An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind

In this book Jonathan Lowe offers a lucid and wide-ranging introduction to the philosophy of mind. Using a problem-centred approach designed to stimulate as well as instruct, he begins with a general examination of the mind-body problem and moves on to detailed examination of more specific philosophical issues concerning sensation, perception, thought and language, rationality, artificial intelligence, action, personal identity and self-knowledge. His discussion is notably broad in scope, and distinctive in giving equal attention to deep metaphysical questions concerning the mind and to the discoveries and theories of modern scientific psychology. It will be of interest to any reader with a basic grounding in modern philosophy.

Preface

xi

Introduction

1

(7)

Empirical psychology and philosophical analysis

2

(1)

Metaphysics and the philosophy of mind

3

(3)

A brief guide to the rest of this book

6

(2)

Minds, bodies and people

8

(31)

Cartesian dualism

9

(2)

The conceivability argument

11

(2)

The divisibility argument

13

(2)

Non-Cartesian dualism

15

(3)

Are persons simple substances?

18

(3)

Conceptual objections to dualistic interaction

21

(3)

Empirical objections to dualistic interaction

24

(2)

The causal closure argument

26

(3)

Objections to the causal closure argument

29

(3)

Other arguments for and against physicalism

32

(4)

Conclusions

36

(3)

Mental states

39

(30)

Propositional attitude states

40

(1)

Behaviourism and its problems

41

(3)

Functionalism

44

(4)

Functionalism and psychophysical identity theories

48

(3)

The problem of consciousness

51

(2)

Qualia and the inverted spectrum argument

53

(2)

Some possible responses to the inverted spectrum argument

55

(4)

The absent qualia argument and two notions of consciousness

59

(2)

Eliminative materialism and `folk psychology'

61

(3)

Some responses to eliminative materialism

64

(2)

Conclusions

66

(3)

Mental content

69

(33)

Propositions

70

(4)

The causal relevance of content

74

(5)

The individuation of content

79

(3)

Externalism in the philosophy of mind

82

(2)

Broad versus narrow content

84

(5)

Content, representation and causality

89

(3)

Misrepresentation and normality

92

(3)

The teleological approach to representation

95

(4)

Objections to a teleological account of mental content

99

(1)

Conclusions

100

(2)

Sensation and appearance

102

(28)

Appearance and reality

103

(4)

Sense-datum theories and the argument from illusion

107

(3)

Other arguments for sense-data

110

(2)

Objections to sense-datum theories

112

(2)

The adverbial theory of sensation

114

(2)

The adverbial theory and sense-data

116

(3)

Primary and secondary qualities

119

(2)

Sense-datum theories and the primary/secondary distinction

121

(4)

An adverbial version of the primary/secondary distinction

125

(1)

Do colour-properties really exist?

126

(2)

Conclusions

128

(2)

Perception

130

(30)

Perceptual experience and perceptual content

131

(4)

Perceptual content, appearance and qualia

135

(2)

Perception and causation

137

(6)

Objections to causal theories of perception

143

(2)

The disjunctive theory of perception

145

(4)

The computational and ecological approaches to perception

149

(6)

Consciousness, experience and `blindsight'

155

(3)

Conclusions

158

(2)

Thought and language

160

(33)

Modes of mental representation

162

(2)

The `language of thought' hypothesis

164

(3)

Analogue versus digital representation

167

(2)

Imagination and mental imagery

169

(6)

Thought and communication

175

(3)

Do animals think?

178

(5)

Natural language and conceptual schemes

183

(5)

Knowledge of language: innate or acquired?

188

(3)

Conclusions

191

(2)

Human rationality and artificial intelligence

193

(37)

Rationality and reasoning

194

(2)

The Wason selection task

196

(4)

The base rate fallacy

200

(3)

Mental logic versus mental models

203

(5)

Two kinds of rationality

208

(1)

Artificial intelligence and the Turing test

209

(5)

Searle's `Chinese room' thought-experiment

214

(4)

The Frame Problem

218

(3)

Connectionism and the mind

221

(6)

Conclusions

227

(3)

Action, intention and will

230

(34)

Agents, actions and events

231

(4)

Intentionality

235

(5)

The individuation of actions

240

(3)

Intentionality again

243

(3)

Trying and willing

246

(4)

Volitionism versus its rivals

250

(2)

Freedom of the will

252

(5)

Motives, reasons and causes

257

(5)

Conclusions

262

(2)

Personal identity and self-knowledge

264

(34)

The first person

266

(4)

Persons and criteria of identity

270

(7)

Personal memory

277

(5)

Memory and causation

282

(1)

Animalism

283

(5)

Knowing one's own mind

288

(3)

Moore's paradox and the nature of conscious belief

291

(2)

Externalism and self-knowledge

293

(3)

Self-deception

296

(1)

Conclusions

297

(1)

Bibliography

298

(15)

Index

313

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An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind

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Table of Contents

Supplemental Materials