Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 7

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics (including moral realism, constructivism, and expressivism) to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.

Mark Timmons is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. He is the author of Morality Without Foundations (OUP, 1998) and co-editor of Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays (OUP, 2013) and Reason, Value, and Respect: Kantian Themes from the Philsophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (OUP, 2015).

Introduction, Mark Timmons
1. Forms of Instrumental Reasoning, Jonathan Dancy
2. Rethinking 'One Thought too Many', Marcia Baron
3. The Concept of Right as the Proper Adjudication of Conflicting Claims, Adam Cureton
4. Lying as Infidelity: A Quasi-Rossian Account, Sarah Stroud
5. How Moral Uncertaintism Can be Both True and Interesting, Andrew Sepielli
6. Do the Right Thing: An Account of Subjective Obligation, Elinor Mason
7. For Better or Worse: Commendatory Reasons, Latitude, and the Challenge from Comparative Dominance, Margaret O. Little and Coleen Macnamara
8. Asymmetrism about Desire Satisfaction and Time, Eden Lin
9. Contractualism and the Counter-Culture Challenge, Jussi Suikkanen
10. Creditworthiness and Matching Principles, Jonathan Way
11. The Centrality of One's Own Life, Stephen White
12. Acts, Agents, and the Definition of Virtue, Gopal Sreenivasan
13. Lopsided Lives, Theron Pummer
Index