Security and Game Theory: Algorithms,

Global threats of terrorism, drug-smuggling, and other crimes have led to a significant increase in research on game theory for security. Game theory provides a sound mathematical approach to deploy limited security resources to maximize their effectiveness. A typical approach is to randomize security schedules to avoid predictability, with the randomization using artificial intelligence techniques to take into account the importance of different targets and potential adversary reactions. This book distills the forefront of this research to provide the first and only study of long-term deployed applications of game theory for security for key organizations such as the Los Angeles International Airport police and the U.S. Federal Air Marshals Service. The author and his research group draw from their extensive experience working with security officials to intelligently allocate limited security resources to protect targets, outlining the applications of these algorithms in research and the real world. The book also includes professional perspectives from security experts Erroll G. Southers; Lieutenant Commander Joe DiRenzo III, U.S. Coast Guard; Lieutenant Commander Ben Maule, U.S. Coast Guard; Erik Jensen, U.S. Coast Guard; and Lieutenant Fred S. Bertsch IV, U.S. Coast Guard.

Acknowledghment	p. xiii
Introductionand Overview of Security Games	p. 1
Introduction	p. 1
Motivation: Security Games	p. 3
Overview of Part II: Applications of Security Games	p. 9
Overview of Part III: Algorithmic Advances to Achieve Scale-up in Security Games	p. 11
Part IV: Toward the Future	p. 17
Summary	p. 23
Security Experts' Perspectives
Lax - Terror Target: The History, the Reason, the Countermeasure	p. 27
Introduction	p. 27
A Brief History of Significant Events	p. 27
Terrorism and the Economic Significance of the Aviation Domain	p. 34
Aviation Security	p. 36
Lax Terror History	p. 37
Rand Study	p. 39
Los Angeles World Airports Police	p. 41
Terrorist Operational Planning Cycle	p. 44
CREATE Pilot Project	p. 45
Summary	p. 49
Maritime Transportation System Security and the Use of Game Theory: A Perfect Match to Address Operational and Tactical Concerns	p. 51
Deployed Applications
Deployed ARMOR Protection: The Application of a Game-Theoretic Model for Security at the Los Angeles International Airport	p. 67
Introduction	p. 67
Related Work	p. 69
Security Domain Description	p. 70
Approach	p. 72
System Architecture	p. 76
Design Challenges	p. 80
Experimental Results	p. 81
Summary	p. 86
IRIS - A Tool for Strategic Security Allocation in Transportation Networks	p. 88
Introduction	p. 88
Federal Air Marshal Service	p. 91
Background	p. 92
System Architecture	p. 96
Major Challenges	p. 98
Organizational Acceptance	p. 100
Experimental Results	p. 102
Summary	p. 104
GUARDS: Game-Theoretic Security Allocation on a National Scale	p. 107
Introduction	p. 107
Background	p. 109
National Deployment Challenges	p. 111
System Architecture	p. 118
Evaluation	p. 119
Lessons in Transitioning Research into Practice	p. 124
Related Work and Summary	p. 125
Efficient Algorithms for Massive Security Games
Coordinating Randomized Policies for Increasing the Security of Agent Systems	p. 131
Introduction	p. 131
Related Work	p. 134
Randomization with No Adversary Mode	p. 135
Randomization Using a Partial Adversary Model	p. 140
Experimental Results	p. 147
Conclusions and Policy Implications	p. 153
Computing Optimal Randomized Resource Allocations for Massive Security Games	p. 156
Introduction	p. 156
Game-Theoretic Modeling of Security Games	p. 157
Motivating Domains	p. 159
A Compact Representation for Multiple Resources	p. 161
Exploiting Payoff Structure	p. 165
Scheduling and Resource Constraints	p. 169
Experimental Evaluation	p. 171
Conclusion	p. 175
Security Games with Arbitrary Schedules: A Branch and Price Approach	p. 177
Introduction	p. 177
Spars	p. 178
Aspen Solution Approach and Related Work	p. 180
Aspen Column Generation	p. 181
Improving Branching and Bounds	p. 84
Experimental Results	p. 186
Conclusion	p. 89
Future Research
Effective Solutions for Real-World Stackelberg Games: When Agents Must Deal with Human Uncertainties	p. 193
Introduction	p. 193
Background	p. 195
Robust Algorithms	p. 198
Experiments	p. 204
Summary and Related Work	p. 211
Approximation Methods for Infinite Bayesian Stackelberg Games: Modeling Distributional Payoff Uncertainty	p. 213
Introduction	p. 213
Related Work	p. 214
Bayesian Security Games	p. 215
Solution Methods	p. 219
Experimental Evaluation	p. 224
Conclusion	p. 23
Stackelberg versus Nash in Security Games: Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness	p. 233
Introduction	p. 233
Motivating Domains	p. 235
Definitions and Notation	p. 235
Equilibria in Security Games	p. 238
Multiple Attacker Resources	p. 248
Experimental Results	p. 250
Summary and Related Work	p. 252
Evaluating Deployed Decision-Support Systems for Security: Challenges, Analysis, and Approaches	p. 254
Introduction	p. 254
Background: ARMOR and IRIS	p. 255
Formulating the Problem	p. 257
Evaluating Case Studies	p. 261
Goals for Security Decision-Support Systems	p. 272
Types of Evaluation	p. 274
Related Work	p. 278
Conclusions	p. 281
Short Bios
Author Bios	p. 287
References	p. 297
Index	p. 311
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Security and Game Theory: Algorithms, Deployed Systems, Lessons Learned

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