Metaethics

When we say that sharing is morally good and that murdering is wicked, what are we doing? Are we picking out existing moral values? Can our judgements be correct and incorrect? How do moral values fit into the natural world? Do moral values even exist? How do our moral judgements relate to how we are motivated to act? Metaethics is an argumentative textbook that considers these and other metaethical questions in a lively and clear manner. As well as discussing all of the main metaethical positions, a new idea metaethical pluralism is introduced. Chapters cover central topics in the subject, including: Moral realism: initial thoughts Moral realism: naturalism and reductionism Moral error theory Noncognitivism Sensibility theory Moral motivation Metaethicsis aimed at upper-level undergraduates and postgraduates, but should appeal to anyone with an interest in the area.

Simon Kirchin is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent, UK. He writes mainly on metaethics. As well as authoring a number of articles, he is the editor of Arguing about Metaethics (with Andrew Fisher), and A World without Values (with Richard Joyce).

Series Editor's Preface	p. vii
Preface and Acknowledgements	p. ix
What Is Metaethics?	p. 1
Starting thoughts	p. 1
The main questions and some standard positions	p. 5
Moral psychology	p. 12
Moral relativism again	p. 14
Concluding remarks and a plan	p. 16
Moral Realism: Mind-Independence	p. 19
Introduction	p. 19
Why realism?	p. 19
Moral properties and humans	p. 22
Objectivity and subjectivity	p. 25
Why be an IM Realist?	p. 30
Concluding remarks	p. 35
Moral Realism: Naturalism and Reductionism	p. 37
Introduction	p. 37
A naive naturalism and the motivation for adopting it	p. 37
The open question argument	p. 41
Two problems with the argument	p. 43
A third problem with the argument	p. 46
A summary and two definitions	p. 48
Nonreductive naturalism explained	p. 50
Three problems for nonreductive naturalism	p. 57
Reductionist realism	p. 68
One last point	p. 75
Concluding remarks	p. 76
Moral Error Theory	p. 78
Introduction	p. 78
What is error theory?	p. 78
Arguments for error theory	p. 85
What if we accept error theory?	p. 93
Concluding remarks	p. 97
Noncognitivism	p. 99
Introduction	p. 99
What is noncognitivism?	p. 100
Why be a noncognitivist?	p. 107
The Frege-Geach problem	p. 111
The moral attitude problem	p. 119
Concluding remarks	p. 123
Sensibility Theory	p. 125
Introduction	p. 125
Colours and ethics	p. 126
Shapelessness and patterns	p. 133
Those two distinctions	p. 138
Problems and some responses	p. 142
Concluding remarks	p. 147
Moral Motivation	p. 149
Introduction	p. 149
Internalism and externalism about moral motivation	p. 150
Beliefs, desires, and besires	p. 160
Concluding remarks	p. 173
Further Thoughts	p. 175
Introduction	p. 175
Metaethics and the generalizing tendency	p. 177
Concluding remarks	p. 186
Bibliography	p. 187
Index	p. 193
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