Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind

Joshua May is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. He obtained his PhD in Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Before arriving in Birmingham, he taught for two years at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. His research is primarily at the intersection of science and ethics, with recent publications appearing in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Cognition, Journal of Medical Ethics, Philosophical Studies, and Synthese.

Introduction
1. Empirical Pessimism
Part A: Moral Judgement and Knowledge
2. The Limits of Emotion
3. Reasoning Beyond Consequences
4. Defending Moral Judgment
5. The Difficulty of Moral Knowledge
Part B: Moral Motivation and Virtue
6. Beyond Self-Interest
7. The Motivational Power of Moral Beliefs
8. Freeing Reason from Desire
9. Defending Virtuous Motivation
Conclusion
10. Cautious Optimism