Right Belief and True Belief

The most important questions in life are questions about what we should do and what we should believe. The first kind of question has received considerable attention by normative ethicists, who search for a complete systematic account of right action. This book is about the second kind of question.

Right Belief and True Belief starts by defining a new field of inquiry named 'normative epistemology' that mirrors normative ethics in searching for a systematic account of right belief. The book then lays out and defends a deeply truth-centric account of right belief called `truth-loving epistemic consequentialism.' Truth-loving epistemic consequentialists say that what we should believe (and what credences we should have) can be understood in terms of what conduces to us having the most accurate beliefs (credences). The view straight-forwardly vindicates the popular intuition that epistemic norms are about getting true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs, and it coheres well with how scientists, engineers, and statisticians think about what we should believe. Many epistemologists have rejected similar views in response to several persuasive objections, most famously including trade-off and counting-blades-of-grass objections. Right Belief and True Belief shows how a simple truth-based consequentialist account of epistemic norms can avoid these objections and argues that truth-loving epistemic consequentialism can undergird a general truth-centric approach to many questions in epistemology.

Daniel J. Singer is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania, where he also holds a secondary appointment as an Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics in the Wharton School of Business. Singer employs both traditional philosophical methodology and innovative formal research techniques using agent-based computer models. As the author of over two dozen articles and book chapters, most of his work is about understanding what beliefs we should have, including questions in epistemology, the nature of normativity in ethics and epistemology, and social philosophy (focusing specifically on the epistemic impacts of diversity and polarization).

Introduction

Chapter 1: Normative Epistemology

Chapter 2: Truth-Loving Epistemic Consequentialism and Trade-offs

Chapter 3: On Specific Trade-off Objections

Chapter 4: On Veritism and Promoting the Epistemic Good

Chapter 5: Consequentialism and Epistemic Utility Theory

Chapter 6: On Racist Beliefs and Moral Encroachment

Chapter 7: Consequentialist Epistemology

Bibliography