The Road To Maastricht Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union

, by Dyson, Kenneth; Featherstone, Kevin

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ISBN: 9780198296386 | 019829638X
Cover: Paperback
Copyright: 1/20/2000

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The negotiations for economic and monetary union in the European Union represented a massive change for Europe and for the world. This book identifies why the historical agreement at Maastricht in December 1991 was possible and how the agreement was made. It examines the motives that inspired EC political leaders, the strategies that they pursued, and the institutions of the EC which were used to achieve monetary union.

List of Abbreviations

xxi

Introduction: An Historical Overview

(11)

Making Sense of the EMU Negotiations

(50)

EMU Negotiations as a `Core Executive' Activity

(2)

Conceptualizing the Negotiations: Structural, Strategic, and Cognitive Dimensions

(4)

EMU as a Prestructured Negotiating Process

(14)

EMU Negotiations as a Strategic Process: Power and Interests

(14)

EMU Negotiations as a Cognitive Process: Ideas and Knowledge

(15)

EMU, the Mitterrand Presidency, and French Political Tradition

(37)

The Role of Inherited Beliefs and Historical Memories

(3)

The Tradition of the Republican State and EMU

(4)

French Leadership of Europe: The Primacy to Construction Europeenne

(4)

The Franc Stable: The Tresor and the Finance Inspectorate

(8)

Rebalancing Power in the International Monetary System: The Search for Economic Independence from the USA and the Problem of Asymmetry

(2)

Domestic Economic-Policy Traditions and EMU

(14)

The Political Problem of Reconciling Domestic and International Interests in EMU: The Legacy of Barre, Giscard d'Estaing, and Pompidou

(25)

EMU and Gold in the 1960s

100

(2)

Pompidou, the Hague Summit, and the Werner Report: The Turning-Point of 1968

102

(10)

The Fourcade Plan and the Reform of the `Snake': The Giscard Presidency

112

(2)

`A New Bretton Woods for Europe': Giscard, the EMS, and EMU

114

(10)

Challenging the `D-Mark Zone': Agenda-Setting on EMU and the Strategy of Indirection under Mitterrand, 1981--1989

124

(78)

Mitterrand's Beliefs about Europe and Strategy for EMU

125

(6)

Mitterrand's Governing Style and EMU

131

(3)

The EMS, EMU, and Construction Europeenne: The Domestic and International Context, 1981-1983

134

(3)

Finance Ministry Power under Delors: The `Tournant' of 1982, Stage 2 of the EMS, and Defining French Objectives for EMS Reform

137

(5)

Mitterrand and the Political Management of the March 1983 ERM Crisis

142

(5)

Reconciling Socialism to Life in the ERM: Delors, Beregovoy, and the Franc Stable, 1983-1986

147

(4)

EMU and the Relance Europeenne: Mitterrand, the Dumas Memorandum, and the IGC of 1985

151

(5)

The ERM and EMU under the Cohabitation, 1986-1988: The Balladur Memorandum, and the Dumas-Genscher Relationship

156

(16)

Mitterrand, Beregovoy, and the Delors Committee

172

(15)

Activating Elysee Leadership of EMU after Madrid: The French Presidency, the Guigou Group, and the Conversion of Beregovoy

187

(15)

French Strategy for the IGC: Making EMU Irreversible

202

(54)

Presidential Leadership after Strasbourg: EMU, Political Union, and the Domestic Political Context

204

(5)

The Bureaucratic Politics of EMU in Paris: Mitterrand, Beregovoy, and the Banque de France

209

(7)

The French Negotiating Team and the Structure of Core Executive Co-ordination: The Elysee, Dumas, and Guigou

216

(3)

Bureaucratic Politics and the Core Executive in the EMU Negotiations: The Finance Ministry and Interministerial Co-ordination

219

(2)

Squaring the Council of Ministers: Preparing the Paper `Progress towards EMU'

221

(3)

Negotiating the French Draft Treaty on EMU: A `Third Route' to EMU?

224

(7)

Managing Bilateral Relations during the IGC

231

(5)

Pursuing French Objectives in the IGC

236

(9)

The `End-Game': Achieving `Irreversibility'

245

(11)

EMU, the Kohl Chancellorship, and German Political Tradition: The Legacy of Adenauer and Erhard

256

(30)

Kohl as `Grandson of Adenauer'

257

(3)

EMU: Between European Unification and the Social Market Economy

260

(6)

Adenauer's Legacy and EMU: The Foreign Ministry and Chancellor Leadership

266

(8)

Erhard's Legacy and EMU: The Ordo-liberal Economics Establishment and Stability Culture

274

(8)

German Negotiating Style: The `Rule-Based' Approach

282

(4)

The Political Problem of Reconciling Domestic and International Interests in EMU: The Legacy of Schiller and Schmidt

286

(20)

The Legacy of Schiller: The Werner Group, `Coronation Theory', and Belief in Parallelism

289

(4)

The Consolidation of Power of the Ordo-liberal Coalition on EMU

293

(1)

Schmidt as Finance Minister: The Changing Domestic Context of EMU

294

(2)

Otmar Emminger, the Bundesbank, and EMU

296

(2)

Schmidt and the Birth of the EMS: Challenging the Ordo-liberals

298

(3)

Schmidt's Legacy

301

(1)

The Second Stage of the EMS in 1982

302

(4)

Negotiating EMU around the German Model: Agenda-Setting under the Kohl Chancellorship, 1982--1989

306

(64)

Kohl's Beliefs about EMU and Governing Style

307

(6)

Stoltenberg and Finance Ministry Power over the EMS and EMU

313

(2)

Saving the EMS: Stoltenberg, Kohl, and the March ERM Crisis

315

(1)

Fighting off Delors's Trojan Horse: EMU and the Single European Act

316

(4)

Challenges to Develop the EMS: New Strains and Tensions

320

(6)

Genscher as `Policy Enterpreneur' and Kohl's Political Strategy for the Hanover European Council

326

(16)

Seizing the Initiative: Pohl, the Bundesbank, and Strategy for the Delors Committee

342

(8)

The Struggle for Control of German Strategy after the Delors Report: The Timetable Issue and Madrid

350

(4)

Policy Reflection in the Shadows of the Delors Report, Madrid, and the `German Question'

354

(9)

Genscher, German Unification, and the Date of the IGC

363

(1)

Kohl's Strategy for the Strasbourg European Council

364

(2)

After Strasbourg: Kohl's Ownership of the EMU Project

366

(4)

German Strategy for the IGC

370

(82)

The German Approach to the IGC Negotiations: Key Themes

371

(4)

Kohl's Use of Metaphor and Historical Narrative to Reframe EMU

375

(3)

Finance Ministry Strategy for the IGC

378

(8)

Bundesbank Strategy for the IGC

386

(8)

Germany and the Italian EC Presidency: Stage 2, the Organization of the IGC, and Political Union

394

(8)

Putting the German Negotiating Team Together and Preparing German Bargaining Positions: From Rome 2 to the German Draft Treaty on EMU

402

(10)

Franco-German Relations after the German Draft Treaty: The Top-Secret Bilaterals

412

(5)

Kohl, the Chancellor's Office, and the IGC on EMU

417

(6)

Kohler and the IGC

423

(11)

The Bundesbank and the IGC

434

(3)

The EMU `End-Game': Saving the Treaty

437

(11)

Conclusion: `D-Mark Patriotism', `Coronation Theory', and Trusting the French

448

(4)

Italian Policy Beliefs about EMU: External Discipline versus Internal Protection

452

(33)

The Need for a Vincolo Esterno: Institutional Weakness at Home

455

(4)

The Tesoro and Sarcinelli

459

(2)

The Banca d'Italia

461

(1)

External Discipline versus Internal Protection: The Two Souls of Faust

462

(7)

Policy Learning: Defer to the Market, Stay in Serie A

469

(2)

From Werner to the EMS

471

(3)

Italy and the Birth of the EMS

474

(5)

Divorce, Italian Style

479

(2)

Financial Market Liberlization

481

(4)

Framing EMU as a New Vincolo Esterno: Policy Enterpreneurs, Co-ordination, and Reflection in Italy, 1988--1990

485

(23)

Policy Entrepreneurs and the Core Executive: The Technocratic Opportunity

486

(5)

Andreotti and EMU: Guile Displaced by Technical Realities

491

(2)

De Michelis and EMU: No Time for Accountancy

493

(2)

Carli and EMU: Breaking Free of Andreotti?

495

(1)

EMU Co-ordination and the `Gang of Three'

495

(2)

Italy and the Emerging EMU Agenda

497

(1)

Public Opinion and Europe

498

(1)

Italian Economists and EMU: A Rationale for Reform

499

(1)

From Basle--Nyborg to Hanover: Policy in the Shadow of the D-Mark

500

(2)

The Devout Courtier: Padoa-Schioppa and the Delors Committee

502

(1)

The Genial Architect: Ciampi, Institutionalism, and the Delors Committee

502

(3)

From the Delors Report to Rome 1: Sustaining EMU

505

(3)

Italy and the IGC: Negotiating External Discipline, Avoiding Exclusion, 1990--1991

508

(26)

Avoiding Relegation from Europe's First Division

510

(2)

Maximalist Ambitions: Italian Negotiating Positions

512

(2)

Negotiating Successes: Andreotti, Vattani, and Rome 1: Padoa-Schioppa's Formula for `Automaticity'

514

(4)

Negotiating Failures: Maximalist Dreams Scuppered

518

(6)

Of their Own Free Will?

524

(1)

Let the British Take It or Leave It

525

(1)

Framing the Wider Package

526

(2)

Strategy and Coalitions

528

(2)

Any Deal is Better than No Deal?

530

(4)

The British Political Tradition and EMU: Policy Legacies, Beliefs, and Co-ordination

534

(67)

The Trouble with Europe

534

(2)

Lessons from History? Policy Beliefs and Strategy on European Monetary Co-operation, 1970--1990

536

(21)

Policy Beliefs and the Structure of the Debate on Europe

557

(25)

The Domestic Policy Process on EMU

582

(19)

Resisting EMU: Political Strategy, Policy Entrepreneurship, and Policy Reflection before the IGC

601

(43)

Caught of Guard: Hanover and the Delors Committee

602

(10)

Britain's Belated Alternatives: The Competing Currency and the Hard ECU Plans

612

(20)

The Rome 1 Debacle

632

(2)

As a Window at Home Opens, That in Europe Closes

634

(4)

The Hard ECU and the IGC

638

(6)

John Major: Between the Party and the IGC

644

(47)

Major, the Party Leader

645

(2)

Major and the Negotiating Strategy in the IGC

647

(2)

This Far and No Further: The Negotiating Mandate

649

(28)

British Strategy and Coalition-Building in the IGC

677

(5)

On the Margins, but Tied to the Core: Britain's Exit from the ERM

682

(4)

Conclusion: Inevitable Heartache or Avoidable Failure?

686

(5)

Jacques Delors as Policy Entrepreneur and Ingenieur of the EMU Negotiations: Agenda-Setting and Oiling the Wheels

691

(55)

The Informal Presidentilization of EMU: Delors's Beliefs and Strategy

695

(11)

Delors as Animateur, Ingenieur, and Entrepreneur: Securing the Chair of the Delors Committee

706

(7)

Achieving a Unanimous Report: Delors as Ingenieur of Agreement in the Delors Committee

713

(7)

Preparing for the IGC on EMU: Delors in Retreat

720

(6)

The Role and Impact of Delors and the Commission in the IGC

726

(14)

Delors's Historical Contribution

740

(6)

Conclusions and Reflections

746

(56)

What have we Learnt about the EMU Negotiations?

747

(4)

Why was an EMU Agreement Possible?

751

(7)

The Nature and Patterns of Coalition Building

758

(12)

Theorizing about Maastricht

770

(4)

Theoretical Implications of the Study

774

(9)

How Successful Was the EMU Agreement?

783

(16)

Some Final Comments: `Locked' into a Politics of Deflation

799

(3)

Appendix: List of Interviewees

802

(7)

References

809

(18)

Name Index

827

(12)

Index

839

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The Road To Maastricht Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union

Summary

Author Biography

Table of Contents

Supplemental Materials