Reason and Explanation A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism

Reason and Explanation develops a novel explanationist account of epistemic justification. Poston argues that the explanatory virtues provide all the materials necessary for a plausible account of justified belief. The justification of a subject's belief consists in the explanatory virtues of the entire set of the subject's beliefs in comparison with other sets of beliefs she could have. Poston's argument for explanatory coherentism involves a defense of the epistemic value of background beliefs, the development of a novel framework view of reasons, and the articulation of a mentalist, evidentialist account of explanatory coherentism. Poston also argues against foundationalist attempts to ground facts about justification in sense experience. He extends the argument against foundationalism by examining how a priori justification consists in one's overall explanatory position. Finally, Poston articulates a compatiblist position regarding the relationship between inference to the best explanation and Bayesianism.

Ted Poston is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of South Alabama, USA. His primary areas of research is epistemology and philosophy of religion. He has written many articles in journals such as American Philosophical Quarterly, Dialectica, Episteme, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenology Research, Res Philosophica, and The Southern Journal of Philosophy.

Series Editors' Preface
Preface
1. Introduction
2. Epistemic Conservatism
3. Reasons without First Philosophy
4. Explanation and Justification
5. BonJour and the Myth of the Given
6. Is Foundational a Priori Justification Indispensable?
7. Bayesian Explanationism
Index