Normativity Epistemic and Practical

Conor McHugh is Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He works on a range of topics in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and ethics broadly construed. These include the nature of belief and of attitudes more generally, normativity, reasons and reasoning, mental agency, doxastic non-voluntarism and self-knowledge. He has published in Ethics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Issues, Philosophical Studies, Analysis, Analytic Philosophy, Erkenntnis, Thought, Synthese, the European Journal of Philosophy, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, and collections published by OUP and Ithaque, among other places.

Jonathan Way is Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He works on a range of topics in ethics and epistemology, broadly construed. These include the nature of reasons, rationality, value, normativity, and reasoning. He has published papers in Ethics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, Philosophical Quarterly, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Philosophical Issues, the Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, and Analysis, among other places.

Daniel Whiting is Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He works on a wide range of subjects, including epistemology, ethics, philosophy of language, aesthetics, philosophy of mind, and the history of philosophy. Recent topics include: reasons and rationality; the norms of belief, assertion, and practical reasoning; normative testimony; and epistemic value. He has published numerous papers in journals such as Nous, Philosophical Studies, Analysis, Erkenntnis, British Journal of Aesthetics, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, and Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

Introduction, Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting
1. Putting Fallibilism to Work, Charity Anderson
2. Pragmatic Approaches to Belief, Jessica Brown
3. The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons, Ulrike Heuer
4. Directives for Knowledge and Belief, David Hunter
5. How Reasons are Sensitive to Available Evidence, Benjamin Kiesewetter
6. Evidence and its Limits, Clayton Littlejohn
7. The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism about Practical Reason, Errol Lord
8. Pragmatic Encroachment: Its Problems are Your Problems!, Matthew McGrath
9. Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief, Kate Nolfi
10. Practical Interests and Reasons for Belief, Baron Reed
11. Two Theses about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity, Andrew Reisner
12. Reasoning with Reasons, Daniel Star
13. Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief, Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen