The State of Strategic Intelligence, June 1941

Merriam Press Military Monograph 38. Fifth Edition (March 2012). One of the least explicable incidents of the Second World War was the almost total surprise-strategic, operational, and tactical-that Germany achieved over the Soviet Union at the start of the Barbarossa campaign. Viewed in modern terms, in which the Soviet Union's intelligence apparatus is sometimes viewed as all-seeing and all-knowing, the need to know why this failure occurred becomes all the more interesting. Much of the difficulty in accurately investigating the matter lies in the almost visceral abhorrence the USSR had toward seriously analyzing many of the events which occurred during the disastrous period between 22 June and 1 October 1941. Smith, an expert in intelligence matters, carefully documents the amazing story behind the German success at surprising the Soviets, and the latter's complete failure of their intelligence apparatus. Contents: * Introduction; * The First Week, 1-7 June 1941; * The Second Week, 8-14 June 1941; * The Third Week, 15-21 June 1941; * Some Speculations and Conclusions.