The U.S. Coast Guard's Deepwater Force

Explores acceleration of the pace at which the U.S. Coast Guard can acquire surface and air assests that it will operate in teh deepwater environment and whether the original Integrated Deepwater System program to modernize its aging cutters and aircraft will provide the Coast Guard with a force structure to meet the demands of its traditional missions and emerging responsibilities.

Preface

iii

Figures

xiii

Tables

xvii

Summary

xix

Acknowledgments

xxxi

Abbreviations and Acronyms

xxxiii

CHAPTER ONE Introduction

1

(6)

Background

3

(2)

Sources of Evidence We Drew on to Address the Study Question

5

(1)

Report Organization

6

(1)

CHAPTER TWO The Coast Guard and Deepwater Today

7

(16)

USCG Missions and Responsibilities

8

(3)

Maritime Safety

8

(1)

Maritime Mobility

8

(1)

Maritime Security

9

(1)

National Defense

9

(1)

Protection of Natural Resources

9

(1)

Homeland Security

10

(1)

Non-Homeland Security

10

(1)

Areas of Responsibility

11

(2)

USCG Current Assets

13

(2)

The Deepwater Program Today

15

(3)

Deepwater Timeline

18

(5)

CHAPTER THREE What Are the Implications of Accelerating Deepwater Acquisition?

23

(40)

RAND'S Questions

24

(1)

Data Sources and Methodology

25

(3)

Data We Relied On

25

(1)

Analytic Tools We Used

26

(1)

How We Employed the Data and Models

27

(1)

Assumptions and Caveats

28

(2)

Objectives and Constraints

30

(1)

RAND's Comparison of Three Acquisition Schedules

31

(1)

Can Acquisition of Deepwater Assets Be Accelerated?

32

(9)

Accelerating the Deepwater Acquisition Schedule from 20 Years to 15 Years

33

(4)

Accelerating the Deepwater Acquisition Schedule from 20 Years to 10 Years

37

(4)

'What Are the Performance Implications of Acceleration?

41

(7)

Implications of Acceleration on Annual Mission Hours

41

(2)

Implications of Acceleration on Annual Airborne Sensor-Detection-Area Coverage

43

(5)

What Are the Cost Implications of Acceleration?

48

(5)

Implications for Acquisition Costs

48

(1)

Implications for Operating and Support Costs

49

(4)

What Are the Industrial-Base Implications of Acceleration?

53

(7)

Implications of Acceleration for Shipyard Industrial Base

53

(6)

Implications of Acceleration on the Air Vehicle Industrial Base

59

(1)

Summary of the Implications of Accelerating the Deepwater Acquisition Schedule

60

(1)

Postscript Question: Can the USCG Integrate Assets Faster Than Planned?

61

(2)

CHAPTER FOUR Will the Deepwater Plan Provide USCG with a Force Structure to Meet the Demands of Traditional Missions and Emerging Responsibilities?

63

(32)

Methodology

64

(1)

Will Currently Planned Assets Enable USCG to Carry Out Anticipated Missions?

65

(2)

Will Currently Planned Assets Meet Traditional Mission Demand?

65

(1)

Will Currently Planned Assets Meet Demands from Emerging Responsibilities?

66

(1)

What Assets Would Be Required to Perform Traditional Missions Robustly?

67

(8)

Assets Required to Perform 100 Percent of Demands of USCG's Traditional Missions

67

(2)

Assets Required to Perform 100 Percent of Demands from USCG's Emerging Responsibilities

69

(3)

HAEUAVs Versus Maritime Patrol Aircraft

72

(3)

What Are the Performance Benefits of the 100-Percent Force Structure?

75

(10)

Mission-Hour Performance

76

(1)

Detection Coverage Area of Airborne Sensors

77

(1)

The Number of Assets Needed to Protect One Port Under MARSEC III

78

(7)

What Is the Cost of Acquiring the 100-Percent Force Structure?

85

(3)

Acquisition Costs

86

(1)

Operating and Support Costs

87

(1)

Is U.S. Industry Capable of Producing the 100-Percent Force Structure?

88

(3)

Labor-Hour Implications for Shipbuilders

88

(2)

Capacity Implications for Air-Vehicle Manufacturers

90

(1)

100-Percent Force Structure Bottom Line: Meets Demands of Traditional Missions and Emerging Responsibilities, but at Higher Costs

91

(1)

Postscript Question One: Can the USCG Integrate the 100-Percent Force Structure?

92

(1)

Postscript Question Two: Is Buying More of the Same Assets the Best Strategy?

93

(2)

CHAPTER FIVE Findings and Recommendations

95

(6)

Findings

96

(2)

I. The Deepwater Program Can Be Accelerated

96

(1)

II. The Deepwater Program Provides Inadequate Assets for USCG's Traditional Missions and Emerging Responsibilities

96

(1)

III. An Alternative Force Structure Can Provide Adequate Assets for USCG's Traditional Missions and Emerging Responsibilities

97

(1)

Recommendations

98

(3)

APPENDIX

A. Definitions of U.S. Coast Guard Mission Responsibilities and Cutters

101

(8)

B. Manufacturer Points of Contact

109

(2)

C. Shipbuilder Survey Instrument

111

(10)

D. Force Structure Levels for 60-Percent and 80-Percent Mission Coverage of Traditional and Emerging Asset-Presence Demands

121

(8)

Bibliography

129

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The U.S. Coast Guard's Deepwater Force Modernization Plan Can it be Accelerated? Will it Meet Changing Security Needs?

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