Contemporary Philosophy of Mind A

This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind. In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and desires.

Georges Rey is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland. In addition to publishing numerous articles in the philosophy of mind, he is co-editor (with Barry Loewer) of Meaning and Mind (Blackwell, 1992).

List of Figures

xii

(1)

Preface

xiii

Introduction

1

(13)

1 A Renaissance of the Explanatory

1

(1)

2(*) Explanation vs. Ontology and Ordinary Talk

2

(4)

3 Plan and Argument of this Book

6

(4)

4 Why it Matters

10

(4)

1 Preliminaries

14

(24)

1.1 Some Distinctions Among Purported Mental Phenomena

14

(7)

1.1.1 Language and metaphysics

14

(4)

1.1.2 Qualitative states and propositional attitudes

18

(2)

1.1.3 Rationality and intentionality

20

(1)

1.2 The Metaphysics of Mind: the Three Main Approaches

21

(4)

1.2.1 Reductionism

21

(2)

1.2.2 Dualism

23

(2)

1.2.3 Eliminativism

25

(1)

1.3 The Need for Non-tendentious Evidence

26

(1)

1.4 The Need for Fairness

27

(1)

1.5 Philosophical and Empirical Research

28

(10)

1.5.1 Constitutive analyses

28

(4)

1.5.2 Analyses of explanatory concepts

32

(6)

2 The Temptations to Dualism

38

(31)

2.1 Explanatory Gaps

38

(7)

2.2 Monism, Dualism,..., N-alism

45

(1)

2.3 Physicalist Reduction

46

(2)

2.4 Identity and Leibniz's Law

48

(1)

2.5 The "Identity Theory" and Its Leibniz Law Difficulties

49

(13)

2.5.1 Rationality and language

50

(2)

2.5.2 Free will

52

(1)

2.5.3 Spatiality and phenomenal objects

53

(2)

2.5.4 Privacy

55

(1)

2.5.5 Descartes' argument: the fallacious version

56

(1)

2.5.6 Intentionality and referential opacity

57

(2)

2.5.7(*) Kripke's version of Descartes' argument

59

(3)

2.5.7.1(*) Constitution or identity?

61

(1)

2.6 Qualia and "What It's Like"

62

(2)

2.7 Summary of Problems So Far

64

(5)

3 Eliminativism: Philosophical Issues

69

(26)

3.1 From Dualism to Eliminativism

69

(8)

3.1.1 The lack of a causal break

70

(4)

3.1.2 Normativity and interpretavism

74

(2)

3.1.3 Instrumentalism

76

(1)

3.2 Philosophical Objections to Eliminativism

77

(11)

3.2.1(*) Transcendental arguments

78

(5)

3.2.2 Introspective arguments

83

(5)

3.3 Standardized Regularities

88

(7)

4 Eliminativism: Empirical Issues

95

(40)

4.1 Radical Behaviorism and Its Problems

97

(10)

4.1.1 Latent learning

99

(1)

4.1.2 Passive learning

100

(1)

4.1.3 Spontaneous alteration

100

(1)

4.1.4 Improvisation

101

(2)

4.1.5 Responses to RBists: epicycles and mentalistic re-description

103

(4)

4.2 Chomsky

107

(15)

4.2.1 The evidence

108

(8)

4.2.2 Competence vs. performance

116

(2)

4.2.3 Creativity and productivity

118

(1)

4.2.4 The poverty and corruption of the stimulus

119

(2)

4.2.5 Extensions of Chomsky's program

121

(1)

4.3(*) Eliminativism's Roots in Empiricism

122

(6)

4.4 The Need for Mind

128

(7)

5 Mentalism: Pre-Functionalist Approaches

135

(30)

5.1 Introspectivism

136

(4)

5.1.1 The problem of application

138

(2)

5.1.2 The problem of other minds

140

(1)

5.2 Irreferentialism

140

(11)

5.2.1 Phenomenal singular terms and their objects

144

(2)

5.2.2 Phenomenal predicates and their properties

146

(1)

5.2.3 Propositional attitude terms and their states

147

(1)

5.2.4 Propositional content expressions and their propositions

148

(3)

5.3 Analytical Behaviorism

151

(4)

5.4(*) Verificationism

155

(10)

6 Functionalism: Commonalities

165

(19)

6.1 The Basic Idea

166

(1)

6.2 Turing Machines

166

(6)

6.3 Ramsification

172

(4)

6.3.1 Structure and the problem of uniqueness

175

(1)

6.4 Multiple-Realizability and Levels of Explanation

176

(8)

7 Functionalism: Differences

184

(24)

7.1 Different Meta-Approaches to Constitutive Stories

184

(7)

7.1.1 Folk functionalism

185

(1)

7.1.2 A priori functionalism

186

(1)

7.1.3 Psycho-functionalism

187

(2)

7.1.4 Some constraints on thought experiments

189

(2)

7.2 Different Functionalist Stories

191

(10)

7.2.1 Input/output vs. anchored functionalism

191

(3)

7.2.2 Holistic vs. molecular (and homuncular) functionalism

194

(2)

7.2.3 Teleo-functionalism

196

(1)

7.2.4 Superficialism

197

(4)

7.3 Towards Minimizing Commitments

201

(7)

7.3.1 The theory theory

201

(2)

7.3.2 Modest Mentalism

203

(5)

8 CRTT: Computation (Meeting Descartes' Challenge)

208

(29)

8.1 Syntactic Computational Architecture

209

(2)

8.2 The Paradigm Case: Syntactic Computations for Deduction

211

(3)

8.3 Extensions to Induction and Abduction

214

(2)

8.4 Practical Reason: Decision Theory

216

(2)

8.5 A Toy Example: the COG Program

218

(3)

8.6 Free Will

221

(1)

8.7(*) The Irrelevance of Godel's Theorem

221

(3)

8.8 Bridging Explanatory Gaps: CRTT vs. Radical Connectionism

224

(13)

9 CRTT: Representation (Meeting Brentano's Challenge)

237

(27)

9.1 Internalist Theories

238

(3)

9.1.1 Images and stereotypes

238

(1)

9.1.2 Conceptual roles

239

(2)

9.1.3 A general problem for any purely internalist theory

241

(1)

9.2 Externalist Theories

241

(10)

9.2.1 Historical causal theories

242

(1)

9.2.2 Co-variational locking theories

243

(3)

9.2.2.1 Ideal co-variation

244

(1)

9.2.2.2 Fodor's asymmetric dependencies

245

(1)

9.2.3 Teleo-semantic theories

246

(3)

9.2.4 General problems with purely externalist accounts

249

(2)

9.3 Two Factor Theorists: Narrow and Wide Content

251

(2)

9.4 Further, Semantic Arguments for CRTT vs. RCON

253

(2)

9.5 Status of the CRTT

255

(1)

9.6 Is Consciousness Necessary for a Mental State?

256

(8)

10 Replies to Common Objections

264

(24)

10.1 Red Herrings

264

(6)

10.1.1 Introspection

264

(1)

10.1.2 Images and "mental models"

265

(2)

10.1.3 Homunculi objections

267

(1)

10.1.4 Actual and artificial intelligence

268

(1)

10.1.5 Nativism

269

(1)

10.2 Searle's Worries About His "Chinese Room"

270

(5)

10.2.1 The Turing Test vs. the right program

271

(1)

10.2.2 The (non-)autonomy of language

272

(1)

10.2.3 Searle's own problem and his fallacy of division

273

(2)

10.3 Worries about Idealization

275

(13)

10.3.1 Normative vs. descriptive idealizations

276

(1)

10.3.2 Dennett's specific idealizations

277

(1)

10.3.3 "Unrealistic" idealizations

278

(3)

10.3.4 Is CRTT's realism really hysterical?

281

(7)

11 Further Capacities (Meeting Levine's Challenge)

288

(34)

11.1 Nested Intentionality

289

(1)

11.2 Subjectivity

290

(5)

11.2.1 Essential indexicals

290

(2)

11.2.2 Central vs. avowed attitudes

292

(3)

11.3 Sensational Sentences

295

(4)

11.4 Dealing with Some Standard Puzzles

299

(2)

11.4.1 Privacy

299

(1)

11.4.2 Privileged access

299

(1)

11.4.3 "What it's like"

300

(1)

11.5 What is Represented in Sensation?

301

(4)

11.6 Are Qualia Real?

305

(5)

11.6.1 Reasons for CRTQ and denying qualia

307

(1)

11.6.2(*) Kripke's Cartesian argument answered

308

(2)

11.7 Further Problems

310

(12)

11.7.1 Reverse qualia and other functional isomorphisms

310

(2)

11.7.2 Arbitrary realizability and absent qualia

312

(2)

11.7.3 Behavioral chauvinism

314

(8)

Glossary

322

(7)

References

329

(21)

Index

350

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Contemporary Philosophy of Mind A Contentiously Classical Approach

Summary

Author Biography

Table of Contents

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