Personal Identity

What is the self? And how does it relate to the body? In the second edition ofPersonal Identity,Harold Noonan presents the major historical theories of personal identity, particularly those of Locke, Leibniz, Butler, Reid and Hume. Noonan goes on to give a careful analysis of what the problem of personal identity is, and its place in the context of more general puzzles about identity. He then moves on to consider the main issues and arguments which are the subject of current debate, including the work of Bernard Williams and Derek Parfit, and makes new and challenging interpretations of them. This new edition contains additional material assessing the biological approach which has become increasingly popular in recent years, and extends the treatment of indeterminate identity to take account of the epistemic view of vagueness. This book covers the problem of personal identity from its origin in Locke's work to the most recent debates in the philosophical literature, and will be invaluablereading for any student of the topic.

Preface to second edition

xi

Preface

xiii

1 An Initial survey

1

(23)

1.1 Introduction

1

(1)

1.2 Constitutive and evidential criteria

2

(1)

1.3 The bodily criterion

2

(1)

1.4 The brain criterion

3

(1)

1.5 The physical criterion

4

(2)

1.6 Objections to the physical criterion

6

(3)

1.7 The memory criterion

9

(1)

1.8 The psychological continuity criterion

10

(1)

1.9 The circularity objection

11

(1)

1.10 The reduplication argument

12

(1)

1.11 The revised psychological continuity criterion

13

(1)

1.12 The multiple occupancy thesis

14

(1)

1.13 The simple view

15

(2)

1.14 The determinacy thesis

17

(2)

1.15 What matters in survival

19

(2)

1.16 Parfit's argument

21

(3)

2 Locke

24

(23)

2.1 Introduction

24

(3)

2.2 The principium individuationis

27

(1)

2.3 Substantial identity

28

(3)

2.4 Plants, animals and men

31

(2)

2.5 Personal identity and consciousness

33

(6)

2.6 'Person': a forensic term

39

(4)

2.7 Consciousness

43

(1)

2.8 A much debated passage

44

(3)

3 Leibniz, Butler and Reid

47

(17)

3.1 Introduction

47

(1)

3.2 Discourse on metaphysics

47

(2)

3.3 The New Essays

49

(4)

3.4 Butler and Reid

53

(3)

3.5 The circularity objection

56

(2)

3.6 The Butler-Reid-Shoemaker objection

58

(5)

3.7 Conclusion

63

(1)

4 Hume

64

(22)

4.1 Introduction

64

(3)

4.2 Our idea of identity

67

(1)

4.3 The reification of perceptions

68

(5)

4.4 Of soul and self

73

(3)

4.5 The source of the mistake

76

(4)

4.6 Objections to Hume

80

(5)

4.7 Conclusion

85

(1)

5 Identity and Personal Identity

86

(19)

5.1 Introduction

86

(1)

5.2 A puzzle

87

(1)

5.3 A solution

88

(5)

5.4 An alternative solution

93

(2)

5.5 The simple and complex views

95

(2)

5.6 Reductionism and non-reductionism

97

(3)

5.7 Person as endurers or persons as perdurera?

100

(4)

5.8 Conclusion

104

(1)

6 Identity and Determinacy

105

(22)

6.1 Introduction

105

(1)

6.2 The Determinacy Thesis

105

(2)

6.3 Types of indeterminacy

107

(1)

6.4 Indeterminacy as semantic indecision

108

(1)

6.5 The Epistemic View

109

(1)

6.6 Indeterminacy and identity over time

110

(2)

6.7 Fuzzy objects

112

(6)

6.8 Indeterminacy and brain transplants

118

(1)

6.9 Indeterminacy and Methuselah

119

(1)

6.10 The determinacy thesis and personal perdurance

120

(1)

6.11 Objections to personal perdurance

121

(3)

6.12 Inconstancy in modal predication

124

(2)

6.13 Conclusion

126

(1)

7 The Reduplicaton Problem

127

(17)

7.1 Introduction: The generality of the argument

127

(2)

7.2 The Only x and y principle

129

(2)

7.3 The slip of Theseus

131

(2)

7.4 Wiggins's argument

133

(2)

7.5 An alternative argument

135

(1)

7.6 Further objections

136

(1)

7.7 A counter-argument countered

137

(1)

7.8 Cambridge change

138

(1)

7.9 The Only x and y principle reformulated

139

(1)

7.10 The multiple occupancy thesis

139

(3)

7.11 Conclusion

142

(2)

8 Quasi-Memory

144

(19)

8.1 Introduction

144

(1)

8.2 The circularity objection

145

(2)

8.3 Quasi-memory

147

(3)

8.4 Quasi-memory and privileged access

150

(3)

8.5 The content of quasi-memory

153

(4)

8.6 M-connectedness and personal identity

157

(6)

9 Parfit and What Matters in survival

163

(15)

9.1 Introduction

163

(1)

9.2 Identity and survival

163

(1)

9.3 What does matter

164

(1)

9.4 Fission and survival

165

(1)

9.5 Assessment of the argument

166

(2)

9.6 Anti-Parfit

168

(3)

9.7 The Only x and y principle revisited

171

(1)

9.8 Parfitian survival and trivial facts

172

(6)

10 The Self and the Future

178

(18)

10.1 Introduction

178

(1)

10.2 Two puzzle cases

179

(2)

10.3 Body-switching?

181

(4)

10.4 Mind-swapping?

185

(5)

10.5 Identity and determinacy

190

(5)

10.6 Conclusion

195

(1)

11 Persons, Animals and Human Beings

196

(18)

11.1 Introduction

196

(3)

11.2 The Transplant Intuition

199

(2)

11.3 Rejection of the Transplant Intuition

201

(4)

11.4 The Hybrid Approach

205

(4)

11.5 The Too Many Minds Objection

209

(4)

11.6 Conclusion

213

(1)

12 Against the Closest Continuer Theory

214

(18)

12.1 Introduction

214

(1)

12.2 The Only x and y principle revisited

215

(5)

12.3 The Vienna Circle

220

(1)

12.4 The self and the future

221

(4)

12.5 Fission

225

(7)

Bibliography

232

(5)

Index

237

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