Jurisprudence in the Mirror The Common Law World Meets the Civil Law World

There is something quite puzzling about the global conversation on jurisprudence. On the one hand, jurisprudence is supposed to deal with abstract questions concerning the nature, structure, and distinctive features of the law. These questions are not tightly associated with, or dependent on, the particular legal practices in one jurisdiction or another. But, on the other hand, it seems that jurisprudents are tacitly affected by their background institutional context: there is an evident divide between theorizing about the law in the civil law world and in the common law world.

Jurisprudence in the Mirror: The Common Law World Meets the Civil Law World systematically presents the major achievements of contemporary civil law jurisprudence to the common law world and bridges the gap in analytic jurisprudence as it is currently practiced in the two traditions. The volume seeks to bring different voices to the table and overcome the cultural and linguistic divides that have created barriers in philosophical exchanges. The book's structure is dialogical: it includes twelve essays written by prominent and influential jurisprudents from the civil law world, each followed by a response by a jurisprudent from the common law world. This approach highlights what the two worlds share, where they part ways, and why. The varied contributions reveal how their respective legal traditions shape fundamental legal concepts and jurisprudential debates and will be invaluable to readers from both the civil and common law worlds.

Luka Burazin, Full Professor, University of Zagreb,Kenneth Einar Himma, Continuing Guest Professor, University of Zagreb,Giorgio Pino, Full Professor of Philosophy of Law, Roma Tre University

Luka Burazin is a full professor in legal theory at the University of Zagreb. In 2022 he was elected president of the Croatian section of IVR. He has published papers in journals Rechtstheorie, ARSP, Diritto e questioni pubbliche, Ratio Juris, Jurisprudence, Doxa, and in books by OUP, Edward Elgar and Springer. He co-edited books Law and State (Peter Lang 2015), Law as an Artifact (OUP 2018) and The Artifactual Nature of Law (Edward Elgar 2022). He is a co-editor of journal Revus. He has translated several legal theory books and a number of legal theory papers into Croatian.


Kenneth Einar Himma is a continuing guest professor at the Faculty of Law at the University of Zagreb. He has published extensively in the areas of philosophy of law, philosophy of information and information ethics, philosophy of religion, and applied ethics. He is the author of Morality and the Nature of Law (OUP 2019) and Coercion and the Nature of Law (OUP 2020). He has published well over 100 essays and book reviews in these various areas and is on the editorial boards of Legal Theory, Law and Philosophy, Ratio Juris, Revus, and other journals in the area.


Giorgio Pino is Full Professor of Philosophy of Law at Roma Tre University. He is a member of the Executive Committee of the IVR. He has published 9 books (in Italian, four of which have been translated in Spanish), and several scholarly articles in various international journals such as Law and Philosophy, Ratio Juris, Doxa, Analisi e Diritto, Ragion Pratica, Diritto & Questioni Pubbliche. He has held visiting positions at, among others, the EUI, Paris 1-Sorbonne, and Columbia University.

Contemporary Analytical Jurisprudence in the Civil Law World and in the Common Law World: Lost in Translation?PART I. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS1. Analytical Legal Philosophy2. Anglophone Analytical Legal Philosophy: Reply to Schiavello3. Legal Positivism4. The Narrowing of Legal Positivism: Reply to Ratti and Redondo NatellaPART II. THEORY OF LEGAL NORMS5. Legal Norms and Normative Relevance6. The Systematisation of Legal Norms: Reply to Navarro and Rodríguez7. Legal Validity and Other Properties of Legal Norms8. The Validity of Validity: Reply to Moreso and Ángeles Ródenas9. Rules and Principles10. Rules and Principles Revisited: Reply to Grabowski and Lifante VidalPART III. THEORY OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM11. Legal System12. Recognition and the Concept of a Legal System: Reply to Guastini13. Sources of Law14. Sources of Law in the Common Law: Reply to Carpentier and Spaak15. Antinomies and Gaps16. Gap-Filling as Law-Making in Common Law and Civil Law Traditions Reply to Chiassoni and Huerta17. Constitution18. Constitutional Democracy: Reply to ManeroPART IV. LEGAL INTERPRETATION, REASONING, AND KNOWLEDGE19. Legal Interpretation20. Interpretation and Determinacy: Reply to Brunet and Poggi21. Legal Reasoning22. Legal Reasoning from Precedent and the Common Law: Reply to Canale23. Legal Science24. On the Nature of Legal Science: Reply to Duarte25. Coda