Belief and Counterfactuals A Study in Means-End Philosophy

This is the first of two volumes on belief and counterfactuals. It provides an introduction to ranking theory, which is a powerful formal theory with a broad range of applications in different areas of analytic philosophy. Drawing on formal logic, ranking theory can account for degrees of belief, which can change with the introduction of new information.

In Belief and Counterfactuals, Franz Huber applies ranking theory and belief revision to metaphysics and epistemology. Though based on his technical writings, the volume is intended to be as accessible as possible, in order to fully present the utility of ranking theory to a wide range of philosophical issues. The volume contains several novel arguments, accounts, and applications--including the consistency argument for ranking theory, the conditional theory of conditional belief, as well as solutions to the problems of conceptual belief change, logical learning, and learning conditionals. Huber also presents a defense of the instrumentalist understanding of normativity, or rationality, and an argument for the thesis that there are only hypothetical imperatives and no categorical imperatives. His distinctive use of means-end philosophy as a unifying methodological approach establishes a treatment of philosophy as a normative discipline, and of philosophical problems as entangled with one another. This position also explains the importance of logic to philosophy, without devolving into a separate technical theory.

Franz Huber is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy, and Affiliate of the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, at the University of Toronto. Huber works in formal epistemology, general philosophy of science, and philosophical logic and previously held
positions at Konstanz University and the California Institute of Technology.

Preface
1. Introduction
2. Belief First
2.1 Ideal doxastic agents
2.2 Belief and ends
2.3 Conditional belief and belief revision
3. Belief Revision
3.1 The AGM theory of belief revision
3.2 Systems of spheres
3.3 Iterated belief revision
4. Conditional Belief
4.1 Ranking theory: static rules
4.2 Ranking theory: dynamic rules
4.3 Iterated belief revision revisited
5. Why Should I?
5.1 The consistency argument
5.2 The consistency argument continued
5.3 The consistency argument completed
5.4 Hypothetical imperatives
5.5 Conditional obligation and conditional belief
5.6 Appendix: Proofs
6. Applications in Epistemology
6.1 Conceptual belief change and logical learning
6.2 Learning indicative conditionals
6.3 In defense of rigidity
References