Belief, Agency, and Knowledge Essays on Epistemic Normativity

Matthew Chrisman, Professor of Ethics and Epistemology, University of Edinburgh

Matthew Chrisman is Professor of Ethics and Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh. His research is focused on epistemology, metaethics, philosophy of language, and political philosophy. He has published widely in these areas, including articles in Noûs, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy & Public Affairs, and The Journal of Philosophy. Chrisman is the author of The Meaning of 'Ought' and What Is This Thing Called Metaethics? He was elected a member of the Young Academy of Scotland in 2016, where he led in creation of the Young Academy of Scotland's Charter for Responsible Debate. He completed his PhD and MA at the University of North Carolina, and his BA at Rice University.

1. IntroductionPART I: DOXASTIC AGENCY2. Beliefs are States not Performances3. Belief Formation Doesn't Exhaust Doxastic Agency4. The Activity of Maintaining BeliefsPART II: EPISTEMIC NORMS5. The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth6. Doxastic Involuntarism and 'Ought to Believe'7. Social Foundations for Epistemic NormativityPART III: EPISTEMIC DISCOURSE8. From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism9. From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism