Deconstructing the Mind

Over the last two decades, debates over the viability of commonsensepsychology have been center stage in both cognitive science and the philosophyof mind. Eliminativists have argued that advances in cognitive science andneuroscience will ultimately justify a rejection of our "folk" theory of themind, and of its ontology. In the first half of this book Stich, who was at onetime a leading advocate of eliminativism, maintains that even if the sciencesdevelop in the ways that eliminativists foresee, none of the arguments forontological elimination are tenable. Rather than being resolved by science, hecontends, these ontological disputes will be settled by a pragmatic process inwhich social and political considerations have a major role to play. In laterchapters, Stich argues that the widespread worry about "naturalizing"psychological properties is deeply confused, since there is no plausible accountof what naturalizing requires on which the failure of the naturalization projectwould lead to eliminativism. He also offers a detailed analysis of the manydifferent notions of folk psychology to be found in philosophy and psychology,and argues that simulation theory, which purports to be an alternative to folkpsychology, is not supported by recent experimental findings.

Stephen Stich is Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University and Professor of Philosophy at the City University of New York Graduate Center.