Donald Davidson Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality

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ISBN: 9780199251346 | 0199251347
Cover: Hardcover
Copyright: 5/5/2005

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Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig present the definitive critical exposition of the philosophical system of Donald Davidson (1917-2003). Davidson's ideas had a deep and broad influence in the central areas of philosophy; he presented them in brilliant essays over four decades, but never set out explicitly the overarching scheme in which they all have their place. Lepore's and Ludwig's book will therefore be the key work, besides Davidson's own, for understanding one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.

Note on In-Text Citations

xviii

Introduction

(18)

Synoptic Overview of Davidson's Philosophy

(4)

Goals

(1)

Keynotes

(7)

Methodology

(1)

Overview

(6)

Part I Historical Introduction to Truth-Theoretic Semantics

(128)

Introduction

(6)

Learnable Languages and the Compositionality Requirement

(13)

The Compositionality Requirement

(3)

The Learnability Argument

(1)

Other Considerations in Favor of Compositionality

(2)

Relation to Knowledge of a Language

(2)

Objections to the Compositionality Requirement

(3)

The Influence of the Compositionality Requirement

(2)

The Form of a Meaning Theory and Difficulties for Traditional Approaches

(25)

The Form of a Theory of Meaning

(4)

The Third Man Argument and Morals Drawn from an Example

(4)

A Fregean Proposal

(1)

The Slingshot Argument

(6)

The Inutility of Meanings

(2)

Fallback Positions

(6)

The Introduction of a Truth Theory as the Vehicle of a Meaning Theory

(15)

The Proposal

(2)

A Truth Theory for Simple English0

(5)

A Solution to the Problem of Providing a Compositional Meaning Theory without Quantifying over Meanings

(3)

The Extended Project

(4)

Appendix: A Closed Form Recursive Definition of `true0'

(2)

Truth and Context Sensitivity

(14)

Adapting the Truth Predicate

(5)

Revising Convention T

(1)

Adapting the Axioms of the Truth Theory

(8)

Appendix: Formulating a Truth Theory for Natural Languages which Predicates Truth of Utterances of Sentences

(4)

Davidson's Extensionalist Proposal

(9)

The Extensionality and Determination Problems

101

(12)

The Extensionality Problem

102

(3)

Counter Moves, Problems, and Solution

105

(4)

The Determination Problem and Canonical Proofs

109

(4)

Foster's Objection

113

(6)

Relation to an Explicit Meaning Theory and to Semantic Competence

119

(6)

Relation to an Explicit Meaning Theory

119

(2)

Relation to Semantic Competence

121

(4)

The Problem of Semantic Defects in Natural Languages

125

(22)

Ambiguity

126

(3)

The Lack of a Precise Syntax for Natural Languages

129

(1)

Semantic Paradoxes

130

(8)

Vagueness

138

(9)

Summary of Part I

143

(4)

Part II Radical Interpretation

147

(154)

Introduction

147

(4)

Clarifying the Project

151

(23)

Initial Questions and Answers

152

(14)

A Modest Project and an Ambitious Project

166

(8)

The Procedure of the Radical Interpreter

174

(24)

From Behavior to Holding True

175

(3)

The Analogy with Empirical Decision Theory

178

(4)

The Introduction of the Principle of Charity

182

(3)

Three Interpretations

185

(7)

Is Charity Sufficient?

192

(2)

The Assumption of Grace

194

(2)

Stages of Interpretation

196

(2)

The Justification of the Principle of Charity

198

(11)

The Argument from the (Partial) Holism of Attitude Content

200

(2)

The Argument to the Best Explanation

202

(2)

The Argument from the Necessity of Radical Interpretability

204

(3)

Taking Stock

207

(2)

The Theory of Agency and Additional Constraints

209

(12)

The A Priori Theory of Rational Agency

210

(1)

Holism about Attitude Content

211

(2)

Constraints on Logical Form in the Object Language

213

(3)

Conformity in a Linguistic Community

216

(2)

The Role of Empirical Constraints

218

(3)

Indeterminacy

221

(27)

Underdetermination and Indeterminacy

223

(2)

Indeterminacy of Interpretation

225

(3)

Two Challenges

228

(3)

Non-Equivalent Sets of L-Sentences

231

(3)

Responses and Replies

234

(2)

Is This Just More Indeterminacy?

236

(7)

Does the Analogy with Measurement Theory Save the Position?

243

(5)

Development of a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action

248

(15)

Interpretation and Attitudes

249

(1)

The Problem of Assigning Desirabilities and Degrees of Belief

250

(2)

The Solution

252

(5)

Summary of the Revised Procedure and Discussion

257

(6)

Appendix: An Alternative Method of Identifying Logical Connectives

260

(3)

The Reality of Language

263

(38)

The Target

264

(5)

The Argument

269

(15)

Reactions

284

(11)

Conclusion

295

(6)

Summary of Part II

298

(3)

Part III Metaphysics and Epistemology

301

(124)

Introduction

301

(4)

The Impossibility of Alternative Conceptual Schemes

305

(17)

Conceptual Schemes

306

(1)

Scheme and Content

307

(3)

Attacking the Metaphors of Conceptual Relativism

310

(2)

Evaluating the Argument for the Impossibility of Radically Different Conceptual Schemes

312

(8)

Conclusion

320

(2)

Externalism and the Impossibility of Massive Error

322

(21)

The Omniscient Interpreter Argument

323

(3)

Evaluating the Omniscient Interpreter Argument

326

(3)

The Argument from Interpretation

329

(4)

Evaluating the Argument from Interpretation

333

(2)

Comparison with Other Sorts of Externalism about Thought Content

335

(5)

Conclusion

340

(3)

First Person Authority

343

(30)

The Explanandum

344

(5)

Two Explanations

349

(7)

Evaluating the Account of First Person Authority

356

(13)

Does Externalism Make Thoughts Self-Verifying?

369

(2)

Conclusion

371

(2)

Inscrutability of Reference

373

(14)

The Argument for the Inscrutability of Reference

374

(2)

The First Premise of the Argument for the Inscrutability of Reference

376

(2)

The Second Premise of the Argument for the Inscrutability of Reference

378

(5)

Responses

383

(3)

Conclusion

386

(1)

Language, Thought, and World

387

(38)

The Main Arguments for the Necessity of Language for Thought

392

(2)

The Argument for the Claim that Having Beliefs Requires Having the Concept of Belief

394

(3)

The Argument for the Claim that to Have the Concept of Belief One Must Have a Language

397

(2)

The Argument to the Primacy of the Third Person Point of View

399

(1)

Evaluating Argument (D)

400

(4)

The Argument from Triangulation

404

(3)

Evaluation of the Argument from Triangulation

407

(6)

The Problem of Other Minds

413

(5)

Conclusion

418

(7)

Summary of Part III

420

(5)

Bibliography

425

(10)

Index

435

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Donald Davidson Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality

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