is no phenomenologically peculiar type of relation

204

(1)

Second sense. `Inner' consciousness as inner perception

205

(1)

Origin of the first concept of consciousness out of the second

206

(2)

The pure ego and awareness (`Bewusstheit')

208

(3)

Additional Note to the Second Edition

210

(1)

Consciousness as intentional experience

211

(31)

The meaning of Brentano's demarcation of `psychic phenomena'

211

(1)

Descriptive characterization of acts as `intentional' experiences

212

(2)

Avoidance of verbally tempting misunderstandings

The `mental' or `immanent' object

214

(3)

The act and the relation of consciousness or the ego to the object

217

(1)

The fixing of our terminology

218

(1)

Difficulties which surround the assumption of acts as a descriptively founded class of experiences

219

(4)

Whether experiences of one and the same phenomenological kind (of the genus Feeling in particular) can consist partly of acts and partly of non-acts

223

(6)

Are there any intentional feelings?

224

(2)

Are there non-intentional feelings? Distinction between feeling-sensations and feeling-acts

226

(3)

Distinction between descriptive and intentional content

229

(1)

The intentional content in the sense of the intentional object

230

(2)

Simple and complex, founding and founded acts

232

(1)

The difference between the quality and the matter of an act

233

(3)

The intentional and the semantic essence

236

(6)

Appendix to §11 and §20. Critique of the `image-theory' and of the doctrine of the `immanent' objects of acts

238

(4)

The matter of the act and its underlying presentation

242

(7)

The question of the relation between the matter and quality of an act

242

(1)

The view of `matter' as a founding act of `mere presentation'

243

(2)

The testimony of direct intuition. Perceptual presentation and perception

245

(4)

Study of founding presentations with special regard to the theory of judgement

249

(2)

An ambiguity in the word `presentation', and the supposed self-evidence of the principle that every act is founded on an act of presentation

249

(2)

Further contributions to the theory of judgement. `Presentation' as a qualitatively unitary genus of nominal and propositional acts

251

(10)

The aim of the following investigation. The concept of an objectifying act

251

(1)

Qualitative and material differentiation of objectifying acts

252

(3)

Presentation in the sense of an objectifying act, and its qualitative modification

255

(3)

Continuation. Qualitative and imaginative modification

258

(2)

New interpretation of the principle that makes presentations the basis of all acts. The objectifying act as the primary bearer of `matter'

260

(1)

Summing-up of the most important ambiguities in the terms `presentation' and `content'

261

(6)

`Presentation'

261

(4)

The `presentational content'

265

(2)

Note

265

(2)

Volume II, Part 2 of the Second German Edition

267

(4)

Foreword to the Second Edition (1921)

267

(4)

INVESTIGATION VI ELEMENTS OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ELUCIDATION OF KNOWLEDGE

271

(8)

Introduction

273

(6)

First Section Objectifying intentions and their fulfilments: knowledge as a synthesis of fulfilment and its gradations

279

(58)

Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment

281

(21)

Whether every type of mental act, or only certain types, can function as carriers of meaning

281

(1)

That all acts may be expressed does not decide the issue. There are two senses to talk about expressing an act

282

(1)

A third sense of talk about the `expression' of acts. Formulation of our theme

283

(2)

The expression of a percept (`judgement of perception'). Its meaning cannot lie in perception, but must lie in peculiar expressive acts

285

(1)

Continuation. Perception as an act which determines meaning, without embodying it

286

(5)

Addendum

289

(2)

The static unity of expressive thought and expressed intuition. Recognition (das Erkennen)

291

(1)

Recognition as a character of acts, and the `generality of words'

292

(4)

The dynamic unity of expression and expressed intuition. The consciousness of fulfilment and that of identity

296

(3)

Addendum

298

(1)

The wider class of experiences of fulfilment. Intuitions as intentions which require fulfilment

299

(1)

Frustration and conflict. The synthesis of distinction

300

(2)

Indirect characterization of objectifying intentions and their essential varieties through differences in the syntheses of fulfilment

302

(10)

The synthesis of knowing (recognition) as the characteristic form of fulfilment for objectifying acts. Subsumption of acts of meaning under the class of objectifying acts

302

(2)

Phenomenological characterization of the distinction between signitive and intuitive intentions through peculiarities of fulfilment. (a) Sign, image and self-presentation

304

(4)

The perceptual and imaginative adumbration of the object

306

(2)

Signitive intentions beyond the limits of the meaning-function

308

(4)

The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge

312

(15)

Simple identification and fulfilment

312

(2)

The question of the relation between fulfilment and intuitive illustration

314

(1)

Fullness and `intuitive substance' (Gehalt)

315

(1)

Relationships of weight between the intuitive and signitive `substance' (Gehalt) of one and the same act. Pure intuition and pure signification. Perceptual and imaginal content, pure perception and pure imagination. Gradations of fulness

316

(3)

Fullness and intentional matter

319

(3)

Continuation. Representation or interpretation (Auffassung). Matter as the interpretative sense, the interpretative form and the interpreted content. Differentiating characterization of intuitive and signitive interpretation

322

(2)

Complete and defective intuitions. Adequate and objectively complete intuitive illustrations. Essentia (Essenz)

324

(3)

The ideal of adequation. Self-evidence and truth

327

(10)

Introduction

327

(1)

The fulfilling function of perception. The ideal of ultimate fulfilment

327

(3)

Positing acts in the function of fulfilment. Self-evidence in the loose and strict sense

330

(1)

Self-evidence and truth

331

(6)

Second Section Sense and understanding

337

(40)

Sensuous and categorial intuitions

339

(21)

The problem of the fulfilment of categorial meaning-forms, with a thought leading towards its solution

339

(3)

Continuation. Extension of our sphere of examples

342

(1)

The distinction between sensuous stuff and categorial form throughout the whole realm of objectifying acts

343

(2)

The objective correlates of categorial forms are not `real' (realen) moments

345

(1)

The origin of the concept of Being and of the remaining categories does not lie in the realm of inner perception

346

(2)

Widening of the concept of Intuition, and in particular of the concepts Perception and Imagination. Sensible and categorial intuition

348

(1)

Phenomenological analysis of the distinction between sensuous and categorial perception

349

(2)

Continuation. Characterization of sense-perception as `straightforward' perception

351

(3)

Characterization of categorial acts as founded acts

354

(3)

Universal objects constituting themselves in universal intuitions

357

(3)

A study in categorial representation

360

(2)

Backward reference to the researches of our first section

360

(2)

The a priori laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking

362

(15)

The complication into ever new forms. The pure theory of the forms of possible intuitions

362

(1)

The relative or functional difference between matter and form. Pure acts of understanding, and those mixed with sense. Sensuous concepts and categories

363

(1)

Categorial forming involves no real reshaping of the object

364

(1)

Our freedom in the categorial forming of given material and its limits. Purely categorial laws (laws of `authentic' thinking)

365

(3)

The new laws of the validity of signitive and admixedly signitive acts (laws of inauthentic thinking)

368

(3)

The pure logico-grammatical laws are laws for any understanding whatever, and not merely for any human understanding. Their psychological meaning and normative function in relation to inadequate thought

371

(2)

The senseless problem of the real meaning of the logical

373

(1)

Distinction between the most important differences mixed up in the current opposition of `intuiting' and `thinking'

374

(3)

Additional note to the Second Edition

376

(1)

Third Section Clarification of our introductory problem

377

(14)

Non-objectifying acts as apparent fulfilments of meaning

379

(12)

That not every act of meaning includes an act of knowing

379

(2)

The controversy regarding the interpretation of the peculiar grammatical forms which express non-objectifying acts

381

(2)

Arguments for and against the Aristotelian conception

383

(5)

Decision

388

(3)

APPENDIX External and internal perception: physical and psychical phenomena

391

(14)

1 The popular and the traditional philosophical concepts of external and internal perception

391

(1)

2 and 3 Epistemological and psychological motives for deepening the traditional division: Brentano's conception

392

(4)

4 Criticism. External and internal perception are, on a normal interpretation of the concepts, of the same epistemological character: Perception and Apperception

396

(1)

5 The equivocations of the term `appearance'

397

(3)

5a Excised passage from the First Edition

400

(1)

6 There is for this reason confusion between the epistemologically meaningless opposition of inner and outer perception, and the epistemologically fundamental opposition of adequate and inadequate perception

400

(2)

7 That the dispute is not verbal

402

(1)

8 Confusion of two fundamentally different divisions of `phenomena'. That `physical' contents do not exist `in merely phenomenal fashion', but exist `actually'

403

(2)

Notes

405

(12)

Index

417

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The Shorter Logical Investigations

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