War by Other Means--Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency: RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Final Report

, by Gompert, David C.; Gordon, John; Grissom, Adam; Frelinger, David R.; Jones, Seth G.

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ISBN: 9780833043092 | 0833043099
Cover: Paperback
Copyright: 3/13/2008

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Examines how the United States should improve its counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities through, for example, much greater focus on understanding jihadist strategy, using civil measures to strengthen the local government, and enabling local forces to conduct COIN operations. Provides a broad discussion of the investments, organizational changes, and multilateral arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities.

Preface	p. iii
Figures	p. xvii
Tables	p. xix
Summary	p. xxiii
Acknowledgments	p. lix
Abbreviations	p. lxi
The Challenge
Defining the Problem	p. 1
GWOT or COIN?	p. 1
The Globalization of Insurgency and COIN	p. 14
The Untidy and Dynamic World of COIN	p. 17
What to Expect from This Report	p. 19
Framing the Problem	p. 23
A Planning Construct	p. 23
Types of Insurgency	p. 23
Local Insurgency	p. 25
Local-International Insurgency	p. 26
Global-Local Insurgency	p. 27
Global Insurgency	p. 28
Aspects of COIN	p. 32
Understanding	p. 32
Shaping	p. 33
Acting	p. 35
Timing: Understanding, Shaping, and Acting over the Lifetime of Insurgency	p. 36
COIN Capabilities	p. 40
Territorial	p. 40
Structural	p. 41
Kinetic	p. 42
Informational	p. 43
Cognitive	p. 44
Countering Type III Insurgency	p. 49
The Main Threat	p. 49
COIN Challenges from Type III Insurgencies	p. 58
The Paradox of Force	p. 62
Achieving Legitimacy and Security While Reducing Reliance on Deadly Force	p. 67
Complete and Balanced Capabilities
Overview of Capabilities Needed to Counter Type III Insurgency	p. 75
Timely Civil COIN	p. 76
The Power of Information	p. 78
Improving Local Forces	p. 81
A Change in Emphasis for U.S. Military Forces	p. 83
Civil Capabilities	p. 87
Introduction	p. 87
Competition in the Civil Realm	p. 89
Strategies to Meet the Challenges of Type III Insurgency	p. 90
Carrot-and-Stick	p. 90
Hearts-and-Minds	p. 91
Transformation	p. 92
Integrating the Three Strategies to Counter Type III Insurgency	p. 93
Expertise and Resources in Functional Areas	p. 95
Coordinated Participation of Multiple Organizations	p. 97
The Host Nation	p. 98
The U.S. Government	p. 98
Other Governments	p. 99
International Organizations	p. 99
Nongovernmental Organizations	p. 100
Guiding Principles for Implementing a Strategy	p. 100
Coordinate Civil and Military Efforts	p. 100
Start Early	p. 101
Manage Expectations	p. 103
Current Efforts	p. 103
Capabilities: How Ready Is the United States to Conduct Civil COIN?	p. 105
Nature of the Quantitative Analysis	p. 106
The Necessary Operational Culture Is Lacking	p. 108
Current Numbers of Personnel Are Too Low	p. 110
Fiscal Resources Are Insufficient	p. 113
Thinking About Future Capabilities	p. 116
"The Big One"	p. 116
Two "Mediums"	p. 117
Two "Mediums" Plus Prevention	p. 117
The Security Problem	p. 120
Conclusion	p. 121
Information Capabilities	p. 123
Information as a Strategic Resource	p. 123
Putting Users First in Setting and Meeting Information Requirements	p. 126
Getting Information	p. 133
Promoting a Cell Phone Society	p. 133
National Registry-Census, ID Cards, and Vetting	p. 137
Three-Dimensional Awareness	p. 139
Embedded Video	p. 140
National Wiki	p. 141
Enabling Information Users to Be Productive Information Providers	p. 142
ICON	p. 144
How Much Difference Would ICON Make?	p. 151
An ICONic Vignette	p. 152
Feasibility and Implementation	p. 155
Perception and Cognition	p. 161
Influencing Opinion	p. 161
From Information Power to Brain Power	p. 168
Cognitive Capabilities for COIN	p. 169
Conclusion	p. 172
General Security Capabilities	p. 175
Rethinking Basic Requirements	p. 175
Core Security Capabilities	p. 178
Institutional Management Capacity	p. 179
Uniformed Command and Leadership	p. 181
Logistics	p. 182
IO Capabilities and Competence	p. 183
Justice Systems	p. 184
Police and Law Enforcement	p. 185
Constabulary Police	p. 187
Technical Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)	p. 188
Human Intelligence	p. 189
Border Security	p. 190
Coastal Security	p. 191
Tactical Air Mobility	p. 191
Long-Range Air Mobility	p. 192
Specialized Forces for High-Value Targets (HVTs)	p. 193
Precision Strike	p. 194
Ground Combat	p. 194
The Relationship of Local and Foreign Capabilities	p. 198
Local Security Capabilities	p. 203
Factors Affecting Local Capability	p. 203
Timing	p. 204
Insurgent Strength	p. 205
Initial Condition of the Local Government	p. 208
Priorities for Local Security Capabilities	p. 209
Real-World Obstacles	p. 214
U.S. Security Capabilities	p. 217
Building for Success; Hedging Against Disappointment	p. 217
Building for Success	p. 218
Three U.S. Missions: Prepare, Enable, Operate	p. 218
Requirements for Preparing, Enabling, and Operating	p. 223
Deficient U.S. Capabilities	p. 228
Hedging Against Disappointment	p. 233
Training and Education	p. 238
Nonlethal Force Options	p. 239
Land Mobility	p. 240
Inclusive, Integrated, User-Based Networks for Sharing and Collaboration	p. 240
Sustainable Ground Operations	p. 240
U.S. Ground Forces-Better or Bigger?	p. 241
Conclusion	p. 247
Organizing and Investing
Multilateral Counterinsurgency	p. 249
The Case for Multilateral COIN	p. 249
The Content of Multilateral COIN Capabilities	p. 251
Preparing for Multilateral COIN	p. 256
The NATO-EU Model	p. 261
The Non-NATO Model	p. 264
Conducting Multilateral COIN	p. 266
Multilateral COIN Campaign Models	p. 269
Functions, Principles, and Options	p. 272
Political Authority, Strategy-Setting, and Policymaking	p. 273
Campaign Oversight	p. 274
Command, Control, and Collaboration in Security Operations	p. 274
Local Cooperation	p. 275
Information	p. 275
Politics	p. 276
Investment Priorities	p. 279
The Need to Invest	p. 279
Setting Investment Priorities	p. 281
Planning High-Priority Investments	p. 287
Investing for an Uncertain Future	p. 295
Costs	p. 297
Conclusion	p. 301
Organization: Unsettled Structures for Unsettled Times	p. 303
Organizational Issues in Perspective	p. 303
Capability Gaps and Organizational Implications	p. 307
Justice and Police	p. 309
Building Local Security Institutional Capacity	p. 311
Organizing, Training, Equipping, and Advising Foreign Armed Forces	p. 313
Employment Impact	p. 314
Mass Public Education	p. 314
Macro-Structural Considerations	p. 316
Business-as-Usual	p. 318
Install a COIN Czar	p. 320
Create a COIN Agency	p. 322
Defense COIN Options	p. 324
Business-as-Usual	p. 326
Expand the Scope and Size of U.S. SOCOM	p. 327
Assign COIN as a Principal Mission of Regular Forces	p. 330
Create a Defense Security Agency	p. 335
Summary	p. 338
Micro-Structural Considerations	p. 339
Implications and Recommendations	p. 347
Definitions Matter	p. 347
Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities	p. 351
Will It Really Work?	p. 354
Implementation Strategy	p. 357
Investment	p. 357
Organization	p. 359
Harnessing Information Power	p. 360
Multilateral COIN	p. 361
Engendering Local Responsibility	p. 363
Getting Started: Specific Recommendations for Immediate Attention	p. 365
Civil COIN	p. 366
Information and Cognition	p. 366
Local Security Services	p. 367
U.S. Forces	p. 367
Multilateral	p. 368
Organization	p. 368
Conclusion	p. 368
Appendixes
Eighty-Nine Insurgencies: Outcomes and Endings	p. 373
Multilateral COIN Capacity	p. 397
Indicators and Warnings	p. 431
Ground-Force Tasks and Improvements	p. 439
About the RAND COIN Team	p. 441
Works Cited	p. 445
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War by Other Means--Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency: RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Final Report

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