The Economic Nature of the Firm

This book brings together classic writings on the economic nature and organization of firms, including works by Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, and Michael Jensen and William Meckling, as well as more recent contributions by Paul Milgrom, Bengt Holmstrom, John Roberts, Oliver Hart, Luigi Zingales, and others. Part I explores the general theme of the firm's nature and place in the market economy; Part II addresses the question of which transactions are integrated under a firm's roof and what limits the growth of firms; Part III examines employer-employee relations and the motivation of labor; and Part IV studies the firm's organization from the standpoint of financing and the relationship between owners and managers. The volume also includes a consolidated bibliography of sources cited by these authors and an introductory essay by the editors that surveys the new institutional economics of the firm and issues raised in the anthology.

Preface: reintroducing the economic nature of the firm
Within and Among Firms: The Division of Labor
From The Wealth of Nations
From Capital Karl Marx
From Risk, Uncertainty and Profit
From The Modern Corporation and Private Property
The use of knowledge in society
Corporate governance
The Nature of the Firm
The nature of the firm Ronald Coase
Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process
The governance of contractual relations
The limits of firms: incentive and bureaucratic features
Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the organization of economic activity
The boundaries of the firm revisited
The Employment Relation, the Human Factor and Internal Organization
Production, information costs, and economic organization
Contested exchange new microfoundations for the political economy of capitalism
Understanding the employment relation: the analysis of idiosyncratic exchange
Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Work motivation
From Worker Participation
Finance and the Control of the Firm
Mergers and the market for corporate control
Agency problems and the theory of the firm
Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure
Organizational forms and investment decisions
The rise in managerial stock ownership
Executive compensation as an agency problem
An economist's perspective on the theory of the firm
Ownership and the nature of the firm
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

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The Economic Nature of the Firm

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