The Matter of Consciousness From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism

Torin Alter, Professor of Philosophy at The University of Alabama

Torin Alter is Professor of Philosophy at The University of Alabama, USA. He is author of articles in Mind, Philosophical Studies, and elsewhere; co-author of A Dialogue on Consciousness and The God Dialogues: A Philosophical Journey (both OUP); and co-editor of Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: A Reader and Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism (both OUP).

Part I: The case for the epistemic gap
1. Introduction
2. The significance of structure
3. Structure, physical knowledge, and ignorance
4. Phenomenal knowledge without experience
5. Non-propositional phenomenal knowledge
6. Phenomenal representation
Part II: The case for the modal gap
7. Deduction and necessity
8. Epistemic-modal bridge principles
9. The phenomenal concept strategy and Chalmers's dilemma
10. Consequences of social externalism
11. The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts
Part III: The case for the ontological gap
12. The supervenience requirement on physicalism
13. Two final objections
14. Two final objections
15. The knowledge argument, Russellian monism, and causal integration
Conclusion