Principles of International Politics: People's Power, Preferences, and Perceptions
, by Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce- ISBN: 9781568024233 | 1568024231
- Cover: Paperback
- Copyright: 11/1/1999
Tables, Figures, and Maps | p. ix |
Preface | p. xii |
Foundations of International Politics | p. 1 |
Governing Principles | p. 2 |
Organizational Features of This Book | p. 6 |
The Core Concerns of International Relations | p. 8 |
The Link Between Domestic Politics and International Politics | p. 8 |
Is the State the Central Actor? | p. 11 |
Solving International Relations Puzzles | p. 12 |
Power, Preferences, and Perceptions: The Three Pillars of International Relations | p. 14 |
Self-Interest: The Decisive Motivation for Action | p. 16 |
Summary | p. 20 |
Christopher Columbus and International Relations | p. 22 |
Columbus's Proposal, or Ferdinand and Isabella's Ambition | p. 23 |
Factors That Shape Foreign Policy Choices | p. 24 |
Probability of Success or Failure | p. 24 |
Policy Costs and Political Costs | p. 25 |
Expected Utility of a Policy Compared to Alternative Policies | p. 26 |
Discovering America: An Evaluation of Political Economy and National Security | p. 27 |
The Offer to Portugal | p. 28 |
The Offers to England and France | p. 30 |
The Offer to Spain | p. 30 |
Lessons Suggested by Columbus's Experience | p. 33 |
The Right Policy for One Leader May Be Wrong for Another | p. 34 |
The Importance of Context | p. 35 |
Tools and Solutions: An Illustration of the Use of Decision Theory in the Study of International Relations | p. 38 |
Spain's Expected Utility | p. 39 |
Portugal's Expected Utility | p. 44 |
Game Theory, or Why People Sometimes Choose What They Do Not Like Best | p. 46 |
Summary | p. 54 |
International Politics from a Structural Perspective | p. 56 |
Evaluating Alternative Principles | p. 56 |
Defining the Puzzles of Cooperation and Conflict | p. 58 |
Examples of International Cooperation | p. 58 |
Examples of Conflict and Competition | p. 61 |
Structural Perspectives | p. 63 |
Neorealism | p. 64 |
Some Limitations of Neorealism | p. 70 |
Liberal Theories | p. 73 |
Liberal Theories and the Promotion of Cooperation | p. 79 |
Marxism | p. 90 |
Summary | p. 92 |
International Politics from Group and Decision-Making Perspectives | p. 95 |
The Bureaucratic, or Interest Group, Perspective | p. 95 |
Organizational Roles in Foreign Policy | p. 97 |
Principal-Agent Problems | p. 100 |
Standard Operating Procedures | p. 107 |
Strategic Perspective | p. 110 |
Comparing the Core Perspectives | p. 113 |
Hierarchy Versus Anarchy | p. 115 |
Core Assumptions About Policy and Security Risks | p. 117 |
The Three Perspectives Illustratively Applied to Columbus | p. 127 |
The Columbian Voyages of Discovery: A Neorealist Explanation | p. 127 |
The Columbian Voyages of Discovery: An Interest Group Explanation | p. 128 |
The Columbian Voyages of Discovery: A Strategic Explanation | p. 129 |
Summary | p. 131 |
Evaluating Arguments About International Politics | p. 133 |
Theories As Simplifications of Reality | p. 135 |
What Is a Theory? | p. 136 |
Constructing Theories | p. 138 |
Judging Theories | p. 140 |
The Importance of Logical Consistency | p. 140 |
Truth and Falsity in Assumptions | p. 143 |
The First Principle of Wing-Walking | p. 146 |
The Case Study Method and Testing Theories | p. 152 |
A Standard for Comparing Theories | p. 156 |
Why Do We Need Theories? | p. 157 |
Guidelines for Evaluating Arguments and Evidence: The Scientific Method | p. 161 |
When a Theory Is Wrong | p. 163 |
Scientific Theories Must Be Falsifiable | p. 165 |
Summary | p. 166 |
What Is Power? | p. 167 |
Defining Power | p. 168 |
Methods of Exercising Power | p. 170 |
Persuasion | p. 171 |
Rewards | p. 173 |
Punishments | p. 176 |
Force | p. 181 |
Measuring Power | p. 183 |
The Fungibility of Power | p. 188 |
Projecting Power over Large Distances | p. 193 |
Summary | p. 195 |
Limits to Power | p. 196 |
Power and Military Victory | p. 197 |
Power Can Be Cyclical | p. 199 |
Coordination and Power | p. 202 |
Distribution Problems, Coordination Problems, and Power | p. 204 |
Pure Strategy Equilibria | p. 206 |
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium | p. 208 |
International Organizations: An Alternative to or Reflection of Power? | p. 211 |
Power and Motivation | p. 217 |
Asymmetric Motivation and Costs | p. 225 |
The Exercise of Power | p. 230 |
Summary | p. 234 |
Preferences in International Politics | p. 236 |
Preferred Values and American Foreign Policy: An Illustration | p. 237 |
What Are Preferences? | p. 241 |
Rationality and Preferences | p. 242 |
Preferences and Constrained Choices | p. 243 |
Vending Machines, Preferences, and Decisions | p. 246 |
Ordering Preferences | p. 246 |
Vending Machines and Information Constraints | p. 247 |
Buying Soda As an Expected Utility Problem | p. 248 |
Constrained Choice in International Relations: Some Examples | p. 249 |
Cold War Perceptions As Constraints | p. 251 |
Preferences at Marathon: An Ancient Greek Example | p. 253 |
Social Choice Problems: Is There a National Interest? | p. 257 |
Social Choice and the Cuban Missile Crisis | p. 257 |
Preference Cycles and Structural Realism | p. 263 |
Interest Groups and the Social Choice Problem | p. 264 |
Summary | p. 265 |
Preferences and the Cold War's End | p. 267 |
Social Choice and Spatial Views of Policy | p. 268 |
Predicting Policy Choices: The Median Voter Theorem | p. 271 |
Multidimensional Issues | p. 274 |
Preferences and the End of the Cold War: Win Sets As a Tool for Understanding Policy | p. 276 |
Domestic Soviet Preferences and the End of the Cold War | p. 278 |
Winning Preferences Inside the Soviet Union | p. 278 |
External Pressures to the End of the Cold War | p. 285 |
Summary | p. 289 |
Perceptions in International Affairs | p. 290 |
Perceptions and Reality | p. 291 |
People Form Perceptions All the Time | p. 295 |
What Are Beliefs or Perceptions? | p. 296 |
Perceptions and Information | p. 298 |
Perceptions and Trade Sanctions: An Illustration | p. 299 |
The Trade Sanctioning Game | p. 301 |
The Sanctioning Game and Domestic Politics | p. 310 |
Perception, Repetition, and Reputation | p. 315 |
Summary | p. 317 |
Perceptions, Deterrence, and Terrorism | p. 320 |
Perceptions and Deterrence | p. 321 |
General Deterrence | p. 322 |
Extended Deterrence and Extended Immediate Deterrence | p. 326 |
North Korea's Artful Use of Misconduct | p. 330 |
Perceptions and Deterrence: The Gulf War | p. 333 |
Beliefs About Terrorism | p. 339 |
Summary | p. 345 |
Domestic Politics and International Interactions: The Central Units of Analysis | p. 346 |
The Origins of the State | p. 347 |
International Relations Without the State | p. 353 |
Domestic Politics As an Alternative to the State | p. 354 |
Can Domestic Politics Affect the Definition of the National Interest? | p. 357 |
The 1992 Presidential Election | p. 358 |
Policy Objectives in the 1992 Presidential Election | p. 360 |
Voter Preferences, Voting Blocs, and Electoral Rule | p. 363 |
Alternative Interpretations of the Domestic Politics Example | p. 369 |
Summary | p. 370 |
Domestic Institutions and National Performance | p. 372 |
Universal Political Institutions | p. 374 |
Tools to Remain in Power | p. 377 |
Allocation of Resources and Political Institutions | p. 378 |
Leadership Incentives and Political Institutions | p. 382 |
Winning Coalition Size and Trade Policy | p. 384 |
The Neorealist, Alternative View of Trade Policy | p. 387 |
The Interest Group View of Trade Policy | p. 390 |
Evidence: Winning Coalition Size and Economic Performance | p. 391 |
Winning Coalition Size and National Survival | p. 393 |
Summary | p. 399 |
Alliances | p. 401 |
What Is a Military Alliance? | p. 402 |
The Purpose of Alliances | p. 404 |
When Are Alliances Reliable? | p. 408 |
Predicting the Reliability of Alliances | p. 413 |
Measuring Shared Interests | p. 414 |
Testing the Predictive Model | p. 418 |
Alliances, Coordination, and Competition | p. 420 |
Conflict Among Allies | p. 426 |
Summary | p. 432 |
The Causes of War: Structural Accounts | p. 434 |
Realist Theories of War | p. 435 |
How Well Does Neorealism Do in Explaining War and Instability? | p. 437 |
Bipolarity and Stability | p. 437 |
Bipolarity and Stability: A Second Look | p. 445 |
History and Neorealist Empirical Claims | p. 448 |
Other Neorealist Hypotheses and the Historical Record | p. 452 |
The Survival of Essential and Inessential States | p. 452 |
Uncertainty and War | p. 453 |
Acquiescence and Neorealism | p. 455 |
Balance of Power and Neorealism | p. 456 |
The Power Transition: A Structural Alternative to neorealism | p. 458 |
Examples of International Rules and Norms | p. 460 |
Dissatisfaction, the Status Quo, and War | p. 462 |
Summary | p. 468 |
Strategic Theories of War | p. 469 |
The International Interaction Game and War | p. 470 |
War and Uncertainty: The IIG and Structural Theories | p. 476 |
Weakness and War: Resurrection and Pacific Doves | p. 478 |
Violent Pacific Doves: A Case History | p. 483 |
Arms Races, Deterrence, and War | p. 488 |
Other Hypotheses About War | p. 495 |
The Scapegoat Hypothesis | p. 495 |
Status Inconsistency | p. 497 |
War in Cycles | p. 499 |
Summary | p. 500 |
A Predictive Model of International Affairs | p. 501 |
Logical Foundation of the Model | p. 503 |
Perceptual Analysis | p. 507 |
Estimating the Model | p. 512 |
Why Does This Model Help? | p. 515 |
Intuition Behind the Model's Dynamics | p. 516 |
Developing the Data | p. 518 |
Model Output | p. 522 |
Prediction and International Relations | p. 529 |
Using the Model | p. 534 |
Glossary of Key Terms | p. 536 |
Bibliography | p. 548 |
Subject Index | p. 573 |
Citations of Authors | p. 585 |
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