Public Choice III

Note: Supplemental materials are not guaranteed with Rental or Used book purchases.

ISBN: 9780521894753 | 0521894751
Cover: Paperback
Copyright: 2/17/2003

Rent

(Recommended)

$42.27

Term

Due

Price

Semester

Dec 12

$46.97

Quarter

Sep 4

$44.62

Short Term

Aug 13

$42.27

*This item is part of an exclusive publisher rental program and requires an additional convenience fee. This fee will be reflected in the shopping bag.
Buy Used

Usually Ships in 3-5 Business Days

$54.17
Buy New

Special Order: 1-2 Weeks

$75.16
eBook

Available Instantly

Online: 180 Days

Downloadable: 180 Days

*To support the delivery of the digital material to you, a digital delivery fee of $3.99 will be charged on each digital item.

$66.24*

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule, Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, Rawls's social contract theory and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock.

Preface

xvii

Introduction

(8)

Part I Origins of the state

The reason for collective choice -- allocative efficiency

(35)

Public goods and prisoners' dilemmas

(5)

Coordination games

(2)

Public goods and chickens

(2)

Voluntary provision of public goods with constant returns to scale

(4)

Voluntary provision of public goods with varying supply technologies

(3)

Externalities

(2)

The Coase theorem

(3)

Coase and the core

(2)

A generalization of the Coase theorem

(2)

Does the Coase theorem hold without predefined property rights?

(1)

Externalities with large numbers of individuals

(4)

Externalities with large numbers of individuals -- a second time

(1)

Experimental results in the voluntary provision of public goods

(4)

The reason for collective choice -- redistribution

(23)

Redistribution as insurance

(2)

Redistribution as a public good

(2)

Redistribution to satisfy fairness norms

(2)

Redistribution to improve allocative efficiency

(2)

Redistribution as taking

(3)

Income transfers in the United States

(2)

Redistribution and the distribution of income

(3)

Redistribution to special interests

(6)

Part II Public choice in a direct democracy

The choice of voting rule

(12)

The unanimity rule

(5)

Criticisms of the unanimity rule

(2)

The optimal majority

(2)

A simple majority as the optimal majority

(3)

Majority rule -- positive properties

(49)

Majority rule and redistribution

(5)

Cycling

(1)

The median voter theorem -- one-dimensional issues

(2)

Majority rule and multidimensional issues

(5)

Proof of the median voter theorem -- multidimensional case

(2)

Majority rule equilibria when preferences are not defined in spatial terms

(1)

Proof of extremal restriction -- majority rule theorem

(2)

Restrictions on preferences, on the nature and number of issues, and on the choice of voting rule that can induce equilibria

(7)

Preference homogeneity

(2)

Homogeneous preferences and qualified majority rules

(4)

The relationship between numbers of issues and alternatives and the required majority

103

(1)

Logrolling

104

(4)

Logrolling and cycling

108

(1)

Testing for logrolling

109

(3)

Agenda manipulation

112

(2)

Agenda control in a spatial environment

112

(1)

Agenda control in a divide-the-cake game

113

(1)

Why so much stability?

114

(14)

Issues are indeed of one dimension

115

(1)

Voting one dimension at a time

116

(2)

Logrolling equilibria

118

(2)

Empirical evidence of cycling

120

(3)

Experimental evidence of cycling

123

(5)

Majority rule -- normative properties

128

(19)

Condorcet's jury theorem

128

(5)

May's theorem on majority rule

133

(2)

Proof of May's theorem on majority rule

135

(1)

The Rae-Taylor theorem on majority rule

136

(1)

Assumptions underlying the unanimity rule

137

(1)

Assumptions underlying the two rules contrasted

138

(2)

The consequences of applying the rules to the ``wrong'' issues

140

(4)

Deciding improvements in allocative efficiency via majority rule

140

(3)

Deciding redistribution by unanimity

143

(1)

Conclusions

144

(3)

Simple alternatives to majority rule

147

(12)

The alternative voting procedures defined

147

(1)

The procedures compared -- Condorcet efficiency

148

(3)

The procedures compared -- utilitarian efficiency

151

(1)

The Borda count

152

(4)

Axiomatic properties

152

(2)

The Borda count and the ``tyranny of the majority''

154

(1)

The Borda count and strategic manipulation

155

(1)

Approval voting

156

(1)

Implications for electoral reform

157

(2)

Complicated alternatives to majority rule

159

(23)

The demand-revealing process

160

(9)

The mechanics of the process

160

(8)

Vernon Smith's auction mechanism

168

(1)

Point voting

169

(1)

An explication of the Hylland-Zeckhauser point-voting procedure

170

(4)

Voting by veto

174

(5)

A comparison of the procedures

179

(3)

Exit, voice, and disloyalty

182

(27)

The theory of clubs

183

(3)

Voting-with-the-feet

186

(3)

Global optimality via voting-with-the-feet

189

(5)

Clubs and the core

194

(5)

Voting-with-the-feet: empirical evidence

199

(3)

Voluntary association, allocational efficiency, and distributional equity

202

(2)

The theory of revolution

204

(5)

Part III Public choice in a representative democracy

Federalism

209

(21)

The logic of federalism

209

(4)

The assignment problem

209

(3)

Federalism with geographic representation

212

(1)

Why the size of government may be ``too large'' under federalism

213

(2)

Logrolling

213

(2)

Universalism

215

(1)

Intergovernmental grants under federalism

215

(8)

Intergovernmental grants to achieve Pareto optimality

216

(5)

The empirical evidence on intergovernmental grants

221

(2)

Why the size of government may be ``too large'' and ``too small'' under federalism

223

(4)

The problem of centralization under federalism

227

(3)

Two-party competition -- deterministic voting

230

(19)

Outcomes under two-party democracy

231

(5)

Two-party competition in a constrained policy space

236

(5)

The uncovered set

236

(4)

The uncovered set with high valence issues

240

(1)

Relaxing the assumptions of the Downsian model

241

(2)

Candidates have preferences over policies

241

(1)

Candidates can enter and exit the contests

242

(1)

Testing the median voter hypothesis

243

(3)

Are local public expenditures public or private goods?

246

(3)

Two-party competition -- probabilistic voting

249

(15)

Instability with deterministic voting

249

(3)

Equilibria under probabilistic voting

252

(1)

Normative characteristics of the equilibria

253

(2)

Equilibria with interest groups

255

(2)

An application to taxation

257

(3)

The logic

257

(2)

The evidence

259

(1)

Commentary

260

(4)

Multiparty systems

264

(39)

Two views of representation

264

(1)

Selecting a representative body of legislators

265

(1)

Proportional representation in practice

266

(1)

Electoral rules

266

(5)

The Hare, Droop, Imperiali, d'Hondt, and Sainte-Lague formulas

267

(2)

The single-transferable vote (STV)

269

(1)

Limited voting

270

(1)

Single-nontransferable-vote systems (SNTV)

271

(1)

Electoral rules and the number of parties

271

(5)

Electoral rules and the degree of proportionality

276

(2)

The goals of parties

278

(12)

Coalition theories with a one-dimensional issue space

280

(5)

Coalition theories with two- or more-dimensional issue spaces

285

(1)

The political heart

285

(1)

The dimension-by-dimension median

286

(4)

Cabinet stability

290

(5)

The duration of governments

290

(2)

The death of governments

292

(3)

Summary

295

(1)

Social stability

295

(1)

Strategic voting

296

(2)

Strategic voting under the plurality rule

296

(1)

Strategic voting in multiparty systems

297

(1)

Commentary

298

(5)

The paradox of voting

303

(30)

The rational voter hypothesis

304

(4)

Expected utility maximization

304

(2)

A taste for voting

306

(1)

Voting as a game of cat and mouse

306

(1)

The rational voter as minimax-regret strategist

307

(1)

The rational voter hypothesis: the evidence

308

(12)

The expressive voter hypothesis

320

(2)

The ethical voter hypothesis

322

(3)

Ethical preferences as selfish behavior

325

(1)

The selfish voter

326

(3)

Summary and implications

329

(4)

Rent seeking

333

(26)

The theory of rent seeking

333

(10)

The basic rent-seeking model with a fixed number of players

335

(1)

Diminishing or constant returns, r ≤ 1

336

(1)

Increasing returns with 1 < r ≤ 2

336

(1)

Increasing returns with r > 2

337

(1)

The impact of free entry

337

(1)

Rent seeking with sequential investments

338

(2)

Relaxing the assumptions

340

(1)

Risk-neutrality

340

(2)

Rent seeking among groups

342

(1)

Rent seeking when the probability of winning is not defined logistically

342

(1)

Designing rent-seeking contests

342

(1)

Rent seeking through regulation

343

(4)

Rent seeking and the political process

347

(1)

Rent seeking through tariffs and quotas

348

(6)

The economic effects of tariffs, quotas, and voluntary export restraints

348

(2)

Endogenous protection models

350

(3)

Remaining puzzles

353

(1)

Rent seeking in other governmental activities

354

(1)

How large are the welfare losses from rent seeking?

355

(4)

Bureaucracy

359

(27)

Uncertainty, information, and power

360

(2)

The budget-maximizing bureaucrat

362

(3)

Environment and incentives

362

(1)

The model

363

(2)

Extensions of the model

365

(3)

Alternative institutional assumptions

365

(3)

Bargaining between sponsor and bureau

368

(1)

Alternative behavioral assumptions

368

(3)

The slack-maximizing bureaucrat

368

(2)

The risk-avoiding bureaucrat

370

(1)

Empirical tests

371

(9)

Power of the agenda setter

371

(2)

Cost differences between publicly and privately provided services

373

(7)

The government as Leviathan

380

(4)

Theory

380

(2)

Empirical testing -- government expenditures and taxes

382

(2)

Conclusions

384

(2)

Legislatures and bureaucracies

386

(20)

The Congressional-dominance model

386

(2)

Congressional dominance through administrative structure

386

(2)

Congressional dominance through administrative procedure

388

(1)

The impact of uncertainty and transaction costs

388

(3)

Uncertainty and the locus of responsibility

389

(1)

Uncertainty, transaction costs, and commitment

389

(2)

Congress and the president

391

(8)

The legislature controls the president

391

(2)

Presidential control over the legislature

393

(2)

The problem of deadlocks

395

(4)

Congress, the president, and the judiciary

399

(2)

Adding the judiciary to the model

399

(1)

The goals of the judiciary

399

(2)

Legislative decision making in the European Union

401

(4)

Conclusions

405

(1)

Dictatorship

406

(23)

The origins of dictatorship

407

(2)

The goals of dictators

409

(3)

The consumption of the dictator

409

(2)

Power

411

(1)

Security

411

(1)

The functioning and survival of dictatorships

412

(5)

The utility-maximizing dictator

412

(1)

Tin pots and totalitarians

413

(1)

Selective strategies to survive

414

(2)

The dictator's dilemma

416

(1)

The limits of totalitarianism

417

(1)

The rise and decline of dictatorships

417

(3)

Dictatorship and economic performance

420

(4)

The relative advantages of dictatorship and democracy

420

(2)

The relative economic performance of dictatorships and democracies

422

(2)

A direct test of Wintrobe's model of dictatorship

424

(1)

Conclusions

424

(5)

Part IV Applications and testing

Political competition and macroeconomic performance

429

(43)

Macroeconomic performance and political success

429

(8)

Vote and popularity functions

429

(4)

Whom do voters hold responsible?

433

(4)

Opportunistic politics

437

(3)

With myopic voters

438

(1)

With rational voters

439

(1)

Partisan politics

440

(6)

Partisan politics with retrospective voters

443

(1)

Partisan politics with rational, forward-looking voters

444

(2)

The evidence

446

(13)

Do politicians try to manipulate the macroeconomic environment?

446

(1)

Are there partisan biases?

447

(4)

Which theories fit the data best?

451

(4)

Additional evidence for the Alesina/Rosenthal model

455

(1)

Discussion

456

(3)

Voter behavior

459

(2)

Myopic, retrospective, rational

459

(1)

Sociotropic or egotropic

460

(1)

Politics and inflation

461

(5)

Hypotheses

461

(1)

The facts

462

(3)

Central bank independence

465

(1)

Deficits

466

(3)

The facts

466

(1)

Hypotheses

466

(1)

Fiscal illusion and Keynesian delusions

466

(1)

Political business cycles

467

(1)

Partisan effects

467

(1)

Government paralysis

467

(1)

Budgetary rules

468

(1)

The evidence

468

(1)

Reflections

469

(3)

Interest groups, campaign contributions, and lobbying

472

(29)

The logic of collective action

473

(2)

Models of interest group behavior in politics

475

(6)

Informative campaigning in a Downsian model

476

(1)

Persuasive campaigning in a Downsian model

477

(4)

Empirical studies of the causes and consequences of campaign contributions

481

(15)

Votes for a candidate are a function of campaign expenditures

481

(5)

Determinants of campaign contributions

486

(3)

Determinants of representative voting behavior -- campaign contributions

489

(1)

Determinants of representative voting behavior -- ideology or pure survival

489

(4)

Evaluation

493

(3)

Lobbying

496

(1)

The welfare effects of interest group activities

497

(4)

The size of government

501

(34)

The facts

501

(5)

Explanations for the size and growth of government

506

(24)

The government as provider of public goods and eliminator of externalities

506

(1)

``Taste variables''

507

(2)

Income

509

(1)

The Baumol effect

510

(1)

The government as redistributor of income and wealth

511

(1)

The Meltzer and Richard model

512

(2)

Additional redistribution--growth-of-government hypotheses

514

(1)

Some logical/empirical difficulties with the redistribution--growth-of-government hypothesis

515

(1)

Direct empirical tests of the redistribution--government-size hypothesis

516

(3)

Interest groups and the growth of government

519

(4)

Bureaucracy and the growth of government

523

(4)

Fiscal illusion

527

(2)

Tax elasticity

529

(1)

Conclusions

530

(5)

Government size and economic performance

535

(28)

The welfare losses from taxation

536

(3)

Government size and black market activity

539

(5)

Government size and corruption

544

(1)

Government size and economic productivity

545

(3)

Government size and economic growth

548

(6)

Methodological issues

548

(3)

The evidence

551

(3)

Government activity and the economic decline of nations

554

(5)

The logic

554

(2)

Empirical evidence

556

(3)

Conclusions

559

(4)

Part V Normative public choice

Social welfare functions

563

(19)

The Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function

563

(5)

Axiomatic social welfare functions

568

(10)

Fleming's social welfare function

568

(1)

Harsanyi's social welfare function

569

(2)

Two criticisms of Harsanyi's social welfare function

571

(1)

Should individual attitudes toward risk count?

571

(1)

Can individuals agree on a value for W?

572

(3)

Ng's social welfare function

575

(1)

Nash's and other multiplicative social welfare functions

576

(2)

What form of social welfare function is best?

578

(4)

The impossibility of a social ordering

582

(15)

Logic of the proof

583

(2)

Relaxing the postulates

585

(7)

Transitivity

586

(3)

Unrestricted domain

589

(1)

Independence of irrelevant alternatives

590

(2)

Strategy-proof social welfare functions

592

(3)

Implications for public choice

595

(2)

A just social contract

597

(18)

The social contract

598

(1)

The two principles of justice

599

(3)

Extensions of the theory to other political stages

602

(1)

Critique of the Rawlsian social contract

603

(6)

The social contract

603

(4)

The two principles of justice

607

(2)

Experimental evidence

609

(1)

Two utilitarian defenses of the maximin principle

609

(3)

Maximin as a means to obtain compliance

609

(2)

Maximin as a redistribution principle

611

(1)

The social contract as a constitution

612

(3)

The constitution as a utilitarian contract

615

(28)

The constitutional context

616

(1)

The two-action case

617

(2)

The constitutional contract

619

(5)

Optimal collective action with only identity uncertainty

620

(2)

Optimal collective action with identity and numbers uncertainty

622

(2)

Optimal collective action with identity, numbers, and payoff uncertainty

624

(1)

Symmetric and asymmetric bans and obligations

624

(1)

Continuous actions with interdependent utilities

625

(2)

Decision-making costs

627

(4)

Prisoners' dilemmas

628

(3)

Direct conflicts

631

(1)

Rights and obligations

631

(3)

Constitutions: contracts or conventions?

634

(5)

Constitutions as contracts

634

(2)

Constitutions as conventions

636

(1)

Discussion

637

(2)

Conclusions regarding two-stage theories of social choice

639

(1)

From the normative, two-stage theory of constitutions to hypothesis testing

640

(3)

Liberal rights and social choices

643

(14)

The theorem

643

(1)

Resolving the paradox

644

(6)

Rights over Pareto

644

(2)

Pareto trades of actions

646

(2)

Pareto trades of rights

648

(2)

Rights over social states versus rights over actions

650

(1)

Liberal rights and obligations

651

(1)

Constitutional rights and liberal rights

652

(5)

Part VI What have we learned?

Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics?

657

(18)

The failures of rational actor models of politics

658

(1)

The rational choice approach to modeling

659

(3)

The prediction of cycling

662

(1)

The predictions of spatial models

663

(3)

Predicting voting and free-riding

666

(2)

Can public choice contribute to the positive study of political institutions?

668

(2)

Has public choice contributed anything to the normative study of political institutions?

670

(1)

Conclusions

671

(4)

Allocation, redistribution, and public choice

675

(8)

References

683

(66)

Name index

749

(14)

Subject index

763

Please wait while the item is added to your bag...

FREE SHIPPING

Rent More, Save More! Use code: BBRENTAL

5% off 1 book, 7% off 2 books, 10% off 3+ books

Public Choice III

Summary

Table of Contents

Supplemental Materials

FREE SHIPPING

Rent More, Save More! Use code: BBRENTAL

5% off 1 book, 7% off 2 books, 10% off 3+ books

Public Choice III

Summary

Table of Contents

Supplemental Materials

Digital License