Conscience and Conviction The Case for Civil Disobedience

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This book shows that civil disobedience is generally more defensible than private conscientious objection.

Part I explores the morality of conviction and conscience. Each of these concepts informs a distinct argument for civil disobedience. The conviction argument begins with the communicative principle of conscientiousness (CPC). According to the CPC, having a conscientious moral conviction means not just acting consistently with our beliefs and judging ourselves and others by a common moral standard. It also means not seeking to evade the consequences of our beliefs and being willing to communicate them to others. The conviction argument shows that, as a constrained, communicative practice, civil disobedience has a better claim than private objection does to the protections that liberal societies give to conscientious dissent. This view reverses the standard liberal picture which sees private 'conscientious' objection as a modest act of personal belief and civil disobedience as a strategic, undemocratic act whose costs are only sometimes worth bearing.

The conscience argument is narrower and shows that genuinely morally responsive civil disobedience honors the best of our moral responsibilities and is protected by a duty-based moral right of conscience.

Part II translates the conviction argument and conscience argument into two legal defenses. The first is a demands-of-conviction defense. The second is a necessity defense. Both of these defenses apply more readily to civil disobedience than to private disobedience. Part II also examines lawful punishment, showing that, even when punishment is justifiable, civil disobedients have a moral right not to be punished.

Kimberley Brownlee, Associate Professor of Legal and Moral Philosophy, University of Warwick

Kimberley Brownlee is an Associate Professor in Legal and Moral Philosophy. Before joining the University of Warwick in 2012, she was a Senior Lecturer in Moral and Political Philosophy at the University of Manchester. She has been a Fulbright Visiting Research Chair in the Philosophy Department at Vanderbilt University (2008); an HLA Hart Visiting Research Fellow at University College, Oxford (2009); a CEPPA Visiting Research Fellow in the Philosophy Department at St Andrews University (2009); and a Visiting Scholar in the UCLA Law School (2012). She has received an AHRC Networks and Workshops Grant (2008) and an AHRC Research Leave Award (2009). In 2012, she was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize from the Leverhulme Trust.

Introduction
I. Morality
1. Conviction
2. Conscience
3. Responsibilities
4. Rights
II. Law
5. Demands-of-Conviction Defence
6. Necessity Defence
7. Dialogue
8. Punishment