Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies

, by Albright, David; Berkhout, Frans; Walker, William

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ISBN: 9780198280095 | 0198280092
Cover: Hardcover
Copyright: 5/29/1997

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Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) are the basic materials used in nuclear weapons. Plutonium also plays an important part in the generation of nuclear electricity. Knowing how much plutonium and HEU exist, where and in which form is vital for international security and nuclearcommerce. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 is a thorough revision of the World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1992. It provides a rigorous and comprehensive assessment of the amounts of plutonium and HEU in military and civilian programmes, in nuclear and non-nuclear weaponstates, and in countries seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. The capabilities that exist for producing these materials around the world are examined in depth, as are the policy issues raised by them. Containing much new information, it is indispensable to all those concerned with the greatcontemporary issues in international nuclear relations: arms reductions in the nuclear weapon states, nuclear proliferation, nuclear smuggling, the roles of plutonium and enriched uranium in the nuclear fuel-cycle, and the disposition of surplus weapon material.

Preface

(1)

Acknowledgements

xvi

(1)

Glossary

xvii

(11)

Abbreviations, acronyms and conventions

xxviii

Part I. Introduction

(26)

1. Reasons, aims and sources

(9)

I. Introduction

(1)

II. Four security contexts

(2)

III. The need for greater transparency

(2)

IV. The limits to accuracy

(1)

V. The scope of the book

(1)

VI. Sources

(2)

2. Characteristics of highly enriched uranium and plutonium and their production processes

(17)

I. Introduction

(1)

II. Highly enriched uranium

(6)

III. Plutonium

(2)

Table 2.1. Plutonium half-lives, and weapon-grade and reactor-grade isotopic concentrations, at given fuel discharges

(3)

Table 2.2. Neutron cross-sections

(6)

Part II. Military inventories in the nuclear weapon states

(104)

3. Inventories of military plutonium in the nuclear weapon states

(50)

Introduction

(1)

II. The production process

(3)

III. Methods of estimating military plutonium inventories

(4)

IV. The United States

(13)

V. The former Soviet Union

(9)

VI. The United Kingdom

(7)

VII. France

(10)

VIII. China

Table 3.1. Historical sources of weapon-grade plutonium

(6)

Table 3.2. US production reactors

(2)

3.3. US Departmemt of Energy total production of weapon-and fuel-grade plutonium (book inventory), 1947-89

(2)

Table 3.4. US Department of Energy inventory of plutonium, by grade, February 1996

(3)

Tabel 3.5. US Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy inventories of plutonium, by location

(1)

Table 3.6. Total plutonium inventory differences at US production sites, cumulative to February 1996

(1)

Table 3.7. US inventory of weapon-grade plutonium declared to be excess to weapon requirements

(1)

Table 3.8. Plotonium in the DOE waste inventory

(1)

Table 3.9. The US plutonium inventory held by the Departments of Energy and Defense, February 1996

(5)

Tabel 3.10. Estimated plutonium production by military reactors in the former Soviet Union, 31 December 1993

(3)

3.11. Estimated Soviet military plutonium output, calculated from estimated krypton releases and plutonium arisings, 31 December 1983

(1)

Table 3.12. Total inventory of military plutonium of the FSU, 31 Decemmber 1993

(7)

Table 3.13. Estimated British inventory of military plutonium, 31 December 1995

(3)

Table 3.14. Estimated French inventory of military plutonium, 31 December 1995

Figure 3.1. Plutonium in warhead production

(11)

Figure 3.2. US Department of Energy weapon-grade plutonium production, 1947-88

(3)

Figure 3.3. Plutonium inventories of the US Department of Energy, 31 December 1993

(35)

4. Inventories of highly enriched uranium in the nuclear states

(54)

I. Introduction

(1)

II. Overview of enrichment programmes

(2)

III. The United States

(13)

IV. The former Soviet Union

(22)

V. The United Kingdom

116

(5)

VI. France

121

(5)

VII. China

126

Table 4.1. HEU stocks dedicated to nuclear weapons, reserves ansd associated categories, including excess, as of 31 December 1995

(5)

Table 4.2. Estimates of US consumption of HEU, to 31 December 1994

(6)

Table 4.3. Estimated allocation of US highly enriched uranium, 31 December 1993

(1)

Table 4.4. US highly enriched uranium inventories, declared excess, 6 February 1996

(11)

Table 4.5. Russian enrichments capacity in the early 1990s

103

(3)

Table 4.6. Estimated increase in the separative capacity of Soviet centrifuges

106

(6)

Table 4.7. Estimated Soviet consumption of seperative work units, to 31 December 1987

112

(4)

Table 4.8. Estimated uranium-235 content of the HEU at the Ulba Plant

116

(4)

Table 4.9. Estimated British inventory of HEU, 31 December 1995

120

Figure 4.1. Highly enriched uranium inventories of the US Department of Energy, 31 December 1993

(26)

Figure 4.2. Maximum and minimum estimates of annual Soviet gas-certifuge capacity, 1957-92

108

(11)

Figure 4.3. Maximum and minimum estiamtes of annual Soviet uranium enrichment capacity, 1950-92

109

(1)

Figure 4.4. Maximum and minimum estimates of cumulative Soviet seperative output, 1950-88

110

(23)

Part III. Principal civil inventories

133

(124)

5. Plutonium produced in power reactors

133

(15)

I. Introduction

133

(2)

II. The fuel cycle in civil reactor systems

135

(1)

III. Fueling strategy and fuel burnup

136

(2)

IV. A sketvh of methods

138

(3)

V. Discharges of spent fuel and plutonium from civil reactors

141

(6)

VI. Conclusions

147

Table 5.1. Fuel characteristics of power reactors

136

(4)

Table 5.2. Past discharges of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, to 31 December 1993

140

(2)

Table 5.3. Past discharges of plutonium from nuclear power reactors, to 31 December 1993

142

(1)

Table 5.4. Estimated discharges of spent fuel and plutonium from nuclear power reactors, 1994-2000 and 2001-10

143

(11)

Figure 5.1. The nuclear fuel cycle includiong reprocessing

134

(1)

Figure 5.2. The once-through nuclear fuel cycle

135

(2)

Figure 5.3. Specific plutonium production as a function of fuel burnup, natural uranium fuel

137

(1)

Figure 5.4. Specific plutonium production as a function of fuel burnup, enriched uranium fuel

138

(6)

Figure 5.5. World spent-fuel and plutonium discharges from power reactors by decade, 1961-2010

144

(1)

Figure 5.6. Spent-fuel discharge profiles by decade for Canada, France, Japan, Russia, the UK and the USA, 1961-2010

145

(1)

Figure 5.7. Plutonium discharges from power reactors in six regions: 1961-2010

146

(2)

6. Reprocessing, Programmes and plutonium arisings

148

(45)

I. Reprocessing in the nuclear fuel cycle

148

(2)

II. The evolution of fuel-cycle strategies

150

(5)

III. A sketch of methods

155

(1)

IV. Overview of power-reactor fuel reprocessing

155

(2)

V. Commercial reprocessing programmes

157

(26)

VI. Summary of power-and fast-reactor fuel reprocessing, 1960-2000

183

(7)

VII. Projections of plutonium separation to 2010

190

(2)

VIII. Conclusions

192

Table 6.1. National spent-fuel management policies, 1960-2000 and beyond

154

(2)

Table 6.2. World industrial-scale reprocessing plants

156

(4)

Table 6.3. Cumulative past plutonium separation at sellafield and Dounreay, at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1993

160

(2)

Table 6.4. Existing contracts for fuel reprocessing at THORP, 1995

162

(6)

Table 6.5. Existing contracts for oxide-fuel reprocessing at La Hague, 1995

168

(4)

Table 6.6. Cumulative past plutonium separation at La Hague and Marcoule, at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1993

172

(2)

Table 6.7. VVER-440 fuel dispatched to RT-1, 1976-93

174

(10)

Table 6.8. Cumulative separation of plutonium from power-reactor and research-reactor fuel, at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990, 1993 and projected to 2000

184

(4)

Table 6.9. Distribution of cumulative plutonium separation from power-reactor fuel, at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990, 1993 and projected to 2000

188

(1)

Table 6.10. Cumulative plutonium separation in the UK, France and Russia from non-nuclear weapon states, at end of 1980, 1990, 1993 and projected to 2000

189

(1)

Table 6.11. Cumulative discharged power-reactor plutonium which has been separeated, at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990, 1993 and projected to 2000

190

(1)

Table 6.12. Projected annual spent-fuel and cumulative plutonium separation at industrial-scale reprocessing plants, three scenarios for 2001-10

191

Figure 6.1. Past and projected plutonium separation from power-reactor magnox fuel at the British B205 reprocessing plant, 1960-2010

158

(5)

Figure 6.2. Projected rates plutonium separation from oxide fuel at the British Sellafield THORP reprocessing plant, 1994-2010

163

(1)

Figure 6.3. Past and projected plutonium separation from gas-graphite power-reactor fuel at the French Marcoule UPI and La Hague UP2 reprocessing plants, 1960-2000

166

(1)

Figure 6.4. Total plutonium separation from gas-graphite power-reactor fuel in France, 1960-2000

167

(2)

Figure 6.5. Plutonium separation from oxide-fuel reprocessing at the La Hague UP2 and UP3 reprocessing plants in France 1975-2000

169

(9)

Figure 6.6. Past and projected quantities of plutonium separated at the German WAK and Japanese Tokai-mura reprocessing plants, 1970-2000

178

(1)

Figure 6.7. World annual separation of civil plutonium

Figure 6.8 Rate of civil plutonium separation at industrial-scale reprocessing facilites in the UK, France and Russia, 1960-2000

187

(6)

7. Commercial and research and development uses of plutonium

193

(45)

I. Introduction

193

(1)

II. Fast-reactor fuel cycles

194

(1)

III. Plutonium use in fast reactors

195

(2)

IV. Past and projected plutonium use in fast reactors

197

(12)

V. Plutonium use in thermal reactors

209

(3)

National programmes for thermal plutonium recycling

212

(11)

VII. Summary of Plutonium use in thermal reactors: past and projected

223

(6)

VIII. Commercial and R&D plutonium use compared with quantities separated

229

(8)

IX. Conclusions

237

Table 7.1. Fast reactors: retired and operating in 1995

196

(1)

Table 7.2. Plutonium fuel fabrication facilities

197

(8)

Table 7.3. Estimated plutonium consumption in nuclear R&D reactors in Russia and Kazakhstan, 31 December 1993

205

(4)

Table 7.4. Plutonium consumed in fast and experimental reactor fuel, 31 December 1993 and high and low scenarios for 1994-2000 and 2001-10

209

(14)

Table 7.5. Plutonium consumption in LWR-MOX fuel fabrication, up to 31 December 1993

223

(1)

Table 7.6. Scenario for plutonium consumption in LWR-MOX fuel, 1994-2000

224

(3)

Table 7.7. LWR-MOX fabrication capacity, 1993-99

227

(2)

Table 7.8. Projected MOX fuel fabrication capacity, high and low scenarios for 2001-10

229

(1)

Table 7.9. Power-reactor plutonium separation and use, to 31 December 1993

230

(3)

Table 7.10. Civil Plutonium balances as declared by states, as of 31 December 1993

233

(2)

Table 7.11. National plutonium balances assuming utility MOX policies are implemented, 1994-2000

235

Figure 7.1. LWR-MOX production at the German Hanau fuel fabrication plant, 1972-92

213

(3)

Figure 7.2. LWR-MOX production at the Belgian Dessel PO fuel fabrication plant, 1986-1995

216

(2)

Figure 7.3. MOX fuel reloads at Electricite de France reactors, 1987-95

218

(8)

Figure 7.4. Projected world LWR-MOX fuel fabrication capacity: committed facilites, 1990-2005

226

(6)

Figure 7.5. Estimated national plutonium balances by ownership and location, 31 December 1993

232

(2)

Figure 7.6. Plutonium consumption forecasts: committed MOX fabrication capacity and Utility MOX plans, 1994-2010

234

(2)

Figure 7.7. Projected world and European/Japanese plutonium surpluses, 1990-2010

236

(2)

8. Civil highly enriched uranium inventories

238

(19)

I. Introduction

238

(1)

II. Civil suppliers of highly enriched uranium

239

(2)

III. Civil reactors using HEU fuels, 1995

241

(1)

IV. Converting to low-enriched uranium fuels

242

(3)

V. Spent fuel take-back and reprocessing of HEU fuels

245

(3)

VI. US exports of highly enriched uranium

248

(5)

VII. Civil inventories of highly enriched uranium

253

Table 8.1. Summary of the distribution of US HEU exports

248

(1)

Table 8.2. United States HEU exports and retransfers for non-Euratom countries

249

(1)

Table 8.3. United States HEU exports and external retransfers for Euration countries

250

(1)

Table 8.4. Amount of US-origin HEU projected to remain overseas

251

(6)

Part IV. Material inventories and production capabilities in the threshold states

257

(138)

9. De facto nuclear weapon states: Israel, India and Pakistan

257

(25)

I. Israel

257

(7)

II. India

264

(7)

III. Pakistan

271

Table 9.1. Estimated plutonium production in the Israeli Dimona reactor, 31 December 1994

262

(1)

Table 9.2. Estimated inventories of Israeli weapons-grade plutonium , at the end of 1994, 1995 and 1999

263

(6)

Table 9.3. Estimated inventories of Indian weapon-grade plutonium, at the end of 1994 and 1995

269

(8)

Table 9.4. Estimated production of weapon-grade uranium at the Pakistani Kahuta centrifuge enrichment plant, 1986-91

277

(3)

Figure 9.1. SPOT image showing a probable plutonium rector complex near Khushab, Pakistan

280

(2)

10. North Korea

282

(27)

I. Introduction

282

(1)

II. An unsafeguarded reactor emerges

282

(1)

III. Intial safeguards declaration

283

(5)

IV. Rector defuelling

288

(7)

V. Plutonium production reactors

295

(8)

VI. Plutonium separation

303

(3)

VII. How much plutonium does North Korea have?

306

(1)

VIII. What about enrichment activities?

307

(1)

IX. Has North Korea built nuclear weapons?

307

(2)

11. A special case: Iraq

309

(42)

I. Introduction

309

(2)

II. The Iraqi nuclear weapon programme

311

(2)

III. Summary of Iraqi fissile material production plans before 1991

313

(4)

IV. The Iraqi enrichment programme

317

(24)

V. Projected indigenously produced weapon-grade uranium inventory for Iraq

341

(1)

VI. The Iraqi plutonium progrmme

342

(2)

VII. The crash programme

344

(5)

VIII. Post-war activities

349

Table 11.1. Selected EMIS separator design specifications

320

(2)

Table 11.2. An R120 seprator deployment schedule for 70 machines, declared by Iraq (but not achieved)

322

(1)

Table 11.3. Actual R120 separator deployment schedule at A1 Tarmiya

323

(15)

Table 11.4. Maximal estimated centrifuge production

338

(3)

Table 11.5. Projected Iraqi weapon-grade uranium inventories

341

(4)

Table 11.6. Iraq's safeguarded fuel

345

Figure 11.1. Map of Iraq showing the approximate locations of the main inspection sites

316

(35)

12. Countries of concern: Iran, Algeria, South Korea and Taiwan

351

(18)

I. Introduction

351

(1)

II. Iran

352

(11)

III. Algeria

363

(2)

IV. South Korea

365

(1)

V. Taiwan

366

(3)

13. Countries backing away from nuclear weapons: Argentina, Brazil and South Africa

369

(26)

I. Introduction

369

(1)

II. Argentina and Brazil

369

(8)

III. South Africa

377

(10)

Table 13.1. Illustrative output of the Y-Plant

387

(8)

Part V. Conclusions

395

(66)

14. Overview of present and future stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium

395

(21)

I. Introduction

395

(1)

II. Investories at the end of 1994

395

(2)

III. Types of inventory

397

(1)

IV. Military inventories in nuclear weapon states

398

(3)

V. Weapon-related inventories and capabilities in countries other than the acknowledged nuclear weapon states

401

(3)

VI. Civil inventories of plutonium and HEU

404

(2)

VII. Material under international safeguards

406

(5)

VII. Possible future trends in plutonium and HEU inventories

411

Table 14.1. Central estimates for civil and military inventories of plutonium and HEU, 31 December 1994

397

(1)

Table 14.2. Central estimates for inventories of plutonium and HEU by type, 31 December 1994

398

(1)

Table 14.3. NWS inventories of highly enriched uranium, after losses and draw-downs, 31 December 1994

399

(1)

Table 14.4. NWS inventories of military plutonium, after losses, 31 December 1994

400

(2)

Table 14.5. Central estimates for current and former de facto nuclear weapon states' inventories of plutonium and HEU, produced for nuclear weapon purposes

402

(1)

Table 14.6. Central estimates for de facto nuclear weapon states' inventories of weapon-grade plutonium and WGU, produced for nuclear weapon purposes

402

(2)

Table 14.7. Civil stocks of plutonium by NPT status, 31 December 1994 (and 1993)

404

(1)

Table 14.8. Civil plutonium separation and use, to 31 December 1994 (and 1993)

405

(3)

Table 14.9. Approximate quantities of plutonium under IAEA safeguards, 31 December 1993

408

(4)

Table 14.10. Projection of cumulative spent-fuel dicharges, plutonium separation and unrecycled stocks, 31 December 1993, 2000 and 2010

412

(2)

Table 14.11. Illustrative inventories of weapon-grade plutonium and HEU inside and outside operational nuclear weapons

414

(2)

15. The control and disposition of fissile materials: the new policy agenda

416

(45)

I. Introduction

416

(2)

II. Two industrial and regulatory systems

418

(3)

III. Contemporary pressures to achieve universality and transparency

421

(3)

IV. Measures against undeclared activities in NNWS parties to the NPT

424

(3)

V. Bilateral initiatives to strengthen controls in the FSU

427

(3)

VI. Extending the multilateral framework for material controls

430

(7)

VII. The disposition of excess plutonium and HEU

437

(7)

VIII. HEU disposition

444

(2)

IX. Plutonium disposition

446

(7)

X. Obstacles to an international disposition strategy

453

(1)

XI. Conclusion: moving towards the framework of control required by complete nuclear disarmament

454

Table 15.1. Illustrative inventories of plutonium available for disposition

443

(2)

Table 15.2. HEU disposition scenarios

445

(2)

Table 15.3. Capacities for disposition through plutonium recycling in power reactors

447

(14)

Appendices

461

(30)

Appendix A. Weapon-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium production

461

(11)

I. Weapon-grade plutonium production

461

(3)

II. Highly enriched uranium

464

Table A.1. Representative conversion factors for reactors producing weapon-grade plutonium

462

(1)

Table A.2. Conversion factors for gas-graphite reactor with natural uranium fuel

463

(1)

Table A.3. Gas-graphite, air-cooled reactor with natural uranium fuel

463

(5)

Table A.4. Overview of principal enrichment technologies

468

(1)

Table A.5. Common examples of Enriched uranium output

469

(1)

Table A.6. Weapon-grade uranium production (93% enriched)

469

(1)

Table A.7. Current activites on uranium sepration and the level of such activities, by country

470

(1)

Table A.8. Commercial enrichment plants

471

Figure A.1. The basic elements of a gaseous-diffusion plant

465

(1)

Figure A.2. A gas centrifuge and a centrifuge rotor

466

(1)

Figure A.3. EMIS configuration

467

(5)

Appendix B. Calculation of plutonium production in power reactors

472

(7)

Table B.1. Plutonium discharge rate by reactor type

473

(6)

Appendix C. Sepration of plutonium from power-reactor fuel at reprocessing plants

479

(7)

Table C.1. Plutonium separation from British Magnox power-rector fuel at B205

479

(1)

Table C.2. Plutonium separated from foreign Magnox fuel at B205

480

(1)

Table C.3. Plutonium separated from Magnox power-reactor fuel at UP1 (France)

481

(1)

Table C.4. Plutonium separated from Magnox power-fuel at UP2 (France)

482

(1)

Table C.5. Plutonium separated from oxide fuel at UP2 (France)

483

(1)

Table C.6. Plutonium separated from oxide fuel at UP3

483

(1)

Table C.7. Plutonium separated from oxide fuel at WAK (Germany)

484

(1)

Table C.8. Plutonium Separated from oxide fuel at Tokai-mura (Japan)

484

(1)

Table C.9. World annual separation of civil plutonium, 1965-2000

485

(1)

Appendix D. Reaserch reactors(>1 MWth) using HEU fuel

486

(5)

Table D.1. US operating reaserch and test reactors with power >1 MWth using HEU Fuel (as of mid-1995)

486

(1)

Table D.2. US-supplied operating research and test reactors with power >1 MWth using HEU (.90%) fuel (as of mid-1995)

487

(1)

Table D.3. Russian operating research and test reactors with power >1 MWth using HEU fuel (as of mid-1995)

488

(1)

Table D.4. Russian-supplied operating research had test reactors with power >1 MWth using HEU fuel (as of mid-1995)

488

(1)

Table D.5. Chinese and Chinese-supplied operating research and test reactors using HEU fuel (as of mid-1995)

489

(2)

Index

491

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Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies

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