The Things We Do and Why We Do Them

The Things We Do and Why We Do Themargues against the common assumption that there is a kind of thing called 'action' which all reason-giving explanation of action are geared towards. Sandis explains why all theories concerned with the form which any such explanation must take fail from the outset, and shows how various debates on the nature of so-called motivating reasons only arise because the participants all share a number of mistaken views which follow from the basic assumption under attack. In so doing, he urges philosophers and psychologists alike to stop asking whether the explanation of action is causal, and to focus instead on its multifarious objects. This book will appeal to anyone interested in motivational psychology, the reasons for which we act, and the philosophy of explanation in general.

CONSTANTINE SANDIS is a lecturer in philosophy at Oxford Brookes University. He is the author of Davidson's Philosophy of Action (Continuum, forthcoming) and is currently editing a collection of essays on action explanation, forthcoming with Palgrave Macmillan.