The Atlas of Reality A Comprehensive Guide to Metaphysics

The Atlas of Reality: A Comprehensive Guide to Metaphysics presents an extensive examination of the key topics, concepts, and guiding principles of metaphysics.

• Represents the most comprehensive guide to metaphysics available today
• Offers authoritative coverage of the full range of topics that comprise the field of metaphysics in an accessible manner while considering competing views
• Explores key concepts such as space, time, powers, universals, and composition with clarity and depth
• Articulates coherent packages of metaphysical theses that include neo-Aristotelian, Quinean, Armstrongian, and neo-Humean
• Carefully tracks the use of common assumptions and methodological principles in metaphysics

ROBERT C. KOONS is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality (1993) and Realism Regained (2000), co-author of Metaphysics: The Fundamentals (with Tim Pickavance, 2014), and co-editor of The Waning of Materialism (with George Bealer, 2010).

TIMOTHY PICKAVANCEis an Associate Professor and Chair of the Talbot Department of Philosophy at Biola University. He is co-author of Metaphysics: The Fundamentals (with Robert Koons, 2014).

Part I Foundations

1 Introduction 3

1.1 A Brief History of Metaphysics 3

1.2 Why Do Metaphysics? 5

1.3 How to Use the Book 9

2 Truthmakers 13

2.1 Introduction 13

2.2 Five Arguments for Classical Truthmaker Theory 19

2.3 The Challenge of Deflationism 25

2.4 Truthmaker Maximalism 30

2.5 Alternatives to Truthmaker Maximalism 36

2.6 Conclusion and Preview 44

Notes 45

3 Grounding, Ontological Dependence, and Fundamentality 47

3.1 Is Grounding Real? 49

3.2 Relation between Grounding and Truthmaking 55

3.3 Relation between Grounding and Ontological Dependence 58

3.4 Conceptual vs. Extra-Conceptual Grounding 62

3.5 Alternatives to Grounding? 65

3.6 Can Grounding Relations be Grounded? 69

3.7 Connections between Grounding and Entailment 71

3.8 How is Grounding Different from Causal Explanation? 72

3.9 Conclusion: Grounding and Ontological Economy 72

Notes 73

Part II Dispositions

4 Conditionals 77

4.1 Counterfactual Conditionals: Semantics, Logic, and Metaphysics 78

4.2 Hypotheticalism 84

4.3 Anti-Hypotheticalism and Laws of Nature 86

4.4 Strong Hypotheticalism: Counterfactual Accounts of Powers and Dispositions 90

Notes 92

5 Laws of Nature 94

5.1 Strong Nomism: The Dretske-Armstrong-Tooley (DAT) Theory of Laws 94

5.2 Neo-Humeism: Reduction of Conditionals, Laws, and Powers 99

Notes 105

6 Powers and Properties 106

6.1 Advantages of Strong Powerism 106

6.2 The Individuation of Properties 108

6.3 Objections to Strong Powerism 118

6.4 Conclusion 121

Notes 121

Part III Universals and Particulars

7 Universals 125

7.1 Introduction 125

7.1.1 What properties must explain 126

7.2 Realism 128

7.3 Universals and the Problem of Intentionality 142

7.4 Properties as the Ground of Causal Powers 145

Notes 145

8 Reductive Nominalism and Trope Theory 147

8.1 Reductive Nominalism 147

8.2 Trope Theory 165

8.3 Conclusion 169

Notes 169

9 Particulars and the Problem of Individuation 171

9.1 Introduction 171

9.2 Facts 172

9.3 Substances 175

Notes 200

10 Relations, Structures, and Quantities 201

10.1 Accounts of Relational Facts 201

10.2 Non-Symmetrical Relations and the Problem of Order 206

10.3 Structural Universals and Constituent Ontology 215

10.4 Determinables, Quantities, and Real Numbers 219

10.5 Conclusion and Preview 225

Notes 225

Part IV The Nature of Reality

11 Nihilism and Monism 229

11.1 Nihilism and Aliquidism 229

11.2 Monism 237

Note 252

12 The Non-Existent and the Vaguely Existing 253

12.1 Does Everything Exist? 253

12.2 Ontic Vagueness 271

12.3 Conclusion 280

13 Solipsism, Idealism, and the Problem of Perception 281

13.1 Defining the Mental and the External 282

13.2 Solipsism and Phenomenalism 284

13.3 Theories of Perception 286

13.4 Arguments against Phenomenalism 306

13.5 Arguments against Solipsism 309

13.6 Conclusion and Preview 312

Notes 313

Part V Modality

14 Possibility, Necessity, and Actuality: Concretism 317

14.1 Introduction 317

14.2 Concretism:Worlds as Universes 321

14.3 Problems for Concretism 327

14.4 Conclusion 331

Note 331

15 Abstractionism:Worlds as Representations 332

15.1 Magical Abstractionism 333

15.2 Structural Abstractionism 341

15.3 Aristotelian Theories of Possibility 348

15.4 Conclusion 350

Note 351

16 De Re Modality and Modal Knowledge 352

16.1 Modality De Re: Transworld Identity and Counterpart Theory 352

16.2 Modality and Epistemology: Possibility and Conceivability 363

16.3 Conclusion 369

Notes 369

Part VI Space and Time

17 Is Space Merely Relational? 373

17.1 The Nature of Location 373

17.2 Spatial Substantivalism 375

17.3 Spatial Relationism 381

17.4 Absences and Vacuums 386

17.5 Conclusion 388

Notes 389

18 Structure of Space: Points vs. Regions 390

18.1 Constructing Points from Regions 391

18.2 Points vs. Regions 394

18.3 Arguments against Points as Fundamental 397

18.4 Voluminism vs. Volume-Boundary Dualism 408

18.5 Conclusion 414

Note 414

19 The Structure of Time 415

19.1 Is Time Composed of Instants or Intervals? 415

19.2 Instants as Dependent Entities 425

19.3 Does Time have a Beginning? 427

19.4 Conclusion 429

20 Time’s Passage 430

20.1 Tensers and Anti-Tensers 432

20.2 Varieties of Anti-Tensism 435

20.3 Varieties of Tensism 437

20.4 Presentism 439

20.5 Arguments for Tensism 442

20.6 Conclusion 456

Note 457

21 Arguments for Anti-Tensism 458

21.1 How Fast Does Time Flow? 458

21.2 Truthmakers for Truths about the Past 461

21.3 The Theory of Relativity 469

21.4 Epistemological Problems for Tensism 473

21.5 McTaggart’s Paradox 474

21.6 Brute Necessities of Time 476

21.7 Conclusion 478

Part VII Unity

22 Material Composition: The Special Question 481

22.1 The Existence of Composite Things 482

22.2 Are Composite Things an “Ontological Free Lunch”? 482

22.3 Redundancy 485

22.4 Fundamental Heaps 490

22.5 Fundamental Artifacts 497

22.6 Living Organisms vs. Mereological Nihilism 499

22.7 Finding an Intelligible Principle of Composition 504

Notes 513

23 Composition: The General Question 514

23.1 Formal Mereology: Le´sniewski, Goodman, and Leonard 514

23.2 Three (or Four) Answers to the General Composition Question 518

23.3 Accounting for the Correct Principles of Mereology 523

23.4 Parthood and Truthmaking 529

Notes 530

24 Change and Persistence 531

24.1 Does Anything Change? Does Anything Persist? 532

24.2 How Objects Change Properties: Substratism vs. Replacementism 537

24.3 The Metaphysics of Motion 551

Notes 554

25 The Persistence of Composite Things 555

25.1 Mereological Constancy and Inconstancy 556

25.2 Coincident Things 564

25.3 Conclusion 573

Note 574

Part VIII Causation

26 The Existence and Scope of Causation 577

26.1 Are there Causes? 577

26.2 The Scope of Causation 583

Note 589

27 Causation: A Relation between Things or Truths? 591

27.1 Causal Explanationism 592

27.2 Causal Connectionism 605

Notes 611

28 Discrete and Continuous Causation 613

28.1 Is All Causation Discrete? 614

28.2 The Nature of Discrete Causation 614

28.3 Is All Causation Continuous? 616

28.4 The Nature of Continuous Processes 618

28.5 Processes and the Direction of Continuous Causation 621

28.6 Are Processes an Exception to Hume’s Epistemic Principle? 622

28.7 Conclusion: The Consequences of Causation 623

Notes 623

29 Conclusion: The Four Packages 624

Appendix A 633

Appendix B 651

References 655

Index 671

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