Metaepistemology

Conor McHugh is Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He works on a range of topics in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and ethics broadly construed. These include the nature of belief and of attitudes more generally, normativity, reasons and reasoning, mental agency, doxastic non-voluntarism and self-knowledge. He has published in Ethics, Mind, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Issues, Philosophical Studies, Analysis, Analytic Philosophy, Erkenntnis, Thought, Synthese, the European Journal of Philosophy, Pacific PhilosophicalN Quarterly, and collections published by OUP and Ithaque, among other places.

Jonathan Way is Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He works on a range of topics in ethics and epistemology, broadly construed. These include the nature of reasons, rationality, value, normativity, and reasoning. He has published papers in Ethics, Mind, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, Philosophical Quarterly, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Philosophical Issues, the Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, and Analysis, among other places.

Daniel Whiting is Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He works on a wide range of subjects, including epistemology, ethics, philosophy of language, aesthetics, philosophy of mind, and the history of philosophy. Recent topics include: reasons and rationality; the norms of belief, assertion, and practical reasoning; normative testimony; and epistemic value. He has published numerous papers in journals such as Nous, Philosophical Studies, Analysis, Erkenntnis, British Journal of Aesthetics, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, and Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting
1. The Costs of Epistemic Realism, Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
2. Defending the Moral/Epistemic Parity, Terence Cuneo and Christos Kyriacou
3. Passing the Epistemic Buck, Davide Fassio and Anne Meylan
4. Is Epistemology Autonomous?, Daniel Greco
5. Logical Disagreement, Anandi Hattiangadi
6. Moral and Epistemic Error Theory: The Parity Premise Reconsidered, Jonas Olson
7. Doubts About 'Genuinely Normative' Epistemic Reasons, Hille Paakkunainen
8. How to Be an Epistemic Expressivist, Michael Ridge
9. Thick Epistemic Concepts, Debbie Roberts
10. Epistemic Planning, Epistemic Internalism, and Luminosity, Karl Schafer
11. Believing Well, Mark Schroeder