Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth

This book traces the development during the 20th century of four central themes in the philosophy of science. The themes, chosen for their importance are expounded in a way which does not presuppose any previous knowledge of philosophy or science. The book thus constitutes an excellent introduction to the philosophy of science.

As an undergraduate, Donald Gillies studied Mathematics and Philosophy at Cambridge. In 1966 he began graduate studies in Professor Sir Karl Popper's department at the London School of Economics, and he completed his PhD on the Foundations of Probability in 1970 with Professor Imre Lakatos as supervisor. From 1968 to 1971, he was a Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. In 1971 he joined the staff of the University of London, and is at present Reader in History and Philosophy of Science at King's College London. In 1982, he was a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University, and from 1982 to 1985 edited the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

Preface	p. xi
Acknowledgements	p. xiii
Inductivism and its Critics	p. 1
Some Historical Background: Inductivism, Russell and the Cambridge School, the Vienna Circle and Popper	p. 3
Inductivism	p. 3
The Uniformity of Nature and the Principle of Induction	p. 8
Russell and the Cambridge School	p. 11
The Vienna Circle	p. 17
The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Physics	p. 20
Popper	p. 21
The Dispersal of the Vienna Circle	p. 23
Popper's Critique of Inductivism. His Theory of Conjectures and Refutations (or Falsificationism)	p. 26
Popper's Critique of Inductivism	p. 26
Popper's Theory of Conjectures and Refutations (or Falsificationism)	p. 29
The Distinction between Discovery and Justification	p. 30
Some General Observations on Popper's Theory of Scientific Method	p. 32
Kepler's Discovery of the Elliptic Orbits of the Planets	p. 36
Fleming's Discovery of Penicillin: Creative Induction	p. 39
The Discovery of the Sulphonamide Drugs: Mechanical or Baconian Induction	p. 48
Duhem's Critique of Inductivism	p. 54
Inductivism as the Newtonian Method	p. 54
Newton's Inference of the Law of Gravity from Kepler's Laws and Duhem's Objections	p. 58
Criticisms of Inductivism and the Revolution in Physics	p. 60
The Lives of Duhem and Poincare	p. 63
Artificial Intelligence and the Revival of Inductivism	p. 69
Conventionalism and the Duhem-Quine Thesis	p. 73
Poincare's Conventionalism of 1902	p. 75
Kant's Philosophy of Geometry	p. 75
The Discovery of Non-Euclidean Geometry	p. 77
Poincare's Conventionalist Philosophy of Geometry	p. 85
Poincare's Conventionalism and Newtonian Mechanics	p. 90
Poincare on the Limits of Conventionalism	p. 94
The Duhem Thesis and the Quine Thesis	p. 98
Preliminary Exposition of the Thesis. The Impossibility of a Crucial Experiment	p. 98
Duhem's Criticisms of Conventionalism. His Theory of Good Sense (le bon sens)	p. 102
The Quine Thesis	p. 108
The Duhem-Quine Thesis	p. 112
The Nature of Observation	p. 117
Protocol Sentences	p. 119
Carnap's Views on Observation Statements in the Early 1930s	p. 120
Neurath's Views on Observation Statements in the Early 1930s	p. 122
Popper's Views on Basic Statements in 1934	p. 124
Is Observation Theory-Laden?	p. 132
Duhem's View that All Observation in Physics is Theory-Laden	p. 132
A Reinforcement of the Holistic Thesis and Neurath's Principle	p. 137
Some Psychological Findings	p. 140
Some General Conclusions	p. 146
The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics	p. 151
Is Metaphysics Meaningless? Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, and Popper's Critique	p. 153
Introduction: The Demarcation Problem and its Importance	p. 153
Wittgenstein's Life	p. 157
Wittgenstein's Tractatus	p. 165
The Vienna Circle on Metaphysics	p. 172
Popper's Critique of the Vienna Circle on Metaphysics	p. 177
Wittgenstein's Later Theory of Meaning	p. 181
The Influence of Wittgenstein's Life on his Philosophy	p. 185
Metaphysics in Relation to Science: The Views of Popper, Duhem, and Quine	p. 189
Popper on Metaphysics in Relation to Science	p. 189
Duhem and Quine on the Status of Metaphysics	p. 192
Duhem and Popper on the Influence of Metaphysics on Science	p. 195
Duhem's Defence of Religion	p. 201
Falsificationism in the Light of the Duhem-Quine Thesis	p. 205
Falsificationism and the Falsifiability Criterion	p. 205
Existential Statements	p. 206
Probability Statements	p. 207
Falsifiability and the Duhem-Quine Thesis	p. 210
A Suggested Demarcation Criterion involving the Principle of Explanatory Surplus	p. 214
How Much of Falsificationism can be Retained?	p. 221
Some Concluding Philosophical Remarks	p. 228
Notes	p. 231
References	p. 238
Index	p. 245
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Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century Four Central Themes

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