A challenging new critique on the epistemic status of belief.
Hamid Vahid is Professor of Philosophy and the Head of the Analytic Philosophy Faculty at the Institute for Fundamental Sciences in Tehran, Iran.
Acknowledgements
p. vii
Introduction
p. 1
Truth and the Aim of Belief
p. 7
Unpacking the metaphor: a survey and critique
p. 8
Truth as doxastic and epistemic goals: the anatomy of a confusion
p. 19
The aim of belief: aiming at a target and hitting the target
p. 24
Belief, Interpretation and Moore's Paradox
p. 33
Resolving the paradox: varieties of approaches
p. 34
Moore's paradox: the pragmatic approach
p. 35
Moore's paradox: the doxastic approach
p. 36
Moore's paradox: the epistemic approach
p. 40
Moore's paradox: the interpretive approach
p. 44
Belief, Sensitivity and Safety
p. 51
Sensitivity and safety
p. 51
Safety: the intuitive version
p. 53
Safety: the epistemic version
p. 55
Safety: the doxastic version
p. 58
Safety and sensitivity as distinct cognitive goals
p. 63
Basic Beliefs and the Problem of Non-doxastic Justification
p. 69
Experience and reason: the problem explained
p. 69
Resolving the problem: normative paradigms
p. 71
Inferential paradigms
p. 71
Non-inferential paradigms
p. 82
Way forward
p. 86
Experience as Reason for Beliefs
p. 89
The supervenience thesis explained and applied
p. 90
Normativity and content: an argument from functional role semantics
p. 104
The Problem of the Basing Relation
p. 114
Main approaches to the basing relation: a survey and analysis
p. 114
Alston: basing relation as input to psychologically realized functions
p. 121
Basing relation: triangulation and content
p. 124
Basic Beliefs, Easy Knowledge and the Problem of Warrant Transfer
p. 131
The problem of easy knowledge
p. 131
What is wrong with easy knowledge?
p. 133
EK-Inferences as illegitimate
p. 136
Dogmatism: EK-inferences as legitimate
p. 144
The legitimacy of EK-inferences as context-dependent
p. 147
Strength of evidence and epistemic distance: varieties of transmission failure
p. 149
Belief, Justification and Fallibility
p. 160
Fallibility as the possibility of falsity or accidental truth
p. 163
Fallibility as failable knowledge
p. 166
Analyzing fallible knowledge
p. 170
Fallible knowledge as externalist knowledge
p. 172
Consequences and confirmations
p. 176
Knowledge of our Beliefs and Privileged Access
p. 180
The slow switching argument explained
p. 181
Some responses to the slow switching argument
p. 182
The standard strategy: a critique
p. 186
Examining the switching argument
p. 188
Externalism and privileged self-knowledge: a diagnosis
p. 192
Notes
p. 197
References
p. 205
Index
p. 211
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