Direct Reference From Language to Thought

This volume puts forward a distinct new theory of direct reference, blending insights from both the Fregean and the Russellian traditions, and fitting the general theory of language understanding used by those working on the pragmatics of natural language

Francois Recanti

The author is Senior Researcher at CNRS/CREA. Paris. He has published many papers and several books on the philosophy of language, including Meaning and Force (1988).

Preface

xi

PART I: DIRECT REFERENCE IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

1

(226)

Introduction

3

(2)

1.1 De re communication

5

(56)

1 Direct reference and linguistic meaning: rigidity de jure

7

(19)

1.1 Introduction

7

(1)

1.2 Rigidity and scope

7

(3)

1.3 Rigidity and referentiality

10

(3)

1.4 Lockwood's criterion

13

(3)

1.5 Type-referentiality

16

(3)

1.6 Referentiality, meaning, and psychology

19

(7)

2 Singular propositions and thoughts

26

(19)

2.1 Truth-conditions, meaning, and propositional content

26

(2)

2.2 Content and character: the neo-Russellian theory

28

(3)

2.3 Quasi-singular propositions: the neo-Fregean theory

31

(3)

2.4 Propositional content and thought

34

(4)

2.5 Two basic intuitions

38

(7)

3 The communication of de re thoughts

45

(16)

3.1 Introduction

45

(1)

3.2 Singular propositions in a neo-Fregean framework

46

(2)

3.3 Interpretation in de re communication

48

(5)

3.4 Communication and subjectivity

53

(8)

1.2 From language to thought

61

(34)

4 Linguistic and psychological modes of presentation

63

(17)

4.1 Introduction

63

(3)

4.2 Linguistic meaning and narrow content: the Simplified Picture

66

(3)

4.3 Two sorts of mode of presentation

69

(3)

4.4 Systematic differences between linguistic and psychological modes of presentation

72

(4)

4.5 Conclusion

76

(4)

5 The meaning and cognitive significance of indexical expressions

80

(15)

5.1 Introduction

80

(1)

5.2 Rebutting the constancy argument

80

(4)

5.3 The Simplified Picture again

84

(3)

5.4 Immunity to error through misidentification

87

(3)

5.5 Conclusion

90

(5)

1.3 De re thoughts

95

(38)

6 De re modes of presentation

97

(22)

6.1 Introduction

97

(1)

6.2 Non-descriptiveness and relationality

98

(5)

6.3 Non-descriptiveness and truth-conditional irrelevance

103

(3)

6.4 Truth-conditional irrelevance and relationality

106

(3)

6.5 Non-descriptiveness as descriptive multiplicity

109

(3)

6.6 Non-descriptiveness and iconicity

112

(7)

7 Egocentric concepts vs. encyclopedia entries

119

(14)

7.1 Introduction

119

(1)

7.2 Indexicality and perception

120

(2)

7.3 From `buffers' to egocentric concepts

122

(3)

7.4 Stable and unstable object files

125

(4)

7.5 Conclusion

129

(4)

I.4 Proper names

133

(58)

8 The meaning of proper names

135

(20)

8.1 Introduction

135

(1)

8.2 The character of proper names

136

(4)

8.3 Proper names as indexicals

140

(3)

8.4 Indexicality or homonymy?

143

(3)

8.5 Localness

146

(3)

8.6 The individuation of languages

149

(6)

9 Answering Kripke's objections

155

(13)

9.1 Introduction

155

(1)

9.2 The modal argument

155

(3)

9.3 The circularity argument

158

(3)

9.4 The generality argument

161

(4)

9.5 Conclusion

165

(3)

10 Proper names in thought

168

(23)

10.1 Introduction

168

(1)

10.2 Proper names, sortals, and demonstrative identification

169

(3)

10.3 The psychological neutrality of proper names

172

(4)

10.4 Descriptive names

176

(5)

10.5 Proper names and encyclopedia entries

181

(10)

I.5 The two-component picture: a defence

191

(36)

11 Narrow content and psychological explanation

193

(16)

11.1 Neo-Fregeanism and the two-component picture

193

(4)

11.2 Alleged arguments for the two-component picture

197

(5)

11.3 Narrow content in psychological explanation

202

(4)

11.4 The empty case

206

(3)

12 Externalism and the two-component picture

209

(18)

12.1 Can thoughts be schematic?

209

(2)

12.2 The externalist objection

211

(2)

12.3 Two forms of environment-dependence: the relative notion of narrowness

213

(5)

12.4 Second-order narrow contents: the externalist's dilemma

218

(4)

12.5 Holistic Externalism

222

(5)

PART II: THE PRAGMATICS OF DIRECT REFERENCE

227

(176)

Introduction

229

(2)

II.1 Methodological preliminaries

231

(44)

13 Truth-conditional pragmatics

233

(22)

13.1 Enriching the Gricean picture: two sorts of pragmatic explanation

233

(7)

13.2 Three minimalist principles

240

(4)

13.3 The Implicature Analysis

244

(2)

13.4 The Availability Principle

246

(4)

13.5 Conclusion

250

(5)

14 Primary pragmatic processes

255

(14)

14.1 Introduction

255

(1)

14.2 Can Minimalism be defended?

256

(2)

14.3 Giving up Minimalism

258

(2)

14.4 Primary and secondary pragmatic processes

260

(9)

Appendix: Availability and the Scope Principle

269

(6)

II.2 Referential/attributive

275

(48)

15 The referential use of definite descriptions

277

(23)

15.1 Introduction

277

(1)

15.2 Donnellan's presentation

278

(3)

15.3 Improper uses and truth-conditional irrelevance: the intuitive basis of the Naive Theory

281

(3)

15.4 An alleged argument for the Implicature Theory

284

(4)

15.5 The Indeterminacy Theory

288

(5)

15.6 The Synecdoche Theory

293

(7)

16 The descriptive use of indexicals

300

(23)

16.1 Introduction

300

(1)

16.2 Nunberg's counter-examples: de re concepts in interpretation

301

(5)

16.3 Other alleged counter-examples

306

(3)

16.4 Nunberg's theory: the index/referent distinction generalized

309

(3)

16.5 The basic level of interpretation

312

(4)

16.6 Multi-layered pragmatics and direct reference theory

316

(7)

II.3 Belief reports

323

(80)

17 Belief reports and conversational implicatures

325

(23)

17.1 Accounting for opacity

325

(3)

17.2 The Implicature Theory

328

(7)

17.3 What's wrong with the Implicature Theory (1)

335

(6)

17.4 What's wrong with the Implicature Theory (2)

341

(7)

18 Belief reports and the semantics of `that'-cluses

348

(20)

18.1 Frege's Puzzle and the Relational principle

348

(2)

18.2 Rejecting the Relational principle

350

(5)

18.3 The reference of `that'-clauses

355

(2)

18.4 The context-sensitivity of `that'-clauses

357

(11)

19 Comparison with other accounts

368

(18)

19.1 Unitary vs. dualist accounts of belief reports

368

(2)

19.2 The incoherence of dualism

370

(5)

19.3 The combined account

375

(4)

19.4 Schematic belief reports

379

(7)

20 How ambiguous are belief sentences?

386

(17)

20.1 Introduction

386

(1)

20.2 Definite descriptions in belief contexts

386

(7)

20.3 Proper names in belief contexts

393

(4)

20.4 Indexicals in belief contexts

397

(6)

Bibliography

403

(10)

Index

413

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Direct Reference From Language to Thought

Summary

Author Biography

Table of Contents

Supplemental Materials