To the Best of Our Knowledge Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity

Sanford C. Goldberg is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Philosophy Department at Northwestern University. He received his PhD from Columbia University in 1995 and taught at Grinnell College and the University of Kentucky prior to going to Northwestern in 2007. He works primarily in the areas of epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind and is the author of dozens of articles in these areas, as well as four monographs, including Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification (Cambridge University Press, 2007), Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2010), Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech (Oxford University Press, 2015)

INTRODUCTION: The aim of this project
I Foundations of Epistemic Normativity
1. Epistemically Proper Belief: the very idea
2. Epistemic Assessment: Core Criteria and General Expectations
II Social Expectations, Epistemic Responsibility, and Epistemically Proper Belief
3. Core Criteria I: Permissions to rely on cognitive processes
4. Core Criteria II: Coherence-Infused Reliabilism (CIR)
5. General Expectations I: Entitlements to expect and Social Epistemic Responsibility
6. General Expectations II: Normative defeat and ultima facie epistemic propriety
7. Epistemic Responsibility in (Social) Context